


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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2484



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9 February 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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BRIEFS

AGRICULTURE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED--There have been differences of opinion in the agricultural talks between Israel and Egypt--not on matters of agriculture, there was agreement on this, but about the place for the signing of the agreement. The Egyptians wanted to sign in Tel Aviv; the Israelis in the ministry of agriculture in Egypt. Finally the agreement was signed in Jerusalem this noon. Our correspondent Tzvi (Zerahiya) reports: In the framework of the agreement, a decision was made on the continuation of the cooperation between Israel and Egypt in the development of various projects in the field of veterinary surgery and protection of plants. The two countries will also take part in the development of a farm in the Nile Delta region, a project that is to begin next month, with the other activities being carried out during the coming year. This is how the head of the Israeli delegation to the talks, Shmu'el Pohoryles, explains the agreement: [begin recording] We signed an agreement for the exchange of scientists, mainly soil and water scientists, who will meet six times in the coming year, mainly to discuss salinity, research in the field of salinity, in which research workers from the Vulcan Institute and our friends from Cairo will take part and projects for the development of barren areas and the exchange of agricultural technology. [end recording] Israel wants Egypt to give it information in the field of medicinal herbs, spices and perfume plants and there is an Israeli delegation now in Egypt to discuss the matter. [Text] [TA141724 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 14 Jan 82]

CSO: 4423/74

BRIEFS

TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY RECEIVE GUNBOATS, TRAINING--The terrorists have recently been equipped with gunboats and have positioned heavy cannons and radar stations along the Lebanese coast, apparently in preparation for an operation against Israeli navy ships. The gunboats, supplied to the terrorists by Libya, are presently in Syria, where the terrorists are training in them with the aid of the Syrians, the [Israeli military] weekly BAMAHAANE notes. Among other things, the terrorists have positioned 130-mm caliber artillery along the coast. [Text] [TA271050 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 27 Jan 82 p 8]

CSO: 4423/73

NEED FOR CLOSER COOPERATION IN VIEW OF TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT EMPHASIZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 228, 14-20 Sep 81 p 20

[Article by 'Ali Hashim: "Aden Tripartite Alliance Arouses the Cooperation Council; New Concept for Unified Defense Plan in the Gulf"]

[Text] The tripartite alliance, concluded in Aden between the PDRY, Ethiopia and the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, has imposed itself on the Arab Gulf region and turned into an important item at the meeting of the area foreign ministers held in Ta'if last week, after having had been an isolated incident which provoked little interest.

The Sultanate of Oman, in cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, insisted on not letting this incident pass as if nothing had happened, because it is aimed at the Gulf first, oil second, and thirdly control of navigation, especially in the Red Sea through the Bab al-Mandab. Instead, the GCC foreign ministers went further than that. They raised it as a principal matter, and preferred not to submit it to the Arab summit, as happened with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's plan, pertaining to peace in the Middle East, for several reasons including:

Completion of an investigation to determine the reasons for establishing this alliance, its goals, and the strategic purpose for it, as well as what the Soviets want to gain through the alliance of three regimes that follow Moscow's policies and that have concluded friendship and cooperation treaties with it, with the exception of the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, whose president will most likely conclude such an agreement some day.

Several participants in the Ta'if meetings expressed their belief that Libya's participation in the alliance was only to give it an Arab cover, and to provide its two allies, South Yemen and Ethiopia, with Soviet arms surplus to Libya's needs or directly from the Soviet Union, and with Libyan oil.

Those diplomats say that the alliance's leadership will attempt to expand it to include other Arab and African nations. Pressure will be put on the Yemeni Arab Republic, i.e., North Yemen, Djibouti, and others, in order to encircle Somalia on the one hand, and to create a front hostile to the Sultanate of Oman on the other. However, Gulf officials are now striving to take steps to prevent something like that from happening. Saudi Arabia is playing a direct role in that, in view of the relations binding it to the regime in Sana' and the assistance that it gives to the Republic of Djibouti, which is basically bound to a military protocol with France, signed on the eve of its independence, before its membership in the Arab League was announced.

The first results of the announcement of the alliance, as one of the regional foreign ministers declared, was to put an end to the mediation that both Kuwait and the UAE were attempting between Aden and Muscat. This mediation has been unsuccessful because the Aden officials would not accept renouncing their alliance with the Soviets and abolishing their privileges in using bases on South Yemen islands, and in ports and bases.

The minister told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI that Kuwait and the UAE have expressed their readiness to resume their good offices if the GCC authorizes that, and if some hope for its success is perceived.

Fear in Sana'

The second result from the alliance's establishment was North Yemen's fear of increasing Soviet presence in the south, where the socialist regime in Aden is, and in the west across the Red Sea in Ethiopia, including the arrival of the Libyan regime in the region, carrying the smell of revolution which moderate regimes in the Horn of Africa area dislike.

Gulf officials expect that the unity talks between the two Yemens will stop, even if just temporarily, until the facts of the new storm become clear, and the goals and pursuits of the alliance are clarified, and whether these pursuits will be limited merely to words or whether they will be translated into deeds, including embracing the secret, revolutionary organizations in the area, and arming them again to carry out operations that threaten stability and security, under the pretext of "combatting imperialism and reaction and striking at American interests."

Return to Security

So far, the clear positive factor of the alliance is that the Gulf states have perceived that they will not be left alone. Whenever one international party talks about the importance of the region and the need to defend it, another international party takes a countermeasure, because it in turn smells the odor of oil.

Talk about the rapid intervention force has disappeared from the stage for a while and has been replaced by the specter of the Soviets behind the establishment of this new bloc, which owes its political allegiance to them, if not just ideologically. This new development that imposed itself on the Ta'if meetings will impose itself once more on the next Gulf summit in Riyadh, the headquarters of the GCC. The discussion there will not be confined to policy and the new axis; on the contrary, it will be a basic look into the question of the Gulf and its security, and ways of maintaining its stability. Accordingly, they will go back to what was discussed at the first Gulf summit in Abu Dhabi a few months ago, especially those things relating to security, the plans and working papers that were submitted. Once again there will be a return to the Omani, Saudi and other concepts for defining a unified defense plan in which the area nations can participate and bring to implementation, because the pretext that some factions in the Abu Dhabi conference adhered to, to the effect that the region was remote from dangers, has collapsed with the establishment of the new bloc. This gives an indication that the major powers remaining silent for a while does not mean that their silence is forever. It also does not mean that they will not take action and implement their plans. This is the Soviets' way, who only

talk after they have implemented, and whose words only come in response to a question about what they have done.

The new concept of the security plan in the Gulf is still a concept so far, except for some officials who have enveloped it in complete secrecy and who are very careful not to bring it up. This is not just because of caution, but rather, it is so as not to unilaterally impose a viewpoint. The participation of all regional officials in consultation is required, and then to come forth with a complete, comprehensive agreement about a matter which a senior Gulf official says was the foundation, or rather, the reason for establishing the GCC. As for talk about economy, industry and culture, that is just doing something that is already being done.

The primary Gulf problem, as the official added, is fundamentally guaranteeing the stability of the region, keeping it remote from international disputes, and consequently, continuing to extract energy and export it to the world.

The Ministerial Council meetings in Ta'if passed without adequate media coverage this time, because the incidents in Iran grabbed all their attention. However, the Supreme Council meetings, which is composed of the heads of the Gulf states, will be the object of interest to observers concerned with the region, because they will be concentrated on the true basics of Gulf cooperation, and will clarify its goals and the basic purpose for its existence.

7005

CSO: 4404/31

SOVIET PREDICAMENT WITH KARMAL, REBELS DISCUSSED

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German No 1, 6 Jan 82 p 5

/Article by Andreas Kohlschuetter: "Condemned to Stay"/

/Text/ Moscow's viceroy-president Babrak Karmal is supposed to bring about a national reconciliation following the communist rape of his country. But the tribes in the Hindu Kush are fiercely determined to resist his regime at any cost. The continuing desolate internal political condition of the country resulting from this guerilla war is forcing the Russians to stay in the country for years to come.

"Have you really no idea whom you are dealing with?" The Hungarian party leader, Janos Kadar, who had been carried to power in November 1956 by invading Russian tanks in Budapest, asked this penetrating question. The person asked was Alexander Dubcek, the communist party leader in the CSSR during the Prague spring, who considered Soviet military action against his country impossible and who ignored all warnings. Four days after this meeting, on 21 August 1968, Soviet tanks were rolling through Prague and Dubcek was dragged off to Moscow as a prisoner.

Among those holding power in the Russian sphere of influence and interest, who apparently did not know with whom they were dealing, was Hafizullah Amin, state and party leader of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" until 27 December 1979, when his alleged request for Soviet assistance was fulfilled and he was immediately killed by those he had summoned to help. Amin, known among the people as "The Diabolical," was a skillful and brutal political gangster, unscrupulously hungry for power and boldly adventurous. An Afghan Pol Pot, a condottiere under the socialist-communist flag.

This evil genius organized the homemade putsch of April 1978, which was not remotely controlled by the Kremlin. He proceeded to ruin the radical reform regime resulting from it, which had been accompanied by many hopes, by forcing a drastic revolutionary remedy on the country, angering the nation and the tribes by anti-Islamic repression and bestial terror, stirring up a broad movement for insurrection, which the army, thoroughly purged, and the "Democratic Popular Party" (which was minute anyway) became increasingly less able to deal with. Hopelessly overestimating his own strength, he quarreled with his great Russian neighbor to the north, to whom even the Afghan kings had always shown their respect.

Amin ignored all Soviet advice to moderate his domestic policy. He sent members of the military, regarded favorably by the Kremlin, and members of the Partsham fraction within the party into exile or imprisoned them in his Kabul torture chamber. In September 1979 he liquidated former president Taraki, Moscow's last hope for a political way out of the "fraternal-progressive" Afghan regime's growing crisis of attrition, and he loudly and noisily demanded the recall of the Soviet ambassador for interfering in internal affairs. Like a reckless gambler, Amin finally tried to establish political ties with Washington, Islamabad and even Peking. In an interview in the summer of 1979 he boasted of his position in relation to the Russians: "They need me more than I need them."

The leadership in the Kremlin, intent on saving its revolutionary face and its prestige as a world power, did not think it could afford to drop the irrationally recalcitrant allied regime in Afghanistan. Waiting passively held the risk that Afghanistan under Amin would sink into uncontrollable chaos and mullahs and Islamic counterrevolutionaries would assume power in Kabul, that both ethnic and religious unrest would spill over into the Islamic Soviet republics along the border. What Moscow was working toward in Afghanistan was threatening to fall apart: A "central Asian Finland," which would assure the Russians of continued "legitimate" influence and at the same time would breach the Islamic front which was closing on the Soviet southern flank from Pakistan through Iran into Turkey.

Central Asian Finland

At the time, Leonid Brezhnev justified the decision to march in by referring to the necessity of eliminating the "source of a serious danger to the security of the Soviet state." Specifically Afghan considerations, related to an acute and concrete crisis situation, seem in actuality--from a Soviet perspective--to have tipped the balance. Nothing so far indicates that the occupation of Afghanistan was only one stage in an overall expansionist plan ("grand design"), that further intervention in the direction of the Gulf or the subcontinent is being contemplated. According to figures from Western experts, the strength of the Soviet troops has remained fairly constant, the approximately 90,000 to 95,000 men are just sufficient to carry out the most urgent tasks of maintaining peace, order and security in Kabul, on the main traffic routes and in a handful of the larger provincial cities. In addition, the military infrastructure in occupied Afghanistan has not been expanded by the Russians in such a way that any conclusions could be drawn about the establishment of a "regional springboard bastion."

The sandbox and map strategists, who "finally" saw their eternal theory of the Russian "thrust" for Gulf oil and warm water ports confirmed, will have to keep on waiting. Much speaks in favor of the theory of "defensive aggression," not least of all the topography, which severely limits Afghanistan's capacity as a landing strip. However, nothing excuses this imperialistic act of force, by which the Soviet Union imposed the reorganization in Kabul, over Amin's dead body, in order to start eliminating internal areas of friction in Afghanistan and restore the old, intact zone of influence.

The extremely courageous resistance of the Mudjahedin, and recently of the urban guerillas, cannot really shake the Soviet occupying forces militarily. Western secret services estimate Russian losses to be at least 5,000 dead and wounded. They point to the low state of morale of the occupation troops and to the fact that the dead are no longer, as formerly, being transported back to the Russian

homeland for an honorable hero's burial, but are being buried in Afghanistan. Still, there seems to be no lack of volunteers, who are rewarded for their service in Afghanistan with enormously high pay in rubles and rapid promotion. This war with the partisans is providing valuable combat experience for the Red army, which has been inactive since World War II, for its men, materiel and munitions, with acceptable losses.

Afghanistan Is Not Vietnam

Afghanistan has not turned into a Vietnam for the Russians. The Mudjahedin lack the protection of the jungle, they are fighting mostly on bare, mountainous territory, which is easy to observe from the air, and they still lack effective weapons--for example, Sam-7 ground-to-air rockets--against the armored Mi-24 rocket helicopters. They lack the great mobilizable potential of the population and the massive, direct assistance from two major powers--China and the USSR--which North Vietnam was able to rely on. Pakistan, weak and susceptible to pressure, is not a sufficiently strong hinterland partner. Most of all, the Afghan partisans, who are split up into more than 60 tribal and valley fighting units, lack a tight organization comparable to the Vietcong. There are also no central command posts, no leader who can integrate them and no secure lines of communication and supply between the exile organizations in Peshawar or Iran--which are themselves divided religiously, politically, ideologically and ethnically--and the fronts inside Afghanistan. In contrast to the Americans in Vietnam, the proximity of the area of intervention is of psychological and logistic assistance to the Russian army of invasion. Finally, the leaders in the Kremlin do not have to fear an explosive criticism of the invasion from broad sectors of the population, stirred up by the mass media which are free to express their own opinions.

The decentralized resistance of the Moslem Mudjahedin, which cannot be stamped out and which cannot be brought under control, is not achieving anything decisive militarily, but it is preventing political normalization. The leaders in the Kremlin have been struggling vainly for 2 years to crown their act of force, to achieve the real goal of the invasion: The establishment of a "popular" protectorate regime, supported by Afghan forces.

The 52-year old Babrak Karmal, escorted from exile in Moscow back to Kabul by Soviet tanks and set up as a viceroy-president, is supposed to make the almost impossible possible and the unacceptable acceptable. Like Janos Kadar, he knows full well "whom he is dealing with." Following Kadar's model, he is striving for national reconciliation after the communist rape, for ideological restraint, expansion of the regime's base, reduction of violent opposition to central power and reconstruction of an army and a party capable of functioning. Only then will the Russians reduce their numbers or even withdraw. But the work in Afghanistan is not going successfully.

Bloody Trench Warfare Among the Party Fractions

Pacification of the rebellious tribes is not making headway. All the offers of money and fine Islamic words are not sufficient. Even giving up the communist red in the country's flag, which changed color after the revolution and has now been dipped deep in Islamic green again under Babrak, is having no effect. The bloody

intrigues and trench warfare between the two hostile fractions in the party continue. The Kalk (People) Activists, who have been ousted from power and who formerly gathered around Taraki and Amin, accuse the others of having brought the Russians into the country and being responsible for the entire sorry state of affairs. The Partscham (Flag) Fraction of Babrak Karmal shows no great desire to suppress their feelings for revenge and make common cause with the Kalkis through whom, under Taraki and Amin, they were purged, imprisoned, tortured and sometimes executed.

Two million Afghans, 15 percent of the population, have fled since 1979. Among them are the irreplaceable Afghan cadres, engineers, doctors, teachers, technicians, without whom no ordered administration, economy or agriculture, no school and educational system, no independent state can be kept running.

The Russians are filling the vacuum that is being created: through scholarships, lecturers, experts, bureaucrats, advisors at all levels. The civilian invasion followed the military invasion. But the more the Soviets become integrated into Afghanistan's internal circulation, the more prestige and interest they are investing and the less they will be able to let themselves be driven out forcibly or even squeezed out. Babrak Karmal's attempt to rid himself of the marks left by the Russian forceps delivery becomes all the more difficult. All the efforts to achieve national reconciliation become all the more unrealistic. The resistance of a population rooted in medieval-absolutist Islam and tribal thinking becomes the more stubborn, a population that has never been colonized, never suppressed, never forced into a historically fateful accommodation, never forced to come to the bitter and necessary insight that there is sufficient room for a life worth living between capitulation that cannot be asked for and suicidal heroism.

Poland and Hungary at the other end of the Soviet empire have somehow learned that. They are different from the former officer in an Afghan artillery regiment who has gone over to the Mudjahedin: Sheltered behind a rock, his eyes on the Kunar Valley which is occupied by Russian tanks, he explains: "We are forced to fight, even if we have no chance. Nations that want to survive in history have no other choice. It keeps them together. If we did not do it, we should feel shame."

The Vicious Circle Is Closing

So a tight vicious circle is closing around Babrak Karmal: Because he entered Kabul with the Russian divisions, he is rejected as an unacceptable pariah by the native Afghan people, which is determined to offer fierce resistance. And because his regime is being opposed in this degree, the Russian occupiers, military and civilians, remain indispensable.

The "shining and happy future," which Brezhnev promised the country when he recently decorated Babrak Karmal in Moscow with the Order of the Sun of Freedom, has not yet begun. The Kremlin leaders are supporting a powerless Afghan satellite which can neither stand nor walk without Soviet crutches. There is no longer any thought of a Finnish solution, at most a Mongolian solution. History is repeating itself, the formula once coined by a U.S. ambassador in Kabul is being confirmed: "Foreign intruders always found it easier to enter Afghanistan than to get out again unharmed."

SOVIETS TRYING TO CONCILIATE PARCHAM, KHALQI FACTIONS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 14 Jan 82 p 4

[Text]

NEW DELHI, India, Jan. 13 (AP) — Moscow appears trying to calm the feuding within Afghanistan's ruling Communist Party by keeping some of the Afghan extremists in the Soviet Union, a western diplomatic source said yesterday.

The idea is to improve the Party image and give the moderates who remain in Kabul a better chance to work together, the informant said, quoting Afghan sources in the landlocked South Asian country.

The appointment of one of those moderates, Gen. Abdul Qader, as Acting Defense Minister, announced January 4, was described as a move to tranquilize the fierce rivalry between the Khalqi (Masses) and the Parcham (Flag) factions of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

His new title means that Qader is standing in as minister for Gen. Mohammad Rafi. It was announced last autumn that Rafi, a member of President Babrak Karmal's Parchamite faction and some of his military subordinates are staying in the Soviet Union for training and orientation.

The diplomatic source, who declined use of his name or nationality, said Rafi is a virtual exile even though he continues to hold the title of minister.

While Rafi is an outspoken Parchamite, Lt. Gen. Mohammad Watanjar and Saeed Mohammed Gulabzoi, who were itching to succeed him, are known as rabid Khalqis.

By deferring to the moderate Qader, Afghanistan's rulers appeared to be keeping their options open and buying time to proceed with the gradual work of unifying the party, the diplomat said.

Qader, a former Air Force Commander, is known as an Afghan nationalist more than a Marxist in his attitude toward the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan, it was pointed out.

Although Qader has been jailed by the Khalq faction, he has not openly carried grudges against them, the diplomat said.

Continuing feuds between the theoretical and ideologically-oriented Parchamites and the Khalqis, known for a laboring class approach to Marxism, reportedly have turned many a

Party meeting violent, with shoot-outs and wounding of Party members.

Afghan Prime Minister Sultan Ali Kistmand was warned by Kremlin leaders during his long visit to Moscow last year that the appearance of a purge by one faction would only lead to reaction by the other, the diplomat said. Changes to make the Party more unified thus have to be carried out gradually, and with stealth, was their reported advice.

The currently bad image of the Afghan Party is a source of concern to the Soviet Union, the diplomat said. A recently-announced Party campaign to get people to clean streets, shovel away debris and generally spruce up the appearance of Kabul was described as a Soviet-style effort at image improvement.

When Interior Minister Gulabzoi tried to persuade Soviet leaders to elevate him during a Moscow visit last November, he was told to be patient, that the Khalq faction would gain more power but that for the sake of Party image restraint was needed, the western diplomatic report said.

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

SABOTEURS' CONFESSIONS--Manama, 2 Feb (WAKH)--A senior Bahraini Interior Ministry official has said that the investigating magistrate has registered the confessions of those accused in the Bahraini sabotage plot and that these confessions have been handed over to the prosecutor general. In a statement to the Bahraini newspaper AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ published today, the Bahraini official said that a group of legal experts is currently studying all aspects of the case and the evidence that has so far been collected in order to determine the charges against each member of the sabotage group. He added that this study will determine whether the members of the group will be tried as a whole or in separate groups according to the role of each member and according to his charges as provided by Bahraini criminal law. The Bahraini security official said because the case is serious, the prosecutor general has been granted enough time to study all aspects of the case and to review it according to criminal law. He said: We are not in a hurry to hand the case over to the courts; we want to give the prosecutor general enough time to collect all of the evidence in the case. The accused members of the sabotage plot "which was uncovered in Bahrain last December" started to register their confessions in front of the investigating magistrate on 4 January. The initial confessions of the members confirmed the role of the so-called Islamic front in the sabotage plot and its role in plotting the conspiracy in Tehran and in training and arming its members. [Text] [GF020713 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0610 GMT 2 Feb 82]

CSO: 4404/234

PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DISCUSSED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2459, 9 Dec 81 pp 26-29

[Article by Suhayr al-Husayni: "In a Dialogue with Professors University Students Say, 'These Are Our Problems; What Are the Solutions?' Students, Professors Agree, Disagree about Textbook Prices, University Housing, Curricula, Transportation and Relationship between Students and Professors"]

[Text] Vice president of Cairo University: "Any student can complain about professors who don't show up for class."

The dean of the College of Education: "A professor is free to set book prices; he does not compel anyone to buy a book."

The dean of the College of Sciences: "The university is doing everything it can under the circumstances that are available."

In this report AKHIR SA'AH devotes its pages to a dialogue between university students and professors. It is a lengthy and multifarious dialogue about the problems that are on students' minds: the high prices of textbooks, transportation, university housing, the relationship between students and teachers, the failure of some professors to meet their classes regularly and curricula.

Furthermore, another aspect of the problems that are on the minds of university students has to do with the future and what awaits those young people as they begin their lives after graduation.

The young people spoke candidly, clearly and truthfully. They expressed themselves, and they said many things. AKHIR SA'AH took the young people's questions as these were presented with all their indications, to the professors who had their opinions on everything the young people had spoken about in detail. There was agreement on some points and disagreement on others. AKHIR SA'AH devoted its pages to this vital and candid dialogue between university students and their professors so that problems can be confronted realistically, appropriate solutions for them found and the [proper] course revealed and clarified.

This is a dialogue of generations. It is necessary that we listen to young people, get closer to them and understand their points of view and their ideas. They are the ones who have the problem, and they are more knowledgeable about the solutions because they are living and experiencing these problems. AKHİR SA'AH is making its pages available to this dialogue so young people can say what they have to say.

Let us now begin reviewing the opinions and inclinations of university students on campus.

It seems that the problem of high textbook prices is still foremost among the problems of university students.

Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif, a third year student in the College of Sciences at Cairo University says, "We heard that universities had printing presses for printing monographs and textbooks at cost. None of that has happened so far. I, for example, as a student in the Chemistry Department have 12 subjects in my discipline. There is a monograph for each subject, and it sells for between 2 or 3 pounds. Where do all these expenses come from when we are in the age of free education?"

Halah Muhammad 'Ali, a student in the College of Business at Banha [University] says, "The textbook problem is the primary problem in the lives of most university students, especially those with limited incomes. It is a problem for which there is no solution. Each professor wants to see what he wrote either in a book or in a monograph in our examination papers. For this reason we paid an advance this month to reserve two monographs for one subject to guarantee that we would get a copy. During the same month three new books came out in the bookstore. If we do not buy them now, we will not be able to find them easily later."

Khalid Sharif, [a student] in the Athletics Department in the College of Education at al-Zaqaziq [University] adds, "There is an educational subject that is non-essential, but professors, nevertheless, want two pamphlets in the same subject."

Maha 'Abd-al-Rahim of the American University says, "It may be that large tuition fees are among the characteristics of our college. Therefore, only those who can afford to pay the tuition enroll here. However, textbook prices here are out of this world. And there are male and female students who come here because they are ambitious. They cannot pay these prices, and they are not few in number [either]."

Transportation and Regulating Hours

The problem of transportation is almost the second problem in importance among the problems of most university students.

Ahmad Sayyid Mahdi, a student at the College of Medicine at 'Ayn Shams University says, "The schedule of classes ends at the same time civil servants get out of work. Therefore we all suffer from [traffic] congestion."

In addition, commuting daily takes up many long hours which would be better spent studying. The schedule of the bus which goes to the university is not suitable to the schedules of all students. Therefore, we would like to have the number of these buses increased, and we would like to have them running throughout the school day."

Majidah 'Abd-al-Halim, [a student] in the English Language Department at Cairo University says, "The schedule of classes is unfair. We have classes from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. Then classes resume again from 3 p.m. to 8 p.m. This is what the schedule is like most of the week. Where do we find the time to study?"

Muhammad Rami, a fourth year student in the College of Medicine at 'Ayn Shams University suggests, "Classes at the university should begin after the work day for civil servants ends so that university students can be assured they can ride the buses [to campus]."

Students and Student Affairs

There is another problem. It is a common problem about which all male and female students in all Egyptian universities agreed. They have a complaint about Students' Affairs.

'Iffat Husayn Fahmi, a student in the College of Law at Alexandria University says, "Students' Affairs offices are supposed to begin work at 9 a.m. and to stay open till 2:30 p.m. However, people begin working [in those offices] at noon, and then they close the doors after 1 or 2 hours at the most. Dealing with the authorized officials [in those offices] is extremely difficult. To put it briefly, one cannot talk with these people."

Siraj al-Din 'Arafah, a student in the College of Arts at al-Azhar University says, "Students' Affairs [offices] are supposed to have been set up to serve students and to look after their interests. But here we feel that they were created to complicate things for students. They put off everything or [they say] this does not fall under the jurisdiction of the official who is in the office at the present time. That is, if we can get to that official!"

University Housing, a Problem

The problem of finding accommodations in university housing is a problem from which 80 percent of the students who are away from home suffer.

Samayah 'Abd-al-Fattah, a student in the College of Arts at Cairo University relates an incident that almost ruined her future and the future of her colleague in the College of Law. Because there were no accommodations in university housing, they had to take a furnished room with a family. It was only the protection of God that saved them [from what would have destroyed their future]!

Tariq Fawzi, [a student] in the College of Law at Alexandria University says, "Why aren't university housing accommodations contingent upon academic excellence so that this could be an incentive to the student who

is away from home? Why don't the universities expand the geographical exchange program so that each student can stay with his family? I know students from Alexandria who are studying law at 'Ayn Shams University [in Cairo], and I live in Heliopolis near the university [and am studying here in Alexandria. Why doesn't the university rent more private homes for its students at any price? [If it did], it would then have the right to supervise them directly."

Professors and High Towers

Regarding the relationship between students and their professors most students say that the relationship is characterized by a lack of warmth, fear and intimidation.

'Abd-al-Hamid Hawidi, a student in the College of Business at Tanta [University] says, "Despite what is being said about good relations between students and professors in university associations and activities, the fact of the matter is that professors are still in their ivory towers, far away from students. If a student did anything [unseemly], even inadvertently, his future can go down the drain. A university professor represents absolute authority."

'Azizah Isma'il, a student in the College of Medicine at Cairo University says, "There are understanding professors, and it is possible to talk with those, but there are professors who cannot be reached outside of class, and it is impossible to discuss anything with them in class. Therefore, private lessons in colleges have become widespread, especially in medical colleges. Through these private lessons we can talk with the professors about what we do. Professors may have a justification for that because of the large number of students in the classes."

The Curricula Also

Opinions are varied about how satisfied students are with the curricula.

Fadiyah al-Minshawi, [a student] in the College of Business at al-Zaqaziq [University] says, "The curricula we study are useless, and most of them are of no use to us in [our] professional life. For example, we graduate from the college with little more than secondary school knowledge of foreign languages even though [knowledge of a foreign] language is now a primary requirement in professional life. Also in the College of Business we are supposed to study [the use of] calculators and computers, especially now that these devices have become the foundation for doing business in most banks and production companies."

'Adil 'Ali Muhammad, [a student] in the College of Engineering at 'Ayn Shams University says, "The nature of the subjects we are studying is largely dry and far from the reality of the workaday world."

The principal features of university students' attitudes toward what takes place around them in the colleges and the quality of the curricula which are being taught to them may be summarized [in the following statements]:

--The university is concerned only with examinations and with measuring students' ability to memorize. Therefore, it is quite irrelevant to professional life.

--The university graduates generations of office workers, but it is not capable of producing one educated person.

--The professor has absolute authority and remains in his ivory tower.

The courses of study are numerous; they are dry; and they are irrelevant to the nature of professional life.

A Nominal Salary

What would we find out if we were to shift [our focus] from students' lives on campus and probe what the attitudes and thoughts of university students outside campus are?

We talked with students about their attitudes toward the kind and nature of the work that would be available after they graduate.

Muhammad 'Umar Sharif, a student in the College of Business at Tanta [University] says, "The future for university students now does not lie in office work and government work where salaries are nominal and hardly meet one's basic needs. Therefore, we feel that studying is one thing and working is something completely different. Young people have to depend on themselves in charting their course in [their] professional life in any profession regardless of its status in society. What matters is that they realize success in that profession and earn an appropriate income."

Nahid 'Abd-al-Halim Ahmad, a student in the College of Law at Asyut [University] says, "It is the nature of our college that large numbers of students graduate from it every year. Most of them are employed in clerical work that has nothing to do with their [area of] specialization. Therefore, I decided to study languages and shorthand after I finish my university education and to work in a bank or a foreign company. You ask me why then did I come to this college. The reason I came here is, first, my average, and, second, so I can be a university graduate."

Iyman Muhammad Khamis, a third year student at the American University says, "Actually, I have not yet thought about working. I am studying only to get an education. As far as work is concerned, I believe that if I do not find work that I would find absorbing and satisfactory, I will not work."

A Preoccupied Father and a High-Strung Mother

The response this generation of young people made [when asked] about their feelings about family life was bold and unequivocal, albeit curious.

'Umar Muhammad Ahmad, a student in the College of Engineering at Alexandria University says, "I believe that we are an unfortunate generation even though many people from the previous generation think otherwise. This is because of the nature of our prosperous life. I as a student may have a car and I may eat and dress well, but where is my father? He works at an export-import office, and he is, therefore, either in the office or abroad. Even when he is on vacation, most of the time he is entertaining business guests. My mother is a school teacher, and she is always high-strung and unwilling to talk."

Muna 'Umar Muhammad, a student in the English Department in the College of Arts at 'Ayn Shams University says, "My father is always grumbling, and he is always suspicious, not because of anything I do, but because of what all young women do. He lets me come and go freely, but then he keeps threatening me that he will deprive me of that freedom. My mother is a kind woman although I always feel she is distant. She defends me, but she does so fearfully. At the same time I see my brother who is a student in the College of Medicine completely free to come and go as he pleases. And then we claim to be in the age of freedom and equality!"

Media Agencies and Culture

The generation of university students have their own opinions about [the programs] offered by the agencies of the media, especially television. There was almost a consensus among them and their opinions may be summarized in the following:

--The subjects that are dealt with by the agencies of the media are irrelevant to Egyptian reality.

--These agencies are not interested in young people and their problems, nor are they interested in the literary and artistic works young people like [even though] these works can play a significant and serious role in these agencies.

--The media emphasize football only which has been rejected by most university students after the recent decline in the standards of the game.

--The agencies of the media do not deal with the figures of old Egyptian literature, art and poetry despite the richness and grandeur of that heritage and despite the fact that most young people are interested in finding out about it.

--The agencies of the media should increase their interest in foreign language instruction programs, especially since young people, especially those with limited incomes, are interested in them.

--Prices of literary and artistic books are high, and reading has become a costly and a luxurious hobby. Admission prices for the theater and the movies are also high despite the fact that programs offered there are below average.

A Single Life Is Better

It is also curious to find that young people's attitudes toward forming families show a far-sightedness and a maturity that may exceed our expectations of young people their age. Their replies were as follows:

More than 60 percent of males affirm that marriage has become a responsibility and that anyone who thinks of making a commitment at least before he is 35 years old is taking a risk.

More than 30 percent of males are thinking of marrying female students with whom they have formed strong friendships, provided they work abroad for several years after graduation. They would then come back and set up their households by themselves.

More than 80 percent of females prefer marriage to someone who is financially prepared and able to provide them with a settled family life.

Love would come second; they would work at it.

About 60 percent of females do not think of marriage before the age of 25. By then they would have become mature and established in [their] professional lives.

More than 20 percent of females would welcome marriage while they are going to school, but the husband would have to have a superior rating.

Young People and Role Models

And now that we have reviewed the opinions of our young people who are studying at the university, what do university officials--deans and professors--think about what students said?

Dr Hasan al-Kashif, dean of the College of Sciences at 'Ayn Shams University says, "As far as the problems university students have are concerned, there is no doubt that the university and university officials are doing everything they can under the circumstances that are available, even though what is required for improvement is a ten-fold increase in effort and capabilities.

"It was inevitable that the unexpected problems which occurred recently from our young people would appear at any time. These problems were the result of a backlog of problems that accumulated over many years under circumstances that were difficult for young people, for professors and for the state as a whole.

"As far as young people are concerned, let me say that all the solutions that have been proposed touched only the form but did not touch the reality or the substance [of the problems]. There were attempts--merely attempts--to solve the problem of large numbers, the problem of textbooks and the problem of the relationship between students and professors. However, for many reasons these attempts did not reach the core of the problem. Consequently, none of these attempts has so far treated any of these problems.

"Reducing the price of a monograph or serving a meal at a reduced price are not enough for today's university student. What the student expects from the university is something more useful and more beneficial. He expects primarily a role model and an example he can follow and be guided by in the future. Where is the professor who gives the student the time and effort these large numbers of young people require? Where are the scientific references which young people can peruse to gain more knowledge? Where is the suitable place at the university and outside the university where students can go during the school day when they get out of class to meet with professors or with other students so they can all benefit from each other? Where is the monograph [that is sold] at an appropriate price? Where is the social care for our young people, the [kind of] care that would prepare appropriate housing and comfortable transportation for university students? Where is the athletic care in schools or universities?

"Since the problem has numerous reasons, it can only be treated as a whole with actual capabilities and not with band-aid remedies. Specialists, whether they are university professors or social, athletic, cultural or religious supervisors have to cooperate with each other to come up with suitable methods for overcoming these problems. In addition, a scientific plan for the university must be devised. It is from here that reform can begin."

There Are Shortcomings, but...

Dr 'Abd-al-Salam 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, dean of the College of Education at 'Ayn Shams University says, "Universities have always done their job despite the cruel circumstances they went through and the difficulties they faced. These difficulties appeared to be shortcomings. However, the university is always trying to do its part in the context of the plans and objectives it has set.

"No one is denying the fact that there have been shortcomings, but there were always attempts to correct these shortcomings."

We asked, "Why haven't the effects of this reform been evident?"

He said, "Because the matter is relative. The magnitude of the lack of discipline which we, university professors used to complain about was not such that the effects of reform would show. Let us suppose that a colleague, a professor did not meet his class, the number of such professors is relatively small. Therefore, reform here is not evident in a concrete way, because the malfunction and the difficulties were not tremendous. We are after all in educational institutions."

The Price of a Book Is Determined by the Professor

The dean of the College of Education went on to say, "As far as the problem of textbooks is concerned, this is a problem of our own creation. A professor is free to present his subject as he sees fit and at the price he thinks is appropriate. No one is forced to buy a book that a professor writes."

"What about the monographs that students are required to buy?"

"If it is a monograph designated for a specific subject and for a specific class, the university is supposed to print it and to give the professor nominal compensation."

"Has this happened?"

"So far it has not. However, a few colleagues who write monographs have begun asking the students themselves to have these monographs printed through the Students' Association. The professor receives no compensation for that. I know three professors who have offered to do this."

The dean of the College of Education added, "I have an objection to this limited university monograph. The foundation of university education is to nurture in students the ability, the desire and the skill to use the sources of knowledge in their various locations. If university education were to be reduced to a set of knowledge and information that are presented in a book or in a limited monograph which the student memorizes, repeats in an examination and then forgets, then its course would have to be corrected because it would have turned into an extension of the traditional public school. Therefore, we must develop educational programs so as to avoid this pitfall."

The Role Model and Attending Classes

Regarding the relationship between professors and students, Dr 'Abd-al-Salam says, "It may be a special characteristic of our college that it is committed to certain objectives and that it has a special mission. It is the college where the future of the country is forged. This is our mission which we fulfill by preparing groups of young people who afterwards take over the [responsibility] for educating the children of this country who will later determine the country's future. Therefore, we emphasize the development of some qualities we believe we need at this stage. These are:

--"The faculty is to abide by work hours and class hours so as to set an example. If I am going to be 10 minutes late for class, I let the students know that before class.

"I teach students to respect others by respecting them and their opinions in the classroom and outside the classroom.

"I teach students that the work they do as teachers is surpassed only by the work that prophets do. They will be called to account for their work in

front of God because they control people's destinies. Our work is extremely serious, and the accounting we have to do for it in front of God is more important than what others have to account for."

Prices Are High because of Printing

Dr 'Abd-al-Khaliq 'Allam, vice president of the American University says, "It is the special character of the American University that gives it the appearance of an institution that meets its obligations. There are 2,170 students at the university. The student-faculty ratio is one professor for each 12 students. The number of students per classroom is between 15 and 35.

"I deal with our students by setting an example. When a student feels that there is earnestness and a sense of obligation, it is natural that this will be reflected on his personality and on the method he uses to deal with matters.

"It is true that we have a problem with high textbook prices, but there may be here [an illustration of] the kind of earnestness that I talked about. The president of the Students' Association at the college told me that printing books in the United States was very expensive. On his own initiative, without [the backing of] the university administration, he contacted a publisher in Britain and agreed with him on a lower price for printing textbooks. This effort stems from the student's sense of responsibility as an elected president of an association; it stems from his wishes to render a service to students.

"The fact is that the idea that young people at the American University are accustomed to luxury and isolated from social life is not a correct idea. We at the university are participating in more than one project to serve the Egyptian environment. At the al-Basayisah village in al-Sharqiyah governorate, for example, Mr Salah 'Arafah of the college is supervising the establishment of a project for using solar energy to serve the rural community--using solar energy instead of firewood and wood for ovens. This project has a scientific as well as a social dimension. The response of the people of the village was actually unanimous, and development began to show in the village. The college is also undertaking numerous projects to serve the environment.

"I emphasize that if a young Egyptian man felt that he was spending his time doing what is useful to him and to society, he will not have any free time that would allow improper activities to emerge.

"In addition, the system of study here is serious and compelling. Any student who fails at any period of time is placed on probation. If he does not make up the failing grade at the first examination, the rules of the university would deny him [the privilege of] studying [at the university] for a period of 3 months. If failure recurs, the college has the right to suspend him immediately."

The Professor Has a Mission

Dr Isma'il al-'Awamiri, associate professor of statistics in the College of Business says, "You talk about the fact that a university professor does not adhere to [the principle of] meeting his classes regularly. I say that this discipline is not mandatory; it is rather a mission that a university professor believes in. It is through this faith that a university professor fulfills his mission among students. In addition, of course, the college administration at every educational location has to monitor the performance of this mission.

"Also as far as the relationship between professors and students is concerned, I emphasize that despite the large numbers of students we have in the College of Business, there is direct contact between professors and students. Students and professors do things together and stay in touch with each other so they can guide activities inside and outside the college. This is confirmed by the extensive activity that is carried out by the college association and its various chapters. These chapters pursue their activities with noticeable success.

"As far as the high cost of monographs and textbooks is concerned, if we wanted to dot the i's and cross the t's regarding this problem, especially in our college, I cannot imagine that there would be a problem with textbooks. Raising this question as a problem can hurt the natural and legitimate relationship that exists between a student and his professor. I cannot imagine that there is a professor who is exploiting his students."

"How then do you explain the complaints students have about high textbook prices?"

"They are spurious complaints. They are being emphasized and focused on primarily by the media. Professors and students are not two parties in a case; they are one party in the case for education in society. This continuous attack on professors can cause professors to become frustrated because they are always portrayed as exploitative.

"As far as textbooks are concerned, the truth is that there is a college ordinance that regulates the number of hours for every subject in the curriculum as well as the pamphlets that are required for it. On the other hand, the board of the university sets the price for each pamphlet according to the subject matter and the kind of paper used to print it. Any faculty member who does not abide by these rules should be questioned about that. We are members of this society; we know what families go through; we know what their capabilities and budgets are; and we take this into account. In addition, we as members of the faculty set an example for students. That example we set may be distorted by constant attack."

Their Problems Are Real and Realistic

Dr Faruq 'Ali Shibl, assistant professor in the Chemistry Department at the College of Sciences adds, "It is a fact that students' problems are

very realistic. They did not add anything to their problems. Therefore, these problems require radical and prompt solutions.

"I would add here that as far as the College of Sciences is concerned, and the Chemistry Department in particular, we have a building problem. We have 70 faculty members and about 2,000 students. The number is appropriate, but the problem lies in the number of classrooms.

"As far as establishing ties between university professors and students is concerned, I go beyond that and say that there is a problem in establishing a relationship between one professor and another in the same department and in other departments as well. We do not know each other. I think that there should be a social official for the faculty itself to carry out this task.

"Regarding the problem of textbooks, a professor who publishes a pamphlet has to set a high price for it, especially since textbooks are extremely expensive, with book prices not less than 60 or 70 pounds. A professor has to buy four or five books which he summarizes in a monograph for students. In my opinion the solution lies in the fact that man by nature is a product of experiments. The whole world takes an expensive edition of a book and makes inexpensive editions of the same book. This happens in India and in Japan. This edition is printed on ordinary paper and has an ordinary paper cover. We must make these inexpensive copies, and we must make many of them. If we were to buy the printing rights from authors, we would be serving the interests of students. At the same time these books would be available to students who would get from them what they wish, and the character of each student would show in his examination paper. So far, there is little difference between the university student and the secondary school student."

Another Official Speaks

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, vice president of Cairo University for students' affairs and education says, "Students' complaints are a sign of life. Anyone who does not complain is a lifeless corpse. Complaints should be classified so that the substance of these complaints can be dealt with. This is the function of the media."

As far as frequent absences by professors are concerned--something students are complaining about--Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi says, "I am pleased with this complaint, and the response to it has to be unquestionable because the schedules are announced to students, and if a professor does not meet his class, that is announced. I hope that any student who has any complaint of this kind will come forward and report the day and the date that happened. We welcome any complaint."

Regarding high textbook prices he says, "In previous interviews with the press I said that students' complaints about high textbook prices and the promptness with which the media embraced this issue created an artificial outcry. Regarding Cairo University in particular I hope students will come to me to complain about any book being highly priced."

"There is a student in the College of Sciences at Cairo University. His complaint is that 12 pamphlets [are required] for chemistry and that the price of each pamphlet is between 2 and 2.5 pounds."

"I challenge any student to print any monograph for less than that. If it is possible, let him come to us, and I am prepared to make a deal with him."

Regarding the shortage of accommodations in university housing he said, "There are no university problems as far as housing is concerned. The problem comes with students' attempts to prefer Cairo University to the regional universities. If we were to abide strictly by geographic distribution--and thank God there is now a university in every governorate--the problem of students away from home would cease to exist."

As far as the quality and variety of the food that is served is concerned and the complaints that are made about the food, he said, "Let me invite you and invite those who are complaining to come unannounced any day and at any time and eat with us; then you can make a judgment. The food that is offered to the student, I, as vice president of the university cannot serve in my home every day. I cannot serve chicken four times a week and meat three times a week at my table."

"The problem of transportation for students is a real and a true problem for all Cairo residents. But there are solutions that can be applied at the university, and this will take place at the appropriate time."

"Regarding the complaint about Students' Affairs, I hope that students know that the Students' Affairs [office] is there to serve them. The doors to my office are open; I will personally accept any complaint, if there is one."

One thing remains to be said. If we were to scrutinize the problems of university students and if we were to try to analyze them, we would find that they are the same problems that university students faced years ago. These problems will continue to exist as long as the matter of reform and the attempts to eliminate these problems are seasonal attempts and as long as the problems are dealt with only on paper. These problems are raised every year; newspapers write about them; and we meet with students and officials. By the end of the academic year, everyone forgets what was said and what is being said. The problem then stays unresolved until the new [academic] year, and it is raised once again on paper. This year we are hoping that the situation will be different.

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MILITARY TAKES OVER PUBLIC SECURITY MISSION

[Interview with Dr S K Nikravesh, minister of interior]

[Text] The Minister of Interior announced that a joint staff of law enforcement agencies and revolutionary organizations will take over the security of the cities.

Dr Seyyed Kamaledin Nikravesh, minister of interior, participated in a press, radio and T.V. interview yesterday afternoon and answered questions in regard to the country's governors-general seminar, appointment of undersecretaries of the minister of interior, internal security and the war refugees foundation.

First when asked about the programs and duties of the ministry he said, "The main duty of the ministry of interior is safeguarding internal security and in this connection the law enforcement agencies under my command are the police and the gendarmerie and with the cooperation of the guards corps and committee brothers they will perform this duty. On this basis, the ministry of interior, with the establishment of the office of deputy minister for law enforcement is trying to accomplish its important duties and create more coordination between the organs of law enforcement and revolutionary organizations such as committees within the cities and guards corps brothers in different parts of the country, outside and inside cities. With the cooperation of these gentlemen and with God's will, we will be able to establish more order and discipline so that it be a better year for law enforcement.

In this regard, extensive changes have taken place in the police cadres and we intend to make the police department appropriate to meet post revolutionary needs. The Islamic Republic's Gendarmerie has been much more active and will continue to be more so and the control of the borders will be totally in control of the gendarmerie.

Joint Headquarters of the Law Enforcement Agencies

Certainly, until after the war, in the same manner as the establishment of a joint headquarters of law enforcement agencies, it is intended to expand coordination between the law enforcement agencies like the gendarmerie and the police and the revolutionary law enforcement agencies like the committees and guards corps, and as a result, we will be able, with God's will, to enforce more order through this headquarters. About other offices of deputies in the ministry of interior, some appointments have been made and at present time they are working. Our brother, engineer Mir Salim has been appointed deputy minister for political and social affairs, and at the present time, we are at the planning stage in order to work more closely in the political areas of the provinces.

The political views of the provinces will be verified in order to be able to solve each others problems in this regard. About the problems of planning, Engineer Zare' is the deputy for planning and it will be attempted to make the organization of the governor-general's office meet the needs of today's society, and also we will try to have vast changes in the organization chart of the ministry of interior, and these changes will be done in a manner appropriate with the needs of post-revolutionary Iranian Islamic society. Also in the training section which is related to these offices, the effort is to have training classes for the personnel of the district governor's office, city governor's office and the governor general's offices which have deficiencies so that they are occupied by trained personnel." The minister of interior in regards to the regional divisions said, "we are trying with God's will, to execute the laws that the Islamic Majlis has approved and in 3 months time the ministry must prepare and submit documents along with models of the new regional division to the Islamic Majlis for their final approval. Mr Mohammad Khan is the deputy minister for financial and administrative affairs and we will attempt to appoint suitable and true believers in various posts in different provinces, God willing, to be able to fulfill the duty of the ministry of interior in the best way. For the post of deputy for development affairs, the policy of the ministry of interior has changed, and the effort is to pay more attention to the oppressed people and more efforts will be made for village development, and in fact, in the plan, instead of cities, we have towns in mind. As a result, some allocations in the budget which were used for the cities will be used in the rural areas of those cities."

The Governor-General's Seminar

Dr Nikravesh, about last weeks governor-general's seminar and the questions discussed in that seminar said: "In this seminar, different questions were analyzed, discussed and studied. The relation between the governor generals and the clergy's manner of cooperation and coordination was studied and discussed and different methods suggested by the brothers about the way to achieve better coordination in each region, the manner to meet the demands of the representatives of the Majlis derived from the demands of the oppressed people in the different regions and decisions were made in this regard. Also, the questions related to the relations between the ministry of interior and different divisions and the general policies of such relations were distinguished. Meanwhile, reconstruction of the law enforcement agencies in a manner to enable them to meet the needs of Islamic society were discussed and studied. Also the questions of war and war refugees were discussed and analyzed in order to enable the ministry of interior to make the necessary cooperation in this regard."

The Parties and Groups

He added, "The political questions related to the parties and groups were studied and with the law passed by the Islamic Majlis and submitted to the Ministry of Interior, we soon will witness that a rule has been restored and the parties and groups will be able to distinguish the limits of their activities, meanwhile the manner of the jurisdiction of the law through the governor-general's office was discussed and an effort will be made so that the necessary guidelines in this regard are adopted in the session and submitted to the brothers. The methods of arranging the seminars will follow the same tradition of our Martyr brother Raja'i, who was the founder. The regular sessions between the Cabinet and the governor-general's office will be revived again, and it was agreed that once every 45 days the governors-general will have a session together and once every 3 months the ministers will

participate in this session. These seminars and gatherings had a good ending which was that the governors-general had an audience with the Imam, and they took advantage of the Imam's guidance for better cooperation and coordination with the clergy and the Friday Imams. We had a seminar last week with the development deputies and we discussed and studied the centers for expansion of production and development services and the ministry of interior has stated activities in these regards."

He added, "I appreciate the services that our brothers have rendered previously in this ministry, and the services of Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani in this ministry is evident to all." The minister of interior about the laws for parties and groups and the role of the ministry of interior in this regard added:" According to the law submitted to us by the Majlis, a council consisting of the ministry of interior and representatives of judicial and legislative powers will study the charter of parties and groups and if they are in accordance with the law, permission will be granted for activities in the country."

The Role of the Clergy in the Provinces

Dr Nikravesh in answer to the question, 'is the cooperation of the clergy brothers with the governors-general in the form of executing work or not?', said, "Our clergy brothers in the different area will take advantage of their influence and will provide the necessary guidance for better execution of affairs to our brother governors-general, city governors, and district governors and to the ministry of interior, as well as other ministries. These matters should be discussed and studied in coordination meetings in order to prevent God forbid, the possible confrontation which might occur among different groups."

The minister of interior about the condition of the war refugees foundation said, "As you know, our brother Engineer Mir Salim has transferred from the war refugee foundation to the ministry of interior and will try with the coordination of different war areas and the officials of war refugees to introduce the new director as soon as possible. In this regard, the effort has been made for the war refugees foundation head office to take part in headquarters' activities and be reinforced in the provinces, in order to make decisions locally and better meet the demands of the refugees of these areas.

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CSO:4640/73

PROGRESS IN INDUSTRIALIZATION LAUDED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Jan 82 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab]

[Text] The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has practically finished the preparation of the budget for next year and it will submit it to the Majlis in the next few days. This news has been made public by Ahmad Tavakkoli, the Labor Minister and the Government Spokesman.

Prime Minister Musavi also spoke about the budget bill when he was interviewed by the media on leaving the residence of Imam Khomeini's last Wednesday at Jamaran. Musavi mentioned the priority in next years budget has been given to heavy industry. Other ministers also have given hints of this new industrial choice.

The problem of industrialisation as a whole, and the orientation toward heavy industry in a Third World country like Iran is not a matter that can be dealt with in one or two editorials in a non-technical newspaper. But, since every step the Islamic Government takes, needs inevitably some additional description for our dear readers, we find it useful to talk about this subject.

Whatever step we take in our policy making the main slogan of the Islamic Revolution (IR) must be considered. The IR started with the well know slogan of independence-liberty and the Islamic Republic. In many past editorials we have spoken in full detail on each word of this slogan but mostly from a political point of view.

But who does not know, for a Third World country like Iran, that so long as economic independence is not achieved, one can hardly claim that true independence has been attained. And again, who does not know that the problem of industrial self reliance is complimentary to economic independence.

In the past the former regime was praised by its western-friends for pushing the then imperial Iran toward a rapid industrialisation. Most of the religious leaders headed by Imam Khomeini, were accused of being opposed to this "patriotic act" of the deposed shah.

Many western political analysts have often reasoned that one of the main causes for the downfall of the ex-shah were his rapid industrialization programs. But it took

the Islamic Revolution for the praisers of the dead king, to see that their analysis was baseless. When the revolution took place and after the first few weeks of the victory, we decided to go back from the streets, into our factories and industrial centers to start the rebuilding of the country. We faced a very bitter reality.

What we saw was at first unbelievable. But when we went back to the analysis that our revolutionaries had offered before the revolution we found that such a scene was nothing but natural. Hundreds of factories were left in a sorry state.

We saw that the "industrialisation propaganda" of the deposed king was nothing but falsehood. We observed that Iran had been turned into a big assembling house. In the many car factories prefabricated pieces were imported from big industrial states and were only assembled here. And when the revolution had occurred and the big factory managers had fled with millions of dollars what was inherited by the revolutionary Iran was hundreds of thousands of workers without jobs plus enormous amounts of social problems which are proper to the jobless classes.

What we instituted was a rapid nationalization, but with great difficulty for our treasury. The big industrial countries which had decided to suffocate us and to crush our revolution ruthlessly continued their sanctions under different guises. It was then that the real sense of industrial independence became meaningful and clear for us. Our workers, technicians and engineers saw how world imperialism was inflicting fatal blows on us via the channel of the dependence we had on them.

But given that initiatives manifest themselves in hardships, our people decided to show their talent and revolutionary maturity. Factories were restarted. Raw materials were used in the most economical way. Discoveries followed inventions and our great people with Islamic devotion and a revolutionary commitment made up their collective mind to rise before the satanic industrial powers.

Only those who are expert in different areas of industrial techniques and have known our country before can appreciate our achievements to date.

This is why, relying upon the industrial capacity of our brothers and sisters, the government has decided to give priority to industries in the new budget. In the field of heavy industry, as said Premier Musavi, "We will pay great attention."

And this is because, after three years of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, we feel continuously what importance heavy industry will play in our real independence.

We believe that in this field we must count upon our own industrial capacity and raw materials. Thanks to Allah we have both and in abundance. We have decided to show the Third World countries that when a nation decides, it can stand upon its own feet.

But should we mention that on the way toward total industrial independence we will have to face great difficulties. Actually we are receiving offers from industrial countries to consider them for joint cooperation.

Very recently a big western European company has offered us an interesting barter contract. This offer has not been solitary. From the same country we have received several other offers.

And even though we respect mutual cooperation, especially in the technical fields, we do not hurry in accepting such offers. The political stability we are enjoying, the recent victories in the war fronts against the Ba'athist invaders and our very sensitive geopolitical situation enables us to be able to say no to those whom we doubt their sincerity.

At any rate we welcome the new orientation in our budget and even though we should walk very cautiously in accepting offers of cooperation in the field of heavy industry. We also will welcome any such offer in which our industrial independence is not sacrificed.

With the revolutionary resistance and Islamic devotion that we know in our people, we can expect them to make Iran self reliant in industry. What we foresee is nothing but a more rapid movement toward the glory our people deserve.

CSO: 4600/213

POLYACRYL COMPANY INCREASES OUTPUT

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 14 Jan 82 p 2

[Interview with Sheikh Attar, managing director]

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 13 (IRNA) -- The Isfahan Polyacryl Company has produced some 22,576 tons of acrylic products during the ten months from March 21, 1981, said the Managing Director of the Company, Sheikh Attar speaking to IRNA yesterday. Out of this amount, some 10,990 tons were polyesters.

The primary materials of the factor are imported and efforts are being made to make this unit self-sufficient, he said. The polyacryl industry is a new industry in the country and the unit in Isfahan is the largest in the Middle East region.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Managing

Director of the factory added that, although some 200 Americans working there were expelled, the Iranian staff was able to run the factory in an effective manner.

Sheikh Attar pointed out that the company started with a capital of 35 billion rials under the former regime and since the intention was to make the country's economy dependent, 40 percent of the shares of the company were owned by Americans.

However, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the changes that took place in the country, the company also went through changes and now the intention is to make the unit a model for other units to follow.

CSO: 4600/213

IRAN

FINES BEING REMITTED TO TREASURY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] Based on the request of the Supreme Judicial Council, revenue received from fines levied by courts and public prosecutors' offices of the revolution must be remitted to the state treasury.

The statement of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance in announcing this news stated: "The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance through the issuance of a circular in this regard has requested the Bank Melli open accounts designated as revenue received from fines levied by courts and public prosecutors' offices of the revolution."

The spokesman for the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance disclosed the following text of this circular: "At the behest of the Supreme Judicial Council, you are requested to instruct all Bank Melli branches throughout the country that at the request of any economic and financial affairs office, they open a nonwithdrawal account for revenue from fines levied by courts and public prosecutors' offices of the revolution and, with the authorized signatures of the economic and financial affairs office, transfer deposits to treasury account No 90 at the Central Bank."

CSO: 4640/146

ARBITRATION COUNCIL RENAMED, GIVEN BROADER DUTIES

Tehr. KEYHAN in Persian 10 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] In a communique yesterday, the Public Relations Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs announced the name change of the Office of the Supreme Arbitration Board to the Supervisory Office for Arbitration and disclosed the office's new duties.

The communique states: "Following detailed study, the Office of the Supreme Arbitration Board of this ministry which was the highest investigatory authority for complaints lodged by workers and employers, has a change of name and altered duties. Under the title of Supervisory Office for Arbitration, it has been assigned the duty of top-level coordination and supervision over authorities engaged in resolving disputes, in addition to its previous functions. Among other duties of this office are the direct investigation and supervision of authorities engaged in resolving disputes; adopting the necessary measures and preparing the necessary directives to render uniform policies regarding the issuance of opinions based on related regulations; stipulating the necessary criteria and standards for accepting complaints and objections and taking up plans of received projects, if required, in the Supreme Arbitration Council and studying and investigating these projects in a three-member committee."

CSO: 4640/146

TEXT OF SADDAM HUSAYN'S ADDRESS TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 24 Nov 81 pp 3-5

[Article: "The Complete Text of President Saddam Husayn's Address to the National Assembly"]

[Text] Iraqis have discovered their historical responsibility to themselves, to the Arab nation and to humanity.

National Assembly elections expressed an authentic ideological state of mind in the party which is leading the revolution and in the course of the revolution which has become the revolution of all the people. Our desire for peace is not due to weakness or anxiety, but it is rather an expression of the responsibility we feel to our people and to humanity, including the Iranian people.

The field is wide open for cooperation with all factions of the Iranian opposition, with no prior limitations or restrictions.

They mistook patience for weakness and wisdom for fear; the figures they are giving to the people of Iraq are miscalculated.

The age of negative, gloomy and unjust surprises has come to an end.

This country has been a towering beacon throughout the ages.

Your army has the initiative; the definitive and ultimate victory will be for the air force; our navy drove their navy out of the contest.

Fellow citizens:

The principal purpose of attending one of your sessions today is that of meeting with you as representatives in this National Assembly and giving ourselves a measure of assurance of the fact that the other official agencies of the state are cooperating with this assembly in accordance with the constitution and the laws (that are in effect). We want to assure ourselves of this so that the assembly can perform its duty and represent

the people properly. Indeed we want to emphasize that the National Assembly in our country is not a matter of appearances. The National Assembly is a serious and a responsible body duly formed in accordance with the constitution to pursue an effective role in building the new, great Iraq. We want to affirm on behalf of the leadership that the National Assembly elections that were held were not the result of a tactical need to cross from one shore to another. It was rather an expression of an authentic, ideological state of mind in the party which is leading the revolution and in the course of the revolution which has become the revolution of all the people of Iraq without exception.

When you begin the business of this session, it is certain that the war with the aggressive, tyrannical enemy, Iran, will be foremost among your concerns, just as it is the foremost concern of the people of Iran. We appreciate that fact. When I say Iran, I am hoping that the forces of the Iranian opposition will not rebuke us. They rebuked us more than once for expressions used in the Iraqi media and in statements made by Iraqi officials. We did not attribute to the Iranian people anything that was not part of Iran, nor did we attribute to the Iranian people anything that does not apply to them. Our statements are directed basically against officials in Iran. However, we also rebuke the Iranian people for the lengthy applause they gave some officials who used to talk about their capabilities for occupying Baghdad. Nevertheless, the people of Iraq are and have always been a generous people. Therefore, we find it acceptable now to draw a distinction between the Iranian people and the rulers, regardless of the background situation we know about, a situation we have dealt with bitterly in both the near and the distant past.

We Are Opening All Doors to the Iranian Opposition

We accept the notion that those who are responsible for the aggressive war against us are the people who are ruling Iran now. Therefore, we did state, and we are emphasizing this in front of the people's representatives in the National Assembly, that we are opening all doors and fields of cooperation with all the factions of the Iranian opposition. There are no prior limitations or restrictions on this cooperation, regardless where the head of this or the other faction stands on the questions of war or peace. We are opening the field for cooperation with the Iranian opposition, not only to protect Iraq from this tyrant who is squatting in Tehran, but also to oppose him and prevent him from realizing his sly, base objectives against Iraq. History will also prove that for the oppressed people of Iran this opposition and its consequences will have provided significant assistance to help the people of Iran get rid of this unjust tyrant. This opposition and its consequences will not make the people of Iran forget the historical background situations which are no more than 2 years old. Let us repeat part of these background situations. I hope you will not be astonished by the fact that when I address the National Assembly, I am also directing part of my address to the people of Iran because the people of Iran are going through a real predicament. It is not our responsibility to act as their substitutes and to deliver them from this predicament. However, it is our human duty to see their predicament, and it is not a

mistake for us to help them get rid of their predicament [and to work with them] against a common enemy who has tried everything to interfere in our internal affairs. When that enemy failed to do anything that would interfere with our internal affairs, he resorted to an aggressive war against our country. [It would not be a mistake to help the Iranian people, they would not repeat their mistake and entrust [their government to] an autocratic dictator with racist, expansionist ambitions.

Even the opposition miscalculated some aspects of the relationship with Iraq. We do not want to investigate past history and to turn it into a burden that would stand in the way of setting up new relations with anybody that wishes to correct the course of relations between the two countries. We will cooperate with any faction of the opposition that wants our help. We will do this not so that Iraq can gain victory against evil--for God and the people have championed Iraq because it is in the right--but rather so that we may be, as the people of Iraq have always been, a factor of what is good, a people who love peace and who would like other people to have what they themselves want for themselves. [The Iranian opposition] applauded for a long time those who used to say that the Iranian army was capable of occupying Baghdad. They applauded for a long time the former minister of defense when he said that the Iranian air force would wipe Iraq out of existence between 4 and 22 [September].

Dreams That Cannot Be Realized

But it is certain that Iranians as well as others know by now that these dreams cannot be realized. Khomeyni used to live here with you in your country, and the Iranian opposition had this country's support. We gave refuge to any Iranian who crossed the border, whether he wanted to stay in Iraq [or not]. If he wanted to leave the country, we made matters easy for him. When our relations with the Shah of Iran were poor and when we made an agreement [with him] in 1975, we honored the agreement despite the fact that sections of the agreement, especially those that had to do with Shatt al-'Arab, were forced on us under conditions that you know. Nevertheless, we did not fail to meet the duties of hospitality, and Khomeyni and other aides of his, some of whom are now in prominent positions of power, continued to live in dignity in our country until the last moment. Khomeyni repaid the people of Iraq by attacking Iraq, and he used his presence in Iraq to secure information about Iraq, to scheme against it and to hurt it.

Ever since his first week in power, it were as though the revolution in Iran was supposed to turn against Iraq and not against any other country. Its actions toward Iraq seemed as though Iraq were the target for aggression. The attacks began, but they were preceded by statements. The Iranians called the 1975 Agreement "the buried agreement." Now it has in fact been buried.

When they made statements about this matter, they naturally used to refer to it as the suspect U.S. agreement that was signed by Saddam Husayn and the Shah of Iran against the Iranian people. We sent them a memorandum and a plea that was mentioned in statements by officials. [We asked them] "Are

you committed to the 1975 agreement or not?" To this day they have not given us an answer. Naturally when I say this I am not forgetting the fact that they are now insisting on the 1975 agreement because the 1975 agreement assures them that half the Shatt al-'Arab waterway can be usurped. Innocent blood has been spilled, and other matters have been exacted from us for half of the Shatt al-'Arab waterway in a war that has gone on now for 15 months. The Iranians were the ones who began this war, and anyone who initiates evil has to endure the consequences.

The Iranians and those who were prodding them to attack Iraq began bombing the guardposts on the borders. When they saw that we continued to be patient, they began bombing Iraqi cities on 4 September.

They Suspended the 1975 Agreement

An Iranian delegation came to Iraq to commemorate a popular occasion for the non-aligned countries, the popular organizations of the non-aligned countries or the organizations of Asia. I greeted [all the delegations], and this delegation was among them. We were surprised when the Iranians told us that we had entered into an agreement against the people of Iran. [We asked] what that agreement was, and they said it was the 1975 Agreement. [We told them] "Let him cancel it if he does not like the agreement; we have no objections." I asked them to give Khomeyni our regards when he suspends the agreement. [I said], "We ask only that you restore to us our usurped rights in Shatt al-'Arab." But they suspended only two sections of the 1975 Agreement: the section that deals with our sovereignty over our land on the land borders and the section that has to do with intervention in internal affairs. They left the usurped right to Shatt al-'Arab untouched.

Their conversation with us was not civil, but we said those people are new [to these matters], and it may be that their lack of civility was due to the fact that they are new to such matters. Had there not been other considerations and had they not been our guests, they would have been hit on their heads and thrown in jail. The Islamic Republic became that way by an electoral process, and we say "let us get on with what we have to do."

We are trying to hang on to any weak hope that would take away the evil of those suspect mad people and not only that of the mad people who came over an arranged cowardly storm.

When Comrade Abu Haytham was in Saudi Arabia performing the minor pilgrimage, I sent Khomeyni a telegram in his name congratulating him on the birth of the Islamic Republic. His reply by telegram was curt, and he concluded it by saying, "Peace on those who follow the right way." It were as though he were dealing with midgets, with people who have no history or with people who were subordinate to him. He would not give such a reply to a civil servant in the smallest province in his country. Another time the [ill-fated] Bani-Sadr, sent Abu Haytham a telegram through official Iraqi channels, that is, it was not a message that we happened to

find or a telegram that slipped in and that we found and read. No. This was a telegram, opened by our Iraqi communications agencies.

Bani-Sadr sent Abu Haytham a cable telling him, "I heard you wanted to get out of Iraq. Don't leave. Stay there so you can lead the action against the Iraqi government." He knew that we would read an open telegram. Consider the measure of their contempt, their pride and their arrogance. Somehow we endured this, and then their bombs began falling on children and women, and you know all the rest. It was then and after their head of state made a statement that he had the capability of occupying Baghdad that our media began talking about this offensive conduct.

No Power Can Occupy Baghdad

We gave him our reply in al-Suwayrah and Nineveh, and we said that with the will of God no power could occupy Baghdad. Not you or the superpowers can occupy Baghdad, and I repeat that now. Even if the superpowers were to think one day of doing harm to Iraq, I have faith in God, in the Iraqi people and in a traditional army, and they will make it impossible for the superpowers to occupy Iraqi territory. This is not pride: it is neither pride nor lack of caution. This is a situation that stems from faith and from reality.

First of all, the fact that they want to occupy Iraqi territory means they are aggressors and that they will have to fight the Iraqis. In order for them to contend with an army which they attacked, they have to have twice its power. We can arm 2 million Iraqis, and they will fight the same way they have been fighting for 15 months, with all the complexities willed on the scene of operations by nature or by man. In practical terms, however, they will not be able to budge the army of Iraq from the basic military centers of action which are set in the plan of operations.

The Iranians said those people can be led into acquiescence. They may have said or they may have been told that those people were most certainly cowards. When they were told those people are cowards, some Arab rulers said, "We know them. We are members of the same party. I don't know how their fortune brought them to such power. You shall see: you will be able to overthrow them after 1 week of war."

The Iranians began by bombing the cities on 4 September. Brother 'Adnan had stopped [by my office] on the morning of that same day concerning a navy contract. The minister of the interior told me that the Iranians had bombed the cities of Mandali, Khanaqin, Zurbatiyah and Naft Khaneh. He said that the people had actually begun coming out of the cities and that women and children in particular had left. A visit to Samarra' was on my schedule. I did not suspend the trip, but I shortened it. I said that Iranian artillery should not [be allowed to] continue bombing Iraqi cities. On the following day an officer who is now a brigadier general in the operations room and whose name is Shakir sent me [a message] Friday noon to tell me how Iranian artillery can be prevented. After an investigation [it was determined that] Iranian artillery had been deployed in accordance with all

agreements in Iraqi territory which is not considered rightfully ours, even though we are entitled to it. Even the Shah used to consider this a case: he did not consider it Iraqi territory, but he had occupied it by force for several ages. These areas are Zayn al-Qaws, Sayf Sa'd and other land. Then the command decision was made to keep the artillery away and to start with the most dangerous area of Zayn al-Qaws.

We Sent Them Three Memoranda

The area of Zayn al-Qaws was invaded on 7 [September] and liberated. Between 4 to 22 [September] I sent the Iranians three memoranda--and I think they were handwritten--to tell them, "You may not be aware of agreements that exist between you and Iraq because you are new in power. In addition to your aggression on 4 September, you may be laboring under false assumptions. This territory is Iraqi territory. In this regard, you may summon your specialists in the Ministry of the Interior and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain to you this fact." Talks were pending, and the sounds of the drums of war were getting louder. The air force was forced to strike our units which were stationed in Zayn al-Qaws and after that, our units in Sayf Sa'd. In addition, they struck land units. Then they continued to change the situation until their gunfire closed Shatt al-'Arab, and they fired on ships sailing through the waterway. One of them, if I remember correctly, was flying a British flag. Another was from southeast Asia. In addition, they fired on Iraqi ships. Then they closed air space and diverted returning transport airplanes to Pakistan. The war then had begun.

When war begins, wisdom dictates that battles be fought on their land and not on ours. There is a military adage which states that defending vital territory is not to be carried out on that territory but rather in front of it. And as is evident to you in Iraq's strategic depth, the capital is about 120 kilometers from the borders. Al-Basrah can be reached by mortar from al-Muhammarah, from the other land to the north, and so can al-Kut and al-'Imarah, territory that has level land and can be reached in any armored onslaught. The Iranians would have a vantage point on all these cities. Then, since they were the ones who started the war, let the war be fought over their land. At least let the children and the free people of Iraq remain safe. The men of Iraq, however, who have always been asked to fight and on whom this war has been forced, let them fight on land that is not theirs to defend their own land. Thus all the vital lines that lead to the principal cities were blocked.

They Thought Patience Was Weakness

They thought [our] patience was [a sign of] weakness, and they thought wisdom was [a sign of fear]. They took only traditional precautions on their side. But just as all the battles that were fought by the people of Iraq were fought under the auspices of the July Revolution, the Iranians always miscalculated the figures they were giving to the people of Iraq. As we said on more than one occasion, they thought they were three times as many as the people of Iraq, but they did not know that the people of Iraq

were no longer the 14 million persons they used to know. Each Iraqi is now worth more than one person. They used to think that they had 533 of the most modern fighter airplanes produced by U.S. and western technology. They also used to think that they had several hundred helicopters.

They thought they had several thousand tanks, and they thought that the war materiel left behind by the Shah and by their old and new friends [would last]. They may have imagined that Iraq would run out of ammunition after a few weeks because of international conditions, and that the lines leading to Baghdad, al-Kut, al-'Imarah, Diyala and al-Basrah would lie open to you [sic]. [They thought Iraq would run out of] even light ammunition. But neither they nor anyone else was able to understand the quality of the new Iraqi. Even now when they try to understand the new Iraqi they take the counsel of others, and some of those unfortunately are Arabs who tell them, "Be patient for a few more weeks!" The weeks go by and new weeks are added to those. But what happened was that the Iraqi people fought courageously, and I do not exaggerate when I say that their courage was rare in all the ages that I've known and read about in history, except for the first radiant ages of the early days of Islam.

They used to say that Iraq was made up of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, etc., but they forgot that their country was made up of Baluchis, Arabs, Persians, Azerbaijanis, etc. They used to say that Iraq had Sunnis and Shi'ites, etc. and that Iraqis were Christians and Muslims, etc. but they forgot that, notwithstanding everything they said about them, these were the same people who had brought civilization to humanity. Iraq was the first country and the Iraqis were the first people who built human civilization. This is indisputable unless they want to forge history. They forgot that the past record of the people of this country as part of the Muslim army that carried the message of Islam to all Muslims is well-known.

Many Great Leaders Come from These People

They forgot that Salah al-Din came from this nation and that many great leaders and memorable builders as well came from this nation. Throughout the ages, except for the dark ages which lasted for a long time in this country--800 years--they made this country a well-known towering beacon. The Iranians were gauging [modern Iraq] to the dark ages, and they were forgetting the radiant, great stages [in our history]. They were forgetting that the people of Iraq, despite religious, denominational, ethnic and other differences, are one nation revived by the July Revolution which put them in touch with the radiant stages of their ancient life. The Iraqi people are now striving to build a new stage that would be like those past radiant stages. But until now foreign forces and others who have Arab citizenship are misleading them and making them believe that continuing the war will produce a new condition in this country. With the firm will of God there will be no surprises.

The age of negative, gloomy and unjust surprises has come to an end. We may come upon a corrupt person here and there, in this or the other village, in this or another city. There may be a traitor here and there, but

the Iraqis as a people have discovered in themselves the historical responsibility they have to themselves, to the Arab nation and even to humanity. Therefore, they are building [their country] even as they fight. At the same time that they are fighting, they are also discussing the design of one of Baghdad's streets. They are discussing how vital the relationship between them and the past should be. In fact, many forces are leading the [Iranians] to believe that you have to ask the Iraqis for a tactical slogan and to tell them that there would be no negotiations and no cessation of hostilities before the Iraqi army withdraws inside the borders of Iraq.

We are not the aggressors, and we are not the ones who wanted the war. When I spoke in the first week of the war, I said that these were our objectives and that we were coming to stop the war immediately. But we had to have a guarantee that our sovereign rights, our rights to the water and to the land and our right to choose our course in peace and security were guaranteed. They know and others know as well that we do not accept this game. Through intermediaries we told them these were our borders, and we asked that they define these borders to us on paper. But they do not recognize our rights. They will come and bomb us wherever we may withdraw, and we would then become engaged in a battle. We are being asked to withdraw then so that their artillery can reach al-Basrah and so that they can occasionally bring a gun to 'Abadan and shell al-Basrah.

We were being asked to station ourselves in a location that would make them able to reach other Iraqi cities. This is unacceptable to Iraqis and to the new Iraq. It may be acceptable to weak, stupid people who do not love their land and their own people. It may be acceptable to people who want no more than to occupy the seat [of power] and count the weeks, the days, and perhaps the hours and months. But we are not this kind of people. We consider it a great victory when Iraqi children in al-Basrah can go to sleep in peace, undisturbed by the sound of pounding artillery.

We Want Peace, and We Will Be Happier [with It]

As we said and as we are still saying, we want peace. They are saying that we are afraid. Let them continue in their misguided delusions. We repeat that we would be happier if opportunities for an honorable peace were available. We would be happier than Khomeyni and all Iranian officials. [Our desire for peace] is not due to weakness and a sense of anxiety, but it is rather an expression of our responsibility to our people and to humanity, including the Iranian people who have become aware of the fact that their rulers have been misguided in their aggression against Iraq. Therefore, the opposition has revealed all the secrets about which we have been speculating.

What has happened now as far as Iran is concerned? The Shah's autocracy is out, and Khomeyni who considers his power absolute is in. The people of Iran have begun calling Khomeyni an imposter just as we have been and still are calling him. I, however, am saying that in addition to being an imposter, he is like the man who used to be called Abu al-Naml, a swindler, a man who ruined his country. I read one of his superficial books, but on

the whole there was a subject he did not forget to mention. That subject is the foundation of his thinking: his passion for power. He says, "You know that there are ideologies among the religions, and you know that religions are ideologies and that there are individual interpretations among them." The awaited Mahdi says that his name is not the awaited Mahdi who can be anyone and have any other name. He says that the Mahdi will not rise from among the dead, but that he will emerge among the living to guide people. He used to be called Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeyni; afterwards he was called deputy Imam. Then after a while the term, deputy Imam, was discarded, and he came to be called Imam. He is then the awaited Mahdi.

This Is a Fact Declared in Front of the World

Consider the extent of this swindle. This is the truth. We are not attributing this to him. This is a fact declared in front of the world. Here is Imam Khomeyni and here is his book. The Iranians and not just Iraqis have discovered this swindle which is published in his book. Iranians have now discovered the political objectives behind all the references that he used to make in his addresses and speeches: he was the one destined to become the awaited Mahdi. It is this that explains his statement that the prophets and the messengers were not able to establish justice on earth and that he would be the one to do so. He has thus assumed the role of the awaited Mahdi without assuming the name because he says that his name is not the awaited Mahdi. This is a case to which any name may apply. Consider the extent of this swindle. Unfortunately, even our clergymen did not become aware of some of these matters, and they spoke about them even though they are unequivocal. They have been unequivocal to Iranians because we have relations with factions of the opposition and we are privy to their opinions.

The Shah was a friend of the United States, and he was subordinate to it in the context the central alliance. He was a friend to Israel, and the most significant indication of his friendship to Israel lay in the fact that he dealt with it. He sold oil to Israel. What has changed? The Shah used to sell oil to Israel, but he did not buy weapons from it. We never heard about him purchasing the kinds of weapons that Khomeyni is buying now. Iranians are beginning now to buy weapons from Israel. They have not been able to conceal that fact; it has become known. The last thing Rafsanjani came up with was the statement, "We are asking Israel to pay 450 million dollars for the oil that was sold to it. This means that the weapons we are now buying from Israel are being bought against the Israeli debt to us for previous oil sales." This imposter covers such a statement with a legal opinion.

I assure you that a large number of Iranians have now discovered that you are fighting on their behalf to defend them, just as you are fighting to defend your country, your land and your people. Thank God for the situation east of Karun. The general command issued a statement to clarify [the situation], and this made our forces withdraw from east Karun. This led them to believe that this situation could be duplicated anywhere on the front. However, in the seventh offensive, I think the first step was made

by your army. Now their morale is extremely low because even the battlefield combat is not going the way it used to. In most cases [Iranians] abandon their artillery positions before becoming involved with the advancing troops. Your army took the initiative, and that has been confirmed now. Regarding the air force, its superiority is decisive and final because there is no surprise. The naval force is a small practical force for the coast; it was taken out [of commission] by this great [force] about which we do not deny we were very apprehensive. We were [also] apprehensive of the air force. But I am not saying that the Iraqi citizen surprised us. We were not surprised at all. [The Iraqi citizen] in some cases exceeded the realistic expectations that were set for him.

I have not heard or read about pilots of a country going to a fight in the air over the land of another country and maintaining an upper hand. This is unheard of. Airplanes fly, for example, to bomb land targets and return [to base]. But [the notion of going to] an air battle deep inside another country and having the upper hand is something novel. Even when Israel's airplanes in 1967 became engaged in a fight with Iraqi airplanes in the forward base, it was the Iraqi pilots who had the upper hand, despite the preparedness of the Israeli pilots whose importance we do not wish to minimize. Thus as far as we know, and we asked people who are knowledgeable about military history, we are told that this is a novel case. Thank God. Such confidence is rare, and this is what is happening. This is what is happening in the 15th month of the war, not in the first or second week.

I had said previously that not too long from now we will [be in a position to] say that we have more tanks, more airplanes and more guns, and we will say that our materiel is excellent and so on. I said that we will [be in a position to] say we have more equipment and that our army was larger [than theirs]. I am now making those statements.

Our Army Is Larger, and We Have More Weapons

I am now saying that this has been achieved despite all the attempts that for numerous reasons were made by many evil people and other forces. Now, our military situation [is better] and our army is larger than it was the day we entered the war. Now, the basic parts of our weapons [systems] are greater and better. Iranians surpass us only in two factors. They have a theoretical superiority in strategic depth or in geographical area, and this factor has its considerations in military plans and military effectiveness. Iranians also outnumber us. Now, however, the two factors do not give them the edge that could change the balances of power. Now not all the ethnic groups in Iran support the existing regime. Not even all the Persian people support the existing regime. Thus, it is certainly evident from certain information that the enthusiasm to volunteer and enlist in the military has declined to very low levels. Regarding the geographical factor, going to Tehran was not part of our plan. Therefore, the geographical factor does not constitute a burden on our strategy. The principal objective was to close the outlets that lead to the dangerous lines to our cities. We want to prevent their army from occupying Iraqi territory and

reaching targets from which they can hurt us. We can thus force them to stop the war and recognize our legitimate rights. This has been certain from the first week up to now. At times they come up with statements by people who like to delude other people.

[They say] they've regained 40 percent, 50 percent and 60 percent of the land. I do not want to argue with the army when they advance on land along a 1,000 kilometer front. This is not a case where a soldier stands in line next to another. Soldiers rather take up basic positions and reach basic targets. They ensure the security of sectors within these lines on their way to reach these targets. We have unequivocal and indubitable arguments to that effect. There are cities about which we made announcements ever since the first week of the war. The names and numbers of those cities are known, and they are still under our control. The situation since then has remained without change. This is a fact which they cannot dispute. Nevertheless our purpose in making those statements is not to demean their people, but rather to point out the truth. Therefore, God has been with us, and the people have been supporting their own cause. They are going to extremes, sacrificing their lives to defend Iraq, a country that wants to live in peace, a country that is being asked to choose its own course in accordance with its own efforts [to bring about] the happiness, peace and prosperity of these people. This is what has been achieved.

In the past it was possible in all cases of war to attack and to fall back. But according to our calculations and to the plan that has been made, [Iranians] may suddenly take from us any target within that plan. We have the capability of regaining what has been taken any time we want to because we have the power and the reserves that would enable us to take the initiative in the offensive on all the combat lines for selected targets so as to crush their military machine. We have begun doing this in a simple way, and we will continue to escalate this. In all cases we are capable of continuing the war until Iranians are prepared to accept security for their country and for ours as well. [We will continue to fight until they accept] simultaneously security for their nation and for ours and their legitimate rights as well as the legitimate rights of our country and our nation.

This is a map of the scene of operations. You can see the cities that we have annexed. There has been no substantive change at all on the scene of operations except for the fact that the east Karun force has been withdrawn. In this case we are entitled to say that the Iraqis did fight with a spirit rare in history.

A Case Without Precedent for 800 Years

Yesterday, I met a woman about 50 years old; she was among citizens [with whom I met]. She is a married woman: she has children and a husband. She told me, "Sir, my husband does not like you. His name is so and so. He overpowers us when we want to hear the news or watch the actions of the leaders, and he turns off the television." He strikes her son and her daughters. This is the kind of people we have now. A mother reports her son

who is late returning to the front. Not only one mother does that, but mothers and fathers. Is this not a rare breed of people?

Male and female citizens are reporting cases. A case that is reported is judged by the law.

The person informed against is executed, but people report [violations]. This is a rare situation that has not occurred in Iraq for at least 800 years.

Neither [Iranians] nor others were seeing this situation; they only saw the old historical situation, the situation that was old and dismal. Naturally when this is the case, we sometimes reduce the sentence out of kindness to the citizen and sometimes we ~~tell~~ him to go for the sake of you good people who will give up a case because of the circumstances. The Shah had brought in his artillery, and with the mullahs he was fighting the Iraqi army. However, they do not know the change that has taken place in the autonomous region. They do not know that now when one of their saboteurs or anyone else slips in, he is fought by members of the popular army of the Kurds. An infiltrator is fought by a student and by simple Kurdish peasants and workers, not by Iraqi soldiers who have the power of the revolution behind them. They did not take this into account, those who were counting on uprisings and revolutions everywhere from the north to the south. Power is not a professional matter in this country. Let them make the whole world know that the ultimate power is that of the people. The power of truth is on the side of the person who is right. Why should such a person fear and what should he be afraid of? But the person who is in the wrong, no matter how strong his muscles are--and none of us has strong muscles--is the one who should be fearful. [The muscular strength we have] barely meets our needs, and our strength does not lie in our muscles. Our strength lies in the fact that we are right, that the people support us and that they are in the right.

In my meeting with the Council of Ministers I made statements, and I tried to explain what was meant by those statements so that my fellow ministers would not understand that this diminished their historical role or their ideological staunchness. I told them, "I may suspect one of you; I may not know all of you; and I may not know all the staff of the party. It is possible for an evil person to emerge among you. But what I can guarantee are the people."

The People Side with Truth and with the Revolution

It is possible that a senior party member, a professional who works with his mind [may come up with something] that is distorted by another. It is possible for a minister, God forbid, to be negligent in his work or to become corrupt. But I am telling you these are isolated cases. I, the speaker, and every member of the command are being called upon to keep up with the thinking of each one in the upper cadre of the party or in the upper cadre of the state so that each one of them will know how he thinks. But you the people accept this according to an absolute majority; yet

this is what is imagined. We live with these people. We ate with them, and we slept with them in the villages and in the cities everywhere. We know how they think. The people support the truth, the revolution and the new life; the army supports the truth, the revolution and the new life. They are living with the people. We are not to believe that they will not produce from this place or another 5, 6, 10 or 100 persons who make mistakes or who become corrupt. It is the absolute standard that made the country, with the power of God, ensure this course and continue with the construction [effort] and with the war until they get their rights. This is one case.

As a responsible official I can say in front of the National Assembly that when I am asked about the army and the people, I give an absolute guarantee that time and circumstances are consuming those who are sweeping them and us away. Thank God, our army is armed with capability; our economy is excellent; and we have spoken to you about our weapons, our arms and our army. Our international posture is known to you. If the basic power of good in the world did not know that we were in the right and that we are fighting to defend what is right, Iraq's representative would not have been chosen in the United Nations while Iraq is involved in a state of war. We would not have received all these different level delegations that come to Iraq under conditions of war. They come to visit as though they were dealing with Iraq in the year that preceded the war. Indeed, they deal with Iraq with more respect and confidence and with a desire to establish and expand strong relations.

You are part of the people, but with all due respect, not you or anybody else can tell me anything about the people I do not know. I am talking about the people in general, not about a small case. I am not talking about a small case in a particular village where someone may have made an error in a particular school where they are not very regular. But if one were to come and tell me that our people in al-Sulaymaniyah, for example, were against us, I would not believe him, not because I do not see. I know that the percentage of those who are against us in al-Sulaymaniyah is greater than that in Irbil. I know that, and I know that the percentage of people against us in Irbil is probably greater than that of those against us in al-Basrah, for example, but that hostility is not due to ethnic reasons; it is due to the fact that the revolution came late to that place because the party did not have deep roots there and because there were special historically inherited complications that made the revolution face from the very first day matters that did not exist, for example, in Baghdad, in al-Basrah or anywhere else I know. But I also know that the people of al-Sulaymaniyah are people who carry weapons and who fight those who slip into their midst from the Iranian borders, from the Turkish borders or from anywhere else.

I know that when an official visits al-Sulaymaniyah, thousands of people cheer for the revolution, for the country and for the people. This ends when the percentage in one place is greater than in another, when one ethnic group is greater than another and when the percentage of one religion is greater than another, not because of partition, but because of well-known historical circumstances that I understand.

We Are Building Iraq To Be a Towering Beacon

Thus, it is with this great nation, with the energy of all loyal people in their positions and in accordance with their responsibilities that, God willing, we will build Iraq so it will become a towering beacon. We will fight until, with God's help, we will secure our rights.

I wish you success in [your efforts to] strengthen your responsible role in building society and furthering democracy by building its new traditions in all areas where democracy is practiced. Chief among these locations after the command is your assembly. I wish you success so you can carry out your responsible role and serve your people because your people deserve to be served, not only because they are our people, but also because they are a vital people. There is no shame in telling you that before the war, friends, close [associates] and relatives told me that I do not understand the Iraqi people as well as I should and that I believe the Iraqi people can do more than they can. In their hearts some of them may have wanted to say that I bragged about the Iraqi people, giving them status they have not yet achieved and speaking about a role for them which they cannot play.

But I think that everyone corrected these ideas after the war. The Iraqis emerged as people who are capable of playing their national historical role and capable of conforming to righteousness, justice, integrity and honor.

They can conform to dignity and to the new life. The old negative [characteristics] that had their hold over them were not part of their causes. Instead, those matters were imposed on them because of the absence of a responsible role and not because of the absence of a single person. No: it is the responsible role with everything that is connected to it and everything that results from it. Now that the responsible role which is being practiced by the revolution, by the party and by the people on the same grounds and with the same spirit has emerged, the Iraqi [citizen] finds himself today in a position that is worthy of him. We will not be satisfied with this, and with God's will we will continue to develop this capability so as to augment and enhance it. We are not satisfied with what has been achieved in this country, and we will work energetically, in solidarity, united on all levels to achieve a higher level of prosperity.

My fellow [citizens], I thank you and I wish you success.

Mr Na'im Haddad, speaker of the National Assembly had delivered a speech welcoming President Saddam Husayn. He said that it was "a great honor for our National Assembly to be patronized by our president, the leader of our struggle and the hero of national liberation, the fighting president. He was the one who sponsored the activities of our assembly, the true representative of the Iraqi people. He was the one who provided all the means of success to our assembly, and he was the one who led the struggle of our people in Iraq. His leadership in all fields and in various areas has been singular." Mr Haddad added, "It was wise leadership and strategic ideas that provided all the components for success, especially in steering the national struggle that our Iraqi people and our Arab nation are waging now against the racist Persian enemy."

Mr Na'im Haddad affirmed that the achievement, continuation and continuity of these victories on the eastern front of our Arab country as well as the liberation of our land and our waters were all due to the leadership of the fighting comrade, President Saddam Husayn. "They are due to the cohesion of our popular masses, to the fact that our brave soldiers respond to his leadership and to the fact that we are all active in the national battle."

The speaker of the National Assembly added, "Mr President, we and our Arab nation are indebted to you. This is a statement that must be said about your leadership, your initiative and your affection for this great people. For no sooner had you started living with them than every citizen began to feel as though you were with him in his home, with his family, dealing with his problems and wiping out his tears with your noble hands. The case is the same with the soldier fighting on the front who is always eager to go before his colleagues and his comrades and to give up his life for the national honor and for Arab dignity and sovereignty." Mr Haddad said, "On behalf of the masses of our people our national assembly is looking forward to making sacrifices, and so do the masses of our people, to deter the racist Persian enemy and to respond to all the challenges that are facing our Arab nation and our people in Iraq."

"Because of your pioneering leadership Iraq has established its authority and is now heard in the Arab homeland and in international gatherings as well."

He added, "We are indebted to your leadership, Mr President. Our assembly offers its utmost respects and its manly pledge to be at the forefront of those who will fight to protect the dignity of the people and of the nation. We welcome you. You used to attend the sessions of our assembly often to give us the benefit of your correct thinking so we can respond to your sound directions and resume our work amidst the masses who are always looking forward to hear your sincere, constructive words that are regarded as a blueprint and a body of laws for the struggle of this great nation."

"We give you our pledge that we will continue serving our people and reinforcing our well established victories in their minds. We are confident that our victory will last and that the bloodthirsty, racist Persian regime will be overthrown."

The National Assembly session was attended by Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and first vice president; by Staff General 'Adnan Khayr Allah, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and deputy commander in chief of the armed forces; by a number of members of the Revolutionary Command Council; and by a number of ministers.

PERES ON U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS

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[Shim'on Peres commentary: "Jewish Foreign Policy"]

[Text:] The agreed-upon part of the Camp David accords will be exhausted in April 1982. Despite Mr Begin's famous claim about "softness internally and firmness in dealing with foreign elements," it may be said that Mr Begin indeed appeared firm internally, while externally he devoured the most important territorial asset in Israel's possession, the Sinai, leaving not even a little of so as to be able to demonstrate the principle of defensible borders. He also withdrew from his often-declared positions, complied with the heavy pressure exerted on him in Camp David and signed the document which recognizes "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just demands." There is no doubt that Mr Begin has demonstrated a great ability as a makeup man. However, this does not change reality. The Sinai was given to Egypt and declarations about "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" aroused expectations which are hard to quell any more.

In view of the asset the evacuation of which will end this year and the Palestinian expectation that will gain renewed momentum after the evacuation, 1982 will be one of the hardest political years for Israel. It may be possible to sign "a memorandum of understanding" on the autonomy issue as well, but similar to the preceding "memorandum of understanding" it will involve the existing lack of understanding more than real understanding. Since it is difficult to reach "a memorandum of understanding" when Egypt views the autonomy as a basis for a Palestinian entity and Mr Begin views it as a corridor to the annexation of all areas of Judaea and Samaria to Israel.

This situation raises questions regarding both the fate of the peace process in the Middle East and our relations with the United States. Our relations with the United States are vital in all cases--both in case of peace and in case of deviating from it toward the inertia of no-peace as there is no "net" peace and no "net" war in the Middle East. The superpowers stand behind the peace efforts and the outbreak of hostility, whether we like it or not. Even if one of them--say the United States--decided to withdraw from its involvement in the region then the other one--the Soviet Union--will remain on the horizon, in ambush, in the potential and realistic strength of several Arab countries.

David Ben-Gurion used to war against entertaining illusions about the ability of the superpowers: They can handle crises in several places at one time. Although the Soviet Union is preoccupied with Afghanistan and Poland it does not disappear from the Middle East. And the Russians, when coming to strengthen their relations with Arab countries do not ask the question--"What can you do for the Soviet Union?"--but bring suggestions on what the Soviet Union can do for them, even if the deeds involve the supply of arms, support of radical demands and intensifying strife. Moscow has chosen to be on the Arab side--on the side of the Arabs who reject peace--on the assumption that the Arab elements inclined toward peace do not need the Soviet Union.

Israel then needs a system of strong relations with the United States in two cases: In case the Soviet policy is "too successful" and another conflict erupts in the Middle East--in which case U.S. support of Israel is important also for emergency supplies--as well as in the opposite case in which "the peace plans" of the United States go as far as to jeopardize the most vital Israeli interests, such as ignoring the need for defensible borders.

Israel then has to be interested in basic understanding with the United States: How to curb the Soviet threat in case of an armed conflict in the region and how to build a policy of peace between it and the Arab countries without smashing the standing capability of Israel itself.

I believe that the basic mistake of the Begin-Sharon U.S. policy is the they believe that our enlisting in the global conflict between the two superpowers will largely free us from the problem of the regional conflict. They ignore the basic fact that the superpowers' rivalry in the region is based on the regional conflict and the chance to solve it.

With the United States we first of all need a regional understanding which will constitute our contribution to the "global" picture, not the other way around. We have already seen how "the global memorandum of understanding" collapsed in view of a limited-scale Israeli move such as applying Israeli law and jurisdiction to the Golan Heights.

It is not only the "global memorandum" which collapsed. It is also the U.S. position regarding the Golan Heights itself that has collapsed. Until the application of the law we had had grounds to believe that the United States was treating with understanding Israel's position that the Golan Heights is an integral part of Israel's defense while now it has joined the UN Security Council resolution demanding Israel's evacuation of the Golan.

Israel has a vital interest in cultivating a proper system of relations with the United States and fostering the elements that strengthen these relations. In cultivating these ties Israel does not need to bend over backwards. On the contrary, I am convinced that a solid element in this system of relations is Israel's uniqueness and not its being similar to the series of "strategic assets" appearing on the shelves of the ever-changing considerations in the Pentagon's computer rooms.

To be "proud" does not necessarily mean to level uncontrolled accusations at another but first to prove that we do not request of him anything except for that which is necessary and vital to ask of him.

I very much disliked Mr Begin's expressions about "General Barker's policy" which he attributed to the United States. Nor did I like his addition that if the Americans cut the financial aid to Israel he would travel throughout the land on a wheelchair and ask people to settle for "bread and margarine." What are we asking of the United States--butter?

Israel's uniqueness is that it managed to direct most of its demands internally, toward the people. This was not "softness internally" but a demand made of ourselves. Relying on ourselves is not only relying on the territories under our sovereignty but also relying on the resources at our disposal. During pentecost we sing "our baskets on our shoulders," not only on the shoulders of others. A policy of waste and squandering indeed disrupts Israel's appeal to another when it does so.

Only after we mobilize all our efforts and capability, both in manpower and in resources and when we find ourselves confronted with a coalition of external forces, Soviets as well and not only Arabs, can we turn to another. The appeal, to the United States in this case, will then be a proud, shameless appeal.

This is both a necessary and a justified appeal since Israel indeed faces a combination of forces, both an Arab combination and an Arab-Soviet combination. If the United States does not neutralize at least the Soviet role in the combination it is not only Israel's condition that will be harmed but the U.S. status too will be weakened.

Being different from other Middle East countries in that it relies on its standing ability against the potential power of Soviet pressure and the potential power of Arab armies, Israel has developed a unique system of relations with the United States. Several elements which should not be minimized stand out in this system:

A. The element of value which is almost metaphysical: Israel is an asset in the eyes of the U.S. public to a large extent since it is considered by U.S. public opinion to be a pioneering country, a democratic and strong country, a country that settles for little and knows how to draw the best out of what little it has. We are not "strategic assets" the way Turkey or Saudi Arabia are. Israel is not expected to have a military regime as Turkey or a money regime the way Saudi Arabia is; Israel is a country with solid values and its values are its assets.

B. The security element: Israel never relied on a foreign army but on its own strength and therefore, as it is not subject to a foreign force, it can rely on its ability of judgment and it has the full right--when it comes to its security affairs--to insist on its views and not budge a bit. Indeed, we requested and also received that which we cannot produce or finance ourselves, that which the Soviet Union amply supplies to the Arab countries: modern arms and financial aid (the Arabs, of course, need financial aid less than we do). Moreover, our security-political demands gained an attentive ear in Washington: rejection of negotiations with the PLO (which endangers Israel's security), defensible borders and special treatment of the unified Jerusalem issue.

C. The political element: History proves, unfortunately, that there is no certainty that the last war is the last of all wars, just as peace treaty is not necessarily a final treaty. History is not composed of end results, it is made up

of processes, processes of peace and war. They are opposites but compose a story, a series of chapters. Israel was successful in proving that through all its years of existence it is able to withstand the warring process and that it prefers, by its own choice, the peace process.

The Soviets preferred to support one of the parties in every international conflict and thus they in fact elected to have the conflict continued. The Americans in many cases preferred to maintain relations with the various parties to the conflicts and this implies that they prefer to put an end to the conflicts. In this sense there is not only a meeting point between the Israeli and the U.S. interests but also in ongoing parallelism. In order to maintain such a system of relations, Israel must persist--both in style and in contents--in the peace initiative, without naturally harming its security needs.

I do not know if there is indeed full agreement between the United States and us in shaping the permanent peace map of the Middle East. I am inclined to think that the United States will be prepared to compromise at our expense more than we can allow. However, I am also doubtful whether the United States has such a map. In my opinion, it is not the map that dictates U.S. policy but the relations that will determine peace relations in the region. [sentence as published]

In other words, even if there is no final peace map, and in the absence of an agreed peace map, the very moves toward peace can nourish the Israeli-U.S. relations even in case of differences. However, when such differences emerge, on matters which concern us, it is not impossible that Israel will emerge triumphant. If we initiate peace moves, we will immeasurably improve the fabric of our relations with the United States. In the absence of an initiative on our part--the United States will try to pressure us into submitting to other peace plans which contain no peace or no security.

Israeli peace initiatives must also express the real parameters of Israel's security. In my opinion, the first parameter is Aliyah to Israel. It is impossible to improve Israel's security if the Aliyah flow stops just as there is no security for the Jewish people without a strong state of Israel. One-fourth of our people, over 3 million, live in the Soviet Union, and 400,000 of them have registered to emigrate to Israel. Our main interest is to keep the Soviet Union's gates open. There is no country in the world, except Israel, to look after the fate of this Jewish community. Concern for the fate of the Soviet Jews is the centerpiece of Soviet-Israeli relations. Consequently, when we speak about Soviet-U.S. relations it is in our interest to recruit the United States to free Soviet Jewry and to release the prisoners of Zion before Israel stands beside the United States in its global conflict with the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that the United States has understood Israel's priorities when it extended help. The departure of hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews since 1967 could not have occurred had the United States not extended its assistance. The United States also refrained from urging us, for its own motives, to join the anti-Soviet alliance.

We are not neutral in the dispute between communism and democracy. Communism and Judaism are contradictory terms and I do not see either room or need to bridge them. We are not indifferent to the Soviet attempt to gain control over other countries. It is ridiculous to listen to the Soviet Union's urging "self-determination rights" for the Palestinians. Does the "self-determination rights" for the Palestinians. Does the "self-determination right" it extended to the Poles have any real value? Nevertheless, we do not want to expand the areas of confrontation with the Soviet Union and we want to focus on the main issues. The Soviet Union is also sensitive to public opinion and our main front now is on the public opinion campaign for the fate of the Jews there. In this aspect, we have occasionally even succeeded in recruiting the heads of the European Communist Parties to side with us, and if we persevere, we also stand a chance to reap some fruit.

So, it is in our interest to recruit the help of the United States and world public opinion to the campaign which is our campaign, to Israel's real foreign policy, which is a Jewish foreign policy.

The same holds true regarding Europe. Israel has a keen interest in Europe's position. Our interest in Europe in the period between the war of independence and the 6-day war mainly revolved around the issue of weapons. However, since the 6-day war, our main interest has been in the economic sphere, namely, the EEC. The fate of Israel's agriculture depends on whether we receive more favorable or at least equal terms to those of European agricultural producers. Our industry also depends to a large extent on our relationships with the EEC.

Europe is generally slackening its support for Israel and giving more of it to the PLO. Europe's increasing support for the PLO also puts pressure on the U.S. position. Can this deterioration be prevented? I am not sure Europe can go back to the positions it held immediately after World War II. However, I am certain that the positions can be moved to a point more comfortable for Israel and less tied to the PLO than at present on the condition that we analyze the motives that brought about the change in the European positions and the changes for amending it.

Begin's remark that Europe "wants to sell expensive weapons to the Arab countries and buy from them cheap oil" may be true. However, it is not the whole truth. Norway, for instance, does not need Arab oil and does not supply weapons to the Arabs and yet, its support for Israel has been deeply eroded. I doubt whether, for example, we will succeed in convincing socialist France that our position is right by trying to tell it that only hideous interests have turned it into the merchant of the Venice declaration.

Israel's stand in Europe has deteriorated due to, among other things, the fact that we were not wise enough to convince them of the importance of the Camp David accords ahead of time and of our ability to propose our own peace initiatives. In my opinion, Israeli peace initiatives--even if not fully accepted by European public opinion--will regain us lost friends and may even help us make badly needed new friends. Moreover, I do not see any reason to categorically reject European involvement while we are knocking on its doors asking for economic and political aid. On the contrary, we should propose to the Europeans to establish joint enterprises in Israel, in the region and in the third world. We should recruit the European potential for constructive aims in the future and at the same time, of course, we should not let up in our struggle against the tilt of its positions toward the PLO..

The ground is ready in Europe for extensive Israeli information activities. For example, over 300 socialist deputies elected to the French Parliament are unfamiliar with the past. They should be invited to visit Israel to learn things from the horse's mouth. Another example is the European Parliament where active Palestinian lobbying has been taking place and our friends in that organization have been complaining about the absence of real Israeli activities.

The combination of an Israel that launches peace initiatives and an Israel that toils to explain its positions not only in times of crisis but throughout the year may bring about the desirable change in the European position. All this leads to the inevitable conclusions that we need Israeli peace initiatives that would be conducive to a solution or a large deflation of the conflict.

An Israeli initiative--in the absence of an Israeli initiative the world would be flooded with non-Israeli or anti-Israeli initiatives--must stem from the Camp David accords. The fate of the most sensitive part of these accords, the Palestinian issue, will be decided in the next few months. If an agreement on the autonomy is signed or if it is signed and it just remains a piece of paper, in the second half of 1982 Israel will be faced with the Fahd plan or a new edition of it. Therefore, it is in Israel's interest to translate the principles of Camp David into a binding reality in the region. It is doubtful whether the autonomy is the best of plans--it might lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, the alternative to this plan today is worse: pressure for the establishment of a Palestinian state without delay and without a commitment for secure borders.

In the few months remaining until the final withdrawal from the Sinai, the government must resolve the disputed issues. On some of them the differences between us and the Egyptians are not vast. On the issue of water and land, the Begin Government has hinted at far-reaching compromises. On the issue of the source of authority, the government does not sound as firm as in the past. Jurists claim that the distance between "laws" and "regulations" is not as significant as it sounds on the condition, of course, that the self-governing authority is not bestowed with powers on foreign and security affairs. I still believe that the best way--for both Israel and Egypt--to turn the autonomy into a realizable hope is to apply it to the Gaza Strip. Gaza is free of many complexities affecting Judaea and Samaria and Israel may assure its security interests in Gaza with relative ease. Autonomy in Gaza would also constitute the first step toward a solution of the Palestinian problem. If autonomy is established in Gaza with Egypt's approval then Israel may make another move toward attempting to establish a dialogue with Saudi Arabia.

Both Saudi Arabia and Israel have a great interest in reaching mutual understanding. The Arab Peninsula lies between two gulfs: The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 'Aqaba. If the Saudis continue to build airbases and naval bases in the Gulf of 'Aqaba, Israel will have no other choice but to entrench its own shores and bases along the same Gulf. Israel would be able to pose a threat to the Saudi oilfields while the Saudis would not be able to threaten the (nonexistent) oilfields in Israel. A calm and relatively demilitarized Gulf of 'Aqaba is even more important to Saudi Arabia's security than four AWACS aircraft. Moreover, strategic and political understanding between the four countries along the Gulf (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel) may be a blessing to the U.S. strategic position and may be a vast resource of economic projects to the inhabitants of these countries.

Israel has no other choice but to take into account the importance of Saudi Arabia in the eyes of the United States. The Saudis are one of the largest customers (its purchases amount to some \$50 billion a year) of the United States and the most important oil supplier of America. To some extent, Saudi Arabia has replaced the U.S. Congress in supplying foreign aid to countries the United States wants to extend aid to, such as Sudan, Pakistan and Morocco. Neither do we want nor are we able to destroy Saudi-U.S. relations. The best thing we can do in this case is to try and steer these relations in the direction of peace. Instead of demanding that the United States sever these relations, we should urge it to insist upon Saudi Arabia accepting UN Resolution 242, expressing support for the Camp David process and agreeing to conduct negotiations without any preconditions.

We should not only make this demand of the United States but we should also try and establish direct contacts with Riyadh. Our status in Washington may improve by holding contacts with Riyadh more than our status in the region would improve by just conducting our activities in Washington.

If we succeed in strengthening our relations with Egypt and in establishing relations with Saudi Arabia, then it will be Jordan's turn. It is impossible to solve the Palestinian problem without Jordan's participation and Jordan will not leave a stone unturned if the Palestinian problem is solved without its participation but at its account. I still believe that a Jordanian-Palestinian state is the best chance for settling the main part of the Israeli-Arab conflict: The Palestinian problem. We should not despair of Jordan or the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. A right policy in the territories will only make it easier for such a relationship to exist. Such an Israeli initiative will also have reverberations in the Western countries. There, too, not all the doors are apparently locked. And even if the road is long there are many chances to cross it.

Many people in our midst realize that in times of war we should retain the initiative. However, this applies just as well to periods of calm. I estimate that, in the military aspect, Israel is today stronger than ever in the past and the Arabs are politically weaker than in the past. Hence, this is a good season to test new peace moves, even if on unpaved roads.

Israel should not be subordinate to the United States, nor should it be subordinate to U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel should not fear the Arab threat and it should not act out of panic. However, neither should Israel sit complacently and let things settle on their own. Israel's foreign and security policy must be subordinate to its national and social goals. These goals are: Security--whose existence depends to a large extent on our relationship with the United States; Aliyah--whose continuation depends on our relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States; peace--whose achievement depends to certain extent on Israel's initiative and its ability to establish a complex of contacts and relations with most Arab countries; and political and economic independence--this goal will not be accomplished only through the receipt of grants and loans from overseas but, first and foremost, through our own efforts. To this end, we should object to Aridor's policy, a policy of "speculate in the stock market, grab and swallow" and ignore the future and the genuine needs of the state and not just of its citizens.

An Israel which will honor its own commitments will also be respected abroad. Abroad does not only refer to the nations of the world but also to the Jews living in the world. Our policy should seek to depict a real picture of Israel for the Jewish people and should present a plan with which they would be able to identify and in which they will wish to partake.

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ISRAELI TV REPORT ON EASTERN FRONT

TA160946 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 15 Jan 82

[Text] Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad last night said that Syria would work tirelessly to achieve a strategic position relative to Israel that would assure the liberation of the occupied land, including the Golan Heights. Al-Asad said that the annexation of the Golan Heights has no influence on the liberation struggle since the Golan had not been taken by a law and it would therefore not be retrieved by a law. Since the Golan Heights law was passed Syria has been trying to bring about a rapprochement between Iran and Iraq who have been fighting an endless war for some 2 years. Syria's goal is to establish a joint Eastern Front of the Arab countries against their common enemy, Israel. Syria wants to include Jordan, Iraq and Syria in this front and is seeking the support of Iran. What is the Eastern Front and under which circumstances might such a front be established? Our defense affairs correspondent Ron Ben-yishay replies to these questions:

[Begin videotape] [Unidentified announcer] It is Thursday, 1100 P.M. A booby-trapped car explodes in the heart of the 'Akko market. The police block the area and set up roadblocks along the roads in the north. Hospitals in the city and the vicinity report a large number of casualties and fatalities. Two hours later, the Palestinian press agency reports from Beirut: The spokesman of the popular front, Ahmad Jibril's faction, announces that the members of his organization are responsible for the attack. We have pledged to transfer the war into the heart of the territory of the Zionist enemy and we have even fulfilled our promise. The Palestinian revolution is alive and kicking and it will ultimately win, the spokesman states.

In the late hours of the afternoon the prime minister arrives aboard a helicopter to visit the injured people. Mr Begin goes from room to room in the hospital and lingers over the beds of the children. Upon emerging from the hospital he states in front of the microphones and cameras: The head of the poisonous snake called the PLO should be beaten into the dust with a sledgehammer, and this time for good.

The following day, speaking to a gathering of bonds activists on the West Coast of the United States, Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon declares: This government will not tolerate any kind of war of attrition between us and the terrorists. Several days later, IDF armored columns cross the Litani River. The Syrians send urgent reinforcements to the fighting areas and fire surface-to-air missiles at a couple

of phantoms flying at very high altitude over the Syrian-Lebanese area on a reconnaissance mission. The IDF attacks the missile batteries. The Syrians launch a heavy shelling on our settlements on the Golan Heights in order to ease the pressure on its troops in Southern Lebanon. Husayn announces that Jordan will not stand idle while its Palestinian and Syrian brothers are attacked. Iraq's leader Saddam Husayn also announces that he is ready to put old disputes aside for the time being. A Libyan Mig-23 squadron lands in Syria followed by an airlift from Tripoli to Damascus of cargo planes carrying ammunition, surface-to-air missiles and spare parts. The IDF mobilizes reserves.

[Ben-Yishay] We should stop at this point to say that this is an imaginary script. The spark that may set such a fire is a terrorist operation. However, the main confrontation might be with the Syrian army. The Syrian army is today deployed in the area between the cease-fire line on the Golan Heights and Damascus. Two mechanized divisions are deployed along the first line of defense in perimeter positions [mutzabim heqefiyim] and in posts at company and platoon level. The armored divisions are in charge of the second and third lines of defense. Another armored force the size of a division and subordinate to an improvised headquarters is stationed in Lebanon, in the areas of Beirut and (?al-Biq'a'). The IDF troops in the north are also in an alert deployment and only one order would have to be issued to the Syrian and the Israeli divisions to find ourselves in the midst of battles within a few hours. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a war is inevitable. All those involved--Israel, Syria the terrorists and the superpowers--know that a flare-up in the north would be tantamount to an all-out war. Under present conditions, all of them stand to lose a great deal in such a war.

[Israeli chief of staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan] the political moves regarding the Syrian missiles in Lebanon and the actions of the terrorists from Lebanese territory would actually determine whether or not there would be a confrontation--I am not saying a frontal confrontation. At the moment, this is not up to us; it depends on the political moves to pull the missiles out of Lebanon--the United States has undertaken to carry out this activity and it is very occupied with it--and on the terrorists' behavior. If they maintain peace then there will be no confrontation with them.

[Ben-Yishay] Chief of staff, sir, if I were to ask you today to say how far the situation in the north is from a war or from a flare-up, if you prefer, what would you say?

[Eytan] I would not say that the situation is close to a flare-up, neither would I rest on my laurels believing that everything is calm and serene.

[Ben-Yishay] Since the Yom Kippur war the Syrian army has undergone a strengthening process which has actually doubled its might. Has this changed the balance of power between Israel and all the Arab confrontation states, I mean 360 degrees around Israel?

[Eytan] Not only Syria has strengthened, both Jordan and Syria have strengthened as well as Iraq, in spite of the war it is fighting. This has an influence on the quantitative balance of power, namely, that who acquires more means carries greater weight. However, this does not mean that the balance has changed.

[Ben-Yishay] Just as the IDF, Syria has also learned the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. In the last 9 years, the Syrian general staff, with the help of the Soviets, has made efforts to overcome the weak points that had been revealed in that war and to strengthen the units which proved relatively successful. The main problem the Syrians were and are still faced with is the IDF's armored corps. Israeli tanks had prevented the Syrians from conquering the Golan Heights in 1973. As the Syrians see it, a large Israeli tank force on the Golan Heights today poses a threat to Damascus. In order to solve this problem in depth the Syrian army has undergone a real revolutionary change: Instead of the two armored divisions it had in 1973, the Syrian general staff presently has four tank divisions at its disposal; instead of 1,600 tanks then there are 3,700 tanks today. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that about 1,300 of these tanks are stored in emergency warehouses and Syria does not have crews to man them. It is assumed that these tanks are designed to replace tanks hit in the course of the war which cannot be repaired on the spot. These tanks would be manned by the crews of damaged tanks or by armored corps soldiers from Iraq, Libya and even from Cuba who would be flown to Syria.

The improvement in the quality of the tanks is more significant than the quantitative growth. The old T-54's and T-55's have now been replaced by T-62's. However, the Syrian armored corps is today proud of its T-72's. No Western army has yet had a battle against this tank. Its performance as well as the penetrability of its armor are still, to a large extent, a mystery. What is known is that its 125-mm cannon can penetrate any armor and that it is loaded automatically. This provides for a very fast rate of fire and saves one crew man. The cannon's stabilizer provides for accurate firing while on the move. It should also be assumed that the fire control system is better than that of the T-62. The spade in the front enables the tank to speedily excavate a position for itself, as we will soon see [in the film shown in the background]. Iron fins protect the tracks from bazooka fire.

Two infantry divisions now in the Syrian army will by April or May this year complete the process of their conversion into mechanized divisions, namely, mobile troops combining tanks and infantry troops fighting from armored troop carriers. These forces are currently receiving Soviet BMP-1 and BTR-60 carriers at an accelerated pace. In addition to the good armored protection it gives to the soldiers and its excellent maneuverability, the BMT is equipped with a 73-mm cannon for short-range destruction of pillboxes and entrenchments. On top of the cannon there is also a launcher for anti-tank missiles of the improved sagger type, and this makes the BMT the best combination now existing in the world of a light tank with an armored fighting car for the infantry.

The fighting methods and nature have also changed. The Syrian army has changed from a defensive into an offensive army. Its units, from the battalion to the division level, endlessly practice penetrating our line of posts on the Golan Heights. In such an exercise conducted recently, the stages of such a penetration were very well exercised according to the Syrian-Soviet conception. The opening move will be from the air. Mig-23's, which are the backbone of the Syrian air force, will attack posts, tanks and artillery batteries. They will be assisted by the Sukhoi-20's, Mig-17's and Sukhoi-7's.

In the last few years the Syrians have devoted a great deal of thought and many training hours to practice the assistance to the ground forces. The air force has generously participated in almost all the maneuvers at the division level.

As for the artillery softening-up: The Syrians currently possess some 2,600 artillery guns of all types and they operate them very efficiently. The innovation in this sphere is the addition of several dozen of Soviet 122-mm mobile cannons. In contrast with the towed cannons, the mobile cannons are self-propelled with the Syrian armored corps and provide it with close covering fire.

In the meantime, the tanks are approaching to firing positions from which they will try to penetrate positions in our posts. At this point, they are joined by the French attack helicopters of the gazelle type. These helicopters are equipped with hawk missiles and their mission is to assist in penetrating the positions and in destroying tanks at the posts and on the ramps in between the posts.

In order to reach our posts, the Syrians must initially cross the anti-tank ditch and the minefields on both sides of it. This is not a simple operation. In order to cross the minefield the Syrians fire a rocket which sets off a series of explosives. When the rocket and its tail land, the explosives go off and clear a path in the minefield. Then, the infantry and engineering corps who will take over the anti-tank ditch start moving and they are succeeded by the bridge laying tanks which will erect the bridge they are carrying to enable the passage of the other forces. Once the bridge has been laid, the tanks and the armored corps carriers--the main components of the force--go through. Once they have removed the obstacles, the infantry troops and the tanks deploy for a combined raid on the posts. Some of the tanks designated for that task provide a smokescreen for the attacking force by pouring oil on their exhaust pipes.

There is no real infantry to talk about in the Syrian army following the revolutionary change it has undergone. The only forces deserving that name are the special force battalions, the commandos. Here in the film we see them in an exercise raiding a Syrian airfield. Please notice the underground hangars sheltering the fighters from an air attack. These forces were the ones that conquered the post on Mount Hermon in 1973. However, their main victories were achieved in sporadic battles, sometimes against the terrorists and, on other occasions against the Christian Syrians [as heard] in Lebanon. No wonder then that instead of six commando battalions in the Yom Kippur War, the Syrians today have 17 battalions of this type. The commandos are mostly members of the 'Alawi sect and they also serve in internal security missions. At times of war, we may encounter them in another attempt to conquer Mount Hermon and the missile posts through ambushes on roads in Northern Israel and by trying to seize vital intersections and bridges for the advancing Syrian armored corps.

Another element designed to transfer the war into Israeli rearguard are the surface-to-surface missiles. Here we see an exercise of a frog missile brigade of the Syrian army. Such a frog missile can carry a warhead weighing several hundred kgs for 70 kms. Less than what a plane can carry but without risking a confrontation with the Israeli air force, this brigade has 24 frog-launchers.

The SCAD missile of the sort we now see in the film can carry a 1-ton warhead for 250 kms, and thus, almost the entire north and central parts of Israel--including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem--are within their range. Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the scope of the danger. These are highly inaccurate missiles and it should be assumed that the Syrians would launch them against military targets.

As for air confrontation, the Syrians have put the emphasis precisely on the surface-to-air missiles, such as the Sam-3's, whose launching we will soon see on the film. This is also a lesson learned from the Yom Kippur War where the radar-guided anti-aircraft missiles and cannons proved very successful. The Syrians currently have some 100 batteries of surface-to-air missiles of all types as well as shoulder-launched missiles of the Sam-7 type.

Yet the Syrian air force has not been neglected and it has been strengthened, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the last 9 years the number of fighters has increased by one third and it currently totals 500 aircraft. The qualitative improvement is mainly revealed in the absorption of the Mig-23's, the Sukhoi-20's and the Mig-25's. The latter is outwardly similar to our F-15. However, unlike the F-15, it can fly at 70,000 feet at twice the speed of sound. The Syrians may use the Mig-25 for high-altitude penetrations for reconnaissance missions and for political provocation. The Mig-21 is used mainly for interception.

The Syrian navy has also trebled its forces since the Yom Kippur War. It currently includes 17 missile boats of the Komar and OSA types, as we see in the film. The lessons of the Yom Kippur War drove the Syrians to station dozens of long-range cannons along its shores and to reinforce them with sophisticated radars.

The Syrian army currently includes some 250,000 soldiers. It has a vast potential of reservists but its organization is faulty. The improvement in the training methods and readiness has apparently not been coupled with a parallel improvement in the quality of manpower. This is the Achilles' heel of the Syrian army. This fact even stands out in the film where we see the Syrian chief of staff, Hikmat al-Shihabi, visiting a perimeter post on the Golan Heights. Some 60 to 70 percent of the recruits are totally illiterate or have elementary school education. Nevertheless, all signs indicate that the Syrians assess they currently have a good capability for repelling any Israeli attack against them. Presumably, under certain conditions, al-Asad will be ready to take the risk and begin a war of attrition, either to avenge his wounded pride in the wake of the Golan Heights law or in order to camouflage internal difficulties.

[Ben-Yishay's question indistinct]

[Litvan] This depends on which side opens the war, on the one hand, and on the other, it depends on the deployment and size of our army, its training and the means at its disposal on ground, sea and air--these are totally different from the means we had in 1973. That will be the main difference. The difference on the operational level depends on which side launches such moves.

[Ben-Yishay] Is our rearguard now more vulnerable to surface-to-surface missiles and to the Arab air forces?

[Eytan] Our rearguard is the same, it has not changed; it is still located in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. Our population is relatively safe but missiles may reach it and Arab air forces may try to reach it and if they succeed then our rearguard does become vulnerable. However, the rearguard is not better organized than in the past. [End videotape]

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'HA'ARETZ 'ON ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN TERRITORIES

TA181255 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Jan 82 p 9

[Yehuda Litani commentary: "Islam--A Rising Power in the Territories"]

[Text] The latest power struggles inside al-Najah University in Nabulus (and later in the Hebron polytechnic as well) highlighted a familiar phenomenon in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but one which nonetheless is hardly known in Israel: The substantial rise in the power of the extremist religious elements in the territories. In the course of the violent clashes at the Nabulus University, one of the lecturers was seriously injured (after having reportedly been pushed--perhaps forced to jump--from the building's third story) and the institute was closed for 2 weeks until emotions calmed down.

Tensions in Nabulus erupted during the elections to the student union, in which the extremist religious list won a sweeping victory (some call it the list of "Muslim brotherhood" supporters, but it appears that it counts among its members more than just brotherhood supporters, but this will be further touched upon later). In contrast, the PLO supporters and the leftists (primarily the communists), as well as a more moderate religious list that wanted to combine the religious Muslim message with partnership in the national struggle, were dealt a striking blow.

A coalition of sorts was established between the newly elected members of the union and the supporters on the one hand, and the chairman of the university's board of trustees, Hikmat al-Masri. The former speaker of the Jordanian Parliament and one of the leaders of the old establishment in Nabulus. The religious students supported him fervently after he had backed the decision to fire four PLO- and leftist-supporters from the teaching staff and to caution 10 more lecturers. That decision sparked off tension in the university, and in general in the town of Nabulus, the issue boiling down to a power struggle between Hikmat al-Masri and the mayor and head of the national guidance committee, Bassam al-Shak'ah.

PLO- and leftist-supporting students locked Hikmat al-Masri in his office in an operation they hoped would result in the reinstatement of the dismissed teachers. Al-Masri was forced to summon employees from the family-owned soap plant to rescue him. His son was injured in the course of the violent brawl that ensued.

After this stage, a compromise was achieved mainly between Bassam al-Shak'ah and Hikmat al-Masri (who are incidentally related, al-Shak'ah's sister being al-Masri's

wife) and it was decided to allow the lecturers to resume their job. This spurred the extremist religious students to violence and they began creating agitation on the campus.

Talks with PLO supporters in the territories, conducted in the course of the violent incident at al-Najah University and the polytechnic in Hebron, showed that the people were baffled and at a loss. The PLO sympathizers do not fear, at least not for the moment, that the extremist zealots will take the reins out of their hands and serve as the leaders of the inhabitants of the territories. However, in their opinion the internal strife merely serves to weaken the main battle, that against the Israeli administration. To their mind, this harms "unity among the frontlines," diverting the attention of the inhabitants of the territories to marginal issues.

But the supporters of the "Muslim brotherhood" and the Liberation Party (a party that branched off from the "Muslim brotherhood" in the early 1950's, based in the Hebron District; the differences between this faction and the "brotherhood" centers mainly on ideology, but the two movements employ similar tactics and share common goals), do not heed these arguments. They purport to be playing "on a different court altogether." As far as they are concerned, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is not the main issue, but rather the establishment of an Islamic state in the style of the Muhammadan country of the prophet and the first four Khalif's. They wish to correct the fundamental wrongs in Islam and as far as they are concerned, action toward establishing an independent Palestinian state constitutes a deviation from the crux of the matter, redirecting excess energy toward the attainment of a peripheral goal.

Hundreds of bearded students donning hats and students in modest garb are proof of the new trend that has gained ground primarily among the rural populace, but also among the urban population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, gaining greater popularity among the younger generation. They are voracious readers of "Muslim brotherhood" publications and written material published by the Liberation Party imported by and large from Arab countries--mainly Egypt (where the "Muslim brotherhood" movement was first established)--as well as articles written here and secretly handed over from one person to another, circulated among the hundreds, nay thousands, of new sympathizers of the back-to-religion movement. It is not only literature, but also manifestos and circulars that are being run off on copying machines and circulated throughout the streets of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on various occasions (lately one such pamphlet presented the views and preaching as carried in the sermons marking the birthday of the prophet Muhammad just a few weeks ago).

They scorn the "moderate," basically pro-Jordanian religious establishment (one which is chiefly financed by the Jordanian Government), regarding it as a rotten establishment divorced from the spirit of Islam, only pretending to be orthodox. This is not altogether dissimilar from the phenomenon we can witness with the neturey qarta zealots scorned member of the NRP or Agudat Yisra'el. Like any other extremist religious movement, they are typified by their extreme fanaticism--this being mainly manifest among these youths who are newly converted and who seek to prove their faithfulness in deeds and actions that are as extreme as can be. They hold in similar disregard the attempt to fuse the nationalistic aspirations and the religious hopes (a trend headed by the chief preacher of the Jerusalem al-Aqsa mosque, Shaykh 'Akrami Sabri). As far as they are concerned, there is no other way but to establish an Islamic country.

In their hatred for Jews and Israelis they cannot be distinguished from PLO members, and may perhaps even surpass them in the intensity of their emotions. "Muslim brotherhood" publications quote ancient Islamic sayings rife with strong anti-Jewish sentiments. Yet it is not the religious difference between Muslims and Jews that is at the heart and core of the matter. As far as they are concerned, the Israelis, in their opinion, introduced into the area characteristics of the degenerate Western civilization (mainly the sale of alcohol) which lead to a moral decline and a marked deviation from the spirit of true Islam among the youngsters and youths. It is primarily against this phenomenon that the extremist Muslims wish to act.

"The Muslim brotherhood" and members of the Liberation Party (Hizb at-Tahrir) were most active during the times of the Jordanian rule, but were weakened and nearly ceased to be during the latter part of the 1960's and the early 1970's. The return to religion movement received a strong impetus after the religious revolution in Iran and the members of the "Muslim brotherhood" were particularly reinforced both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (the main center of influence of the West Bank being Amman, and on the Gaza Strip--Cairo) although the Iranian Islam is Shi'ite whereas in most middle eastern countries, Israel and the territories included, it is Sunnite.

Members of the Israeli military government have claimed that at this stage it is merely a movement numbering a few thousand and that it does not constitute (and again they stress "for the time being") a security danger to Israel. The struggles between them and PLO supporters and the communists are nothing but internal fighting and we should not get entangled in them, they say. They disclaim the contention raised by PLO supporters and leftists that Israel is supportive of the extremist religious figures as being "pure nonsense." We surrounded al-Najah University but did not interfere in what was happening inside the campus so that no party could accuse us of having taken a sympathetic stand toward the adversary, they say. It is none of our business. It is a completely internal feud.

According to them, the fight waged by the clerics in the Gaza Strip in the early 1980's against the PLO supporters and the leftists (which included, among others, also the office of the PLO sympathizers in the Gaza Strip--the "red crescent" offices--as part of the fight for supremacy over the Gaza al-Azhar University) is not at all similar to the present struggles in Nabulus and Hebron. In Gaza, members of the military government argue, the clerics who fought against the communists were members of the establishment lacking affiliation to the "Muslim brotherhood" who are, by and large, supported by Jordan.

It should be pointed out that PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat fought on Eretz Yisra'el soil in 1948 in "Muslim brotherhood" units (al-Jihad al-Muqadas), whose units excelled in the battles over the Faluja Salient, in the course of the fighting. They reached the southern parts of the Hebron hills and were influential in establishing the first movement branches in Hebron and Bethlehem (even though the first "Muslim brotherhood" branch was established by force of heavy Egyptian inspiration as early as in May of 1946 in Jerusalem).

People versed with the issue of the return to religion in the West Bank have said that the parallel trend in the villages of the Israeli triangle began as an attempt to emulate the Samaria "Muslim brotherhood." The "Usrat al-Jihad" (the Jihad family) underground, active primarily in the triangle villages, was loosely linked to the "Muslim brotherhood" as well.

One could sympathize with the apprehensions of the supporters of the PLO and the left in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under whose very nose grows a movement, comprising largely youths, and one whose goals are different from theirs, regarding the religious struggle rather than the national struggle as the chief goal to be achieved mainly through effecting social-moralistic changes. The PLO members try to smooth over the religious differences between Muslims and Christians in working toward the "common objective." Many Christians are prominent activists in the Palestine Liberation Organization (to use but one well-known name out of dozens of such figures, let us cite Dr George Habash) and among the Muslims in its leadership are many who espoused Marxist and leftist ideologies.

The appearance of the extremist Muslim power in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip serves as a direct, overt threat to all those termed "the national forces." "We need the 'Muslim brotherhood' at this moment like we need a hole in the head," I was told last week by a well-known PLO-supporting journalist, "but everyone has got their own problems--you, too, have gush emunim and neturey qarta." He smiled as he said this, but his grin concealed embarrassment and fears in view of the growing power of the back to religion movement in the territories.

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'ITIM' REVIEWS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-LEFTIST CONFLICT IN WEST BANK

TA141502 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1330 GMT 14 Jan 82

[Text] Nabulus, 14 Jan--The Muslim brotherhood movement in Judaea and Samaria has brought back hundreds of Arab young people over the last few months to the arms of religion and it is mainly concentrating its activity in the towns of Samaria--Nabulus, Hebron and East Jerusalem--and also villages in Northwest Samaria and the Hebron hills.

Arab religious groups told the ITIM reporter in Judaea and Samaria that the fights and violence that have recently occurred at al-Najah University in Nabulus and in the engineering college in Hebron indicate a strengthening of Muslim brotherhood members in the area to the dissatisfaction of the leftists, a not inconsiderable number of whom belong to the various splinter groups of the terrorist organizations. These circles have reported that the people who have come back to religion are being backed by clergy who enjoy increased financial aid from conservative Arab countries, mainly Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The clerics are angry about the mass murders being committed by the "Alawite Ba'th regime in Syria against their fellow Muslim brotherhood members. It will be noted that, as a part of the sermons delivered in mosques in Judaea and Samaria on Fridays, the rulers of Damascus are being accused indirectly of committing genocide in the name of left-wing socialism. As is known, the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria are Sunnis.

Rifts have recently increased between members of the Muslim brotherhood and the left. It was against the backdrop of these Rigts that a strike occurred in al-Najah University in Nabulus both last year and this year, after the town's public figures and some from outside it had been unsuccessful in bridging the two rival camps. Last Saturday, 9 January, the Rigts reached the point of bloody clashes, when 18 students from both camps were injured--13 of them needed hospitalization and there was even a case of a lecturer being thrown from the third floor of the al-Najah University building. The man, Hasan (Sawalha) by name, was seriously injured and after this violent incident the board of trustees declared that the university would be closed until further notice.

This bloody incident aroused tension among the inhabitants of Nabulus, and, as the ITIM correspondent has learned, the local notables are making efforts to calm

feelings, using the aid of the Arab press in East Jerusalem. All of them are calling for the "ranks to be closed in order to stand firm against the oppression and exploitation of the Israeli conquest."

The al-Najah incident also aroused strong feelings at the Hebron polytechnic. The day after the incident, leftist students condemned the Muslim brotherhood in Nabulus. In the Hebron polytechnic too, the religious camp has become stronger over the past year and students who are members of the Muslim brotherhood pulled down the condemnations from the bulletin boards and tore them to pieces. As a result of this, a fight broke out between the two rival camps and as a result of the tension, the directors decided to close the school for 2 days. In Hebron, too, public leaders are now trying to calm feelings and they are also using the "settlers' oppression" reason to persuade them.

To date, public figures have not succeeded in bringing about an appeasement between the people who have returned to religion and the leftists. The Muslim brotherhood in Nabulus even published an announcement this week, in which they condemned leftists in the town and abroad for backing the latest quarrels and disputes in the al-Najah University.

In the meantime, two universities--Bi'r Zayt and Bethlehem--have remained as the bastions of the leftists, apparently because they are located in regions in which most of the population is Christian. But even in these two universities, there is restricted activity by members of the Muslim brotherhood, although they are a minority among the leftist majority.

The security forces have not intervened in the latest incidents in Nabulus and Hebron and, as has been reported, there will be no intervention in the activities of the Muslim brotherhood as long as it is conducted on a purely religious basis and is not connected with the terrorist organizations. In this context, it will be noted that religious leaders and members of the Muslim brotherhood are also keeping away from contacts with Israeli authorities and they call for an "Islamic Palestine" in their sermons.

CSO: 4423/74

ARENS ARGUES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF LAVI AIRCRAFT

TA191436 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Jan 82 p 11

[Moshe Arens commentary: "KFIR, Arye, Lavi"]

[Excerpts] The maiden flight of the KFIR prototype was conducted in September 1970 under strict secrecy. By the end of 1973 most of the development work involved in this aircraft was completed and the technical crew in charge of the development of the plane began devoting time to the next challenge. But even today, 8 years later, the go ahead has not yet been given for the development of the air force's next aircraft, an infinite number of sessions and deliberations have been held on this both during the alignment and the Lidud governments' terms. Moreover, it was even found necessary to rename the project Lavi, changing it from the earlier nomenclature of Arye; yet the engineering crew in the aircraft industries and other plants that were to be involved in this project are still waiting on the starting line.

The length of the deliberations and postponement, 8 years, proves that this is a difficult decision involving immense sums and great risks. It is worthwhile taking a long breath to gather information and carry out examinations and comparisons on this subject before the final decision is made, but one can hardly believe that it should take more than 1 or at the most 2 years for the decisionmaking process to exhaust its course. This prolongation merely makes the decision more difficult since the technological and economic considerations change and the engineers sitting waiting for a decision might find other places of employment. It is time to reach a decision.

Had there been room to assume that the cost of developing a combat aircraft locally would amount to more than the procurement of a similar one from the United States, there would have been cause to consider weighing the advantages of it being an Israeli-made aircraft against the additional economic resources this would require. However, all signs indicate that a locally-produced aircraft would not cost more than a similar imported one. Whether one bases this on the analysis of the development and production input or on the comparison of the price of the KFIR and the westwind to that of similar foreign-made aircraft. The many political, defense and social advantages involved actually serve as an additional bonus. When a country has the technical capability of manufacturing a combat aircraft and when the cost of that aircraft would not exceed that of a similar aircraft that would have been purchased elsewhere, it is rather difficult to find reasons not to decide in the affirmative.

CSO: 4423/74

EASTERN EUROPE FINANCING ARAB STUDENTS

TA181345 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Jan 82 p 2

[Report by Me'ir Hare'uveni]

[Text] Some 300 Israeli Arab students are sent annually to East European countries to study. The host countries cover all the students' expenses to the tune of an estimated \$2,000 per student per year. A few more dozen Arab students, studying in universities in Israel and the West, enjoy tuition scholarships and subsistence fees reaching \$1,000 per capita that come from the U.S. universities' organization called "graduates' organization," a body run by extremist Arabs residing in the United States.

These scholarships and grants total hundreds of thousands of dollars per year and are channeled to the students through Arab committees and bodies in Israel, mostly under Rakah control or that of even more extreme nationalistic bodies. The power to approve these grants and send students for studies in Eastern Europe provides these bodies with an immense power to control the high school graduates in the Arab sector in Israel.

Thus, for instance, the Rakah branches exploit this to recruit youngsters between the ages of 13 to 15. The eligibility for a scholarship, in due course, is made conditional upon several years of activity in its branches by way of distributing newspapers and party manifestos and even organizational and political activity in Israel. It is similarly conditioned upon a commitment undertaken by the students to deal with partisan activity upon their return to Israel upon the completion of their study tour abroad.

Funds from nationalistic and leftist sources have been funneled into Israel through Christian church funds from Western Europe as well, particularly through a leftist body in Copenhagen activated by Israeli draft dodger Uri David. This fund has transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars toward the establishment of a large cultural center in the village of Dayr al-Sada, an educational institution in Kafr 'Arraba, development projects in villages and the paving of internal roads in one of the Western Galilee villages.

State elements have clarified that all these funds are transferred to Israel, where they are being distributed through strict adherence to state laws.

CSO: 4423/74

'HA'ARETZ' ON SHARON'S EGYPT TRIP

TA271308 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Jan 82 p 11

['Uzi Benziman commentary: "What Does Sharon Mean?"]

[Text] It is difficult to accept the remarks made by Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon about his latest visit to Egypt as being as simple as they seem. Did he really go to Cairo via Sinai just to see with his own eyes that the Egyptians were scrupulously keeping to the security arrangements in accordance with the military annex to the peace treaty? Does he have no better means at his disposal? And what happened in his talks with the Egyptian leaders that made him change his approach to them so sharply? It was only 2 or 3 weeks ago that he spoke about the Egyptians with great aggressiveness and, among other things, proposed destroying the houses in the Yamit District before the area is handed over to Egypt. After all, he said that Egypt would do well to understand that the rest of Sinai is not yet in its pocket.

And, as if this was not enough, Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir only last week reminded the cabinet that the situation regarding the normalization in the relations between Israel and Egypt was terrible, that the Egyptian secret police was investigating everyone who requests and entrance visa to Israel and that the channel of commercial relations was empty. The Egyptians themselves underlined the troubles in the relations between the two countries when they received the defense minister with a salvo of very unsympathetic articles.

And now Sharon returns to Israel singing another tune. From the television screen--a platform that seems like an advertising slot for the defense minister--he tells the world about the meticulousness with which the Egyptians are keeping the security arrangements in Sinai and, at the cabinet session, he calls upon the ministers to take care in what they say about Egypt because of the enormous repercussions Israeli statements have in Egypt. And even if he did not exactly say that "everything is fine" in the relations between the two countries, the spirit of what he said was that the links between them are being established properly, that peace has created a new reality which must be fostered, that Egypt will adhere to the peace treaty even after April, that every effort must be made to avoid a renewal of the tension in the dialogue between them, that there is an appreciable willingness in Cairo to introduce practical contents into the "normalization era."

Below is my interpretation of the turn in Sharon's approach, based on an attempt to understand the developments among those involved.

It seems that the key to an understanding of the defense minister's updated position is his recognition that there is no chance of now reaching an understanding with the Egyptians about the foundation of autonomy. It seems that before he went to Cairo Sharon still hoped that pressure on Egypt could push it into changing its positions in the negotiations on this problem. It was for this reason that he spoke to the rulers of Cairo in an aggressive tone (mainly in hints he spread around about the possibility that Israel would not complete the withdrawal from Sinai), on the assumption that Israeli pressure in this direction could be a lever for a move in the Egyptian position in the autonomy negotiations (a move which would also drag with it a more flexible Israeli position).

The latest visit to Egypt apparently taught Sharon that this desirable turn in the Egyptian position will not take place. If in the past the Egyptians believed that they could not permit themselves to accept the whole of Sinai without demonstrating some sort of achievement for the Palestinians (through a signed autonomy agreement), then their approach has now changed and they think that they cannot permit themselves to reach an understanding with Israel on this issue because any achievement in this direction would be interpreted as a purely diversionary action for the main attempt being made by Egypt: Bringing back all of Sinai under its sovereignty.

Sharon is very well aware that Israel has no official excuse to demand that Egypt reach an understanding about the foundation of autonomy before April. It was Israel that throughout the peace negotiations denied the existence of any link between the completion of the withdrawal from Sinai and the end of the autonomy negotiations. Israel cannot now come along and demand a linkage between the two processes.

It is almost certain that there was another reason for the sharpening of the tone in which Sharon spoke to the Egyptians before he went on his latest visit--he wanted to obtain their agreement to the dismantling of the installations in Sinai, even after April. It was apparently for this reason that he declared that the houses in the Yamit District being evacuated would be dismantled. It may be assumed that this intention was not well received in Cairo and served Sharon in gaining the Egyptians' agreement to a postponement of the dismantling of the installations, even after the completion of the withdrawal.

In brief, what is known as of this moment: Sharon reached the conclusion that it was essential to dispel the tension in the relations between the two countries and, for this reason, he sharply changed the tone of his words about Egypt. He agreed with Mubarak about a series of visits by Egyptian personalities to Israel in order to demonstrate correctness in the relations between the two countries. He called (at a cabinet session) on the minister of tourism, commerce and industry to be prepared for the visit by Mustafa Khalil, who may in the future play a main role in the Egyptian Government as the person responsible for commercial relations between the two countries. He tried to instill in the ministers his feeling that Israeli-Egyptian peace is still an infant that must be handled carefully. At the same time, it is known that Sharon unambiguously explained to Egypt that any violation of the conditions of the military annex to the peace treaty would bring in its wake a military action by Israel.

This explanation (which, it may be assumed, he also passed on to his interlocutors in Cairo) necessarily involves the fact that in the future Israel may be hesitant about how to react to breaches of the conditions of the peace treaty. This is because, for Mubarak, a decision to transfer several divisions via the Suez Canal to Sinai is nothing but an organizational operation, while for Israel, a counter-decision is a decision for war. A minor change in the situation of the Egyptian forces in Sinai (behind the conditions permitted in accordance with the peace treaty) could present a problem for Israel: Should it react firmly to the positioning of scores of additional tanks in the thinned-out area? Sharon explained to his hosts in Cairo that in order to avoid problems of this sort he had instructed the IDF to react rapidly and aggressively--that is, in a military manner--to any violations of the conditions of the peace treaty.

Mand thus, it is against the background of an Israeli readiness for a firm military reaction on the one hand, and of an attempt to demonstrate Israeli-Egyptian practical and political understanding on the other, that Sharon intends to advance toward 26 April.

It is typical that most of the cabinet members do not get right down to digging into the defense minister's views and do not understand the meaning of the change in his position. Therefore, against the background of the hostility and suspicions many ministers are showing about Sharon. A completely different explanation was given this week for the latest reversal in his position on Egypt. According to the explanation the defense minister's rivals are giving, the sweet words about the Egyptians were only intended to put them to a severe test up to April. According to this interpretation, the minister of defense is now industriously creating an especially good atmosphere in Israeli-Egyptian relations in order to prevent any Egyptian excuse for any complaints against Israel.

His rivals claim Sharon needs these circumstances in order to test Egypt on the political or military development that will replace an Israeli move on another front such as the move annexing the Golan Heights or a military confrontation in the north.

CSO: 4423/73

LEVI INTERVIEWED ON YAMIT, OTHER ISSUES

TA222027 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1820 GMT 22 Jan 82

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister David Levi by correspondent Yoram Ronen at the studio; 22 Jan--videotaped]

[Excerpt] [Question] Mr Levi, it has been reported that during the last cabinet meeting you chaired, you proposed to the cabinet members not to question the sum of the compensation to the Yamit District evacuees before the endorsement by the Knesset Finance Committee. Do you intend to request an additional debate of the amount of the compensations?

[Answer] I am not dealing with this on a day-to-day basis, by way of a performance in installments. I stated my opinion before the adoption of the cabinet decision. Since the resolution has been adopted, it is binding.

[Question] But you are saying that a minister may request a revision of the discussion. Will you exploit your right?

[Answer] What I said pertains to all the ministers. This is not a right, the word right has not been mentioned, but we shall wait and see what the Knesset Finance Committee decides. It should be recalled, however, that this issue has been resolved by the cabinet. And it is a fundamental rule that when you have a position, you state it, you work for it before the decision is adopted. Once the decision is adopted, it is binding.

[Question] This means that you see this issue as concluded.

[Answer] I would not want to rediscuss it in the media.

[Question] Mr Levi, the day after tomorrow you will be chairing, during the cabinet meeting, the first discussion on the state budget. Do you not fear that the new budget will entail considerable cuts in the welfare budgets, perhaps on account of the increased compensation to people from the Yamit District?

[Answer] I want to refrain from confusing different issues. The state budget has several fundamental healthy components, but it has also a number of problems. As for the social problems in the areas of education and welfare: We shall discuss

them. I have no doubt whatsoever that we shall find--I would say--the path that expresses the two concepts. There will certainly be no harsh measures.

[Question] It is well known that the education minister has in the last few weeks conducted a hard struggle to prevent cuts in the education budget. Will you give backing to Minister Hammer when the issue is to be decided?

[Answer] Every discussion of the budget is a rehearsal of positions manifested by the ministers in charge. But it was proved that after the discussion not every budget is approved as presented and not every request is necessarily accepted, for this reason there is a cabinet meeting and the golden median way is being sought, as I said. I would not say anything decisive today, before the cabinet gives its considered opinion, and I would not say that harsh measures characterize this budget--by no means.

[Question] Do you indeed believe that a gold path can be found between the finance minister and the education minister on the subject of the education budget?

[Answer] I believe so, and I will do everything in my power to find a common language and a common denominator.

[Question] Do you intend to intervene actively in this issue?

[Answer] What did you think: Will I be merely a robot, just giving the floor?

[Question] Mr Levi, let us go back to the Yamit District; not to the compensation, but to the stop the withdrawal from Sinai movement. How do you view the activities of that movement in the Yamit District?

[Answer] This thing is certainly deviating and totally unacceptable in an orderly state. This issue was discussed in the cabinet and, as probably you also know, the issue was submitted for decision to the ministerial security committee, which will decide on the issue.

[Question] How will it decide the issue? Should steps be taken against the violators of the law in Yamit?

[Answer] Actions regarding the evacuation will be decided upon.

[Question] Deputy Minister Druckman is in the United States now, and is publicly speaking against the withdrawal. Do you regard it as conceivable that a deputy minister in the government is going abroad and opposes the position of the government?

[Answer] This is something unprecedented, deviatory and intolerable.

[Question] Do you intend to act in this matter?

[Answer] What I must do, I will do on the proper levels.

[Question] Including an action against Mr Druckman?

[Answer] If I am saying that I am against, I am against this specific deviatory activity. I certainly think I am not the only cabinet member who holds such a view. This definitely contradicts the partnership and the responsibility. It is inconceivable for a person who is a partner in the coalition and in the cabinet to continue acting outside the country--without restraint from the cabinet--in something that completely contradicts cabinet policy.

[Question] Will the issue be raised in the cabinet?

[Answer] Possibly so.

[Question] Mr Levi, after you were excluded from the ministerial committee for security affairs, tension has been reported between you and the prime minister, tension that was perhaps alleviated last week, when you were appointed acting prime minister.

[Answer] I would like to make this clear: There was no tension between me and the prime minister. True, I was dissatisfied with not being chosen to serve on this important committee. I felt and still feel umbrage at this. This does not mean that there was tension between me and the prime minister. But the prime minister charged me with this task, [as acting prime minister] and I am doing everything to fulfill it as best as I can, but the two things are not to be confused.

[Question] But the prime minister was nevertheless the man who failed to include you in the ministerial committee for security affairs.

[Answer] That is his prerogative. If it offended me, then I am offended. At the same time, however, even in the most difficult situations--and there are such things from time to time--there is sympathy between me and the prime minister, we both know about it, and we both want it to continue.

[Question] Do you think a way will be found to include you in the ministerial committee for security affairs?

[Answer] This is in the hands of the prime minister.

[Question] Do you intend to continue pressing in that direction?

[Answer] I will not discuss this issue in the media.

CSO: 4423/73

'DAVAR' COMMENTARY ON EGYPT-ISRAEL RELATIONS

TA281702 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Jan 82 p 9

[Dan Avidan commentary: "How Will Egypt Behave Toward Israel After April?"]

[Text] This week I was happy to read the instructive article by Mikha'el Asaf about what can be expected in Egypt after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The importance of all this springs mainly, from an attempt to gainsay the fears recently prevalent in the Israeli public--to no small extent, on the basis of reading the press--that we may soon expect a strategic reversal in Cairo's position toward the peace agreement.

Furthermore, the impression could even have been gained recently that all of President Mubarak's latest moves--the release of the leftist opposition elements who had in the past opposed the peace process, the renewed looking toward the Arab world and the USSR--alerts us not only to a new style of action, but also to an attempt to prepare the ground for an about-face in the Egyptian commitment to the peace agreement and Cairo's current reliance on close ties with the United States. Today there is no longer any doubt that Mubarak will be different from his predecessor. In fact, this is how it has been throughout Egypt's modern history when a new leader arose there, where all authority of power is concentrated in the image of the "leader of the nation." It is also reasonable to assume that the situation to be created in the area after April will make it more convenient for moves of a new style by Cairo, which has in fact never retracted its view on the need to achieve a comprehensive settlements of the Middle East conflict.

However, Asaf was right in the basic assumption that even after April it is very difficult to expect Egypt to rejoin an Arab coalition considering preparing the ground for a war with Israel in the near future. It should also be taken into account that Mubarak is a new image in power and is now mainly immersed in consolidating his status in the leadership; it is very doubtful if it is already clear to him, at this stage, how he will map out his main policies for the distant future. For the moment it appears that he is very dependent in this field on his close group of advisers.

It appears to me that, accordingly, Mubarak, who was after all al-Sadat's close partner on the road to peace, is still a partner to the basic assumption that behind the al-Sadat approach--that if Egypt, in the near future, really intends to deal

with its severe domestic problems, there is no longer any place for its reentry into some sort of military complications with Israel for the sake of the Palestinian and Pan-Arab fight against zionism.

For this reason it is also difficult to predict the achievement of an Egyptian understanding with President al-Asad's and the radical Arab bloc's line, which is currently thinking in terms of war with Israel. Furthermore, even if after April it turns out that Mubarak's trend is not toward further developing the peace, and even if we gradually notice Egyptian reservations on the Camp David process--this does not mean that Egypt will turn to the opposite extreme.

In terms of the Egyptian position toward Israel, two main scenarios are possible after April:

--Egypt will continue with the policy of developing bilateral relations in the spirit of the soothing tones we are currently hearing from Egypt's leaders in talks with Israelis, without paying any attention to the state of its relations with the Arab world.

--Egypt will begin a speeded-up process of rapprochement with the Arab world--keeping controlled relations with Israel--and mainly the conservative Arab countries. This will not be part of an attempt to enter a common war against Israel, but in the framework of following the political path Egypt has in the past presented alone and which Saudin Arabia, to a certain extent, presents today. The main point of this approach is to lead Israel to significant concessions on the borders in return for peace.

The second scenario may be more reasonable than the first: First of all, because Mubarak's character is different from that of al-Sadat and he is less enthusiastic and committed than his predecessor to a rapprochement with Israel, and also because of his desire to sever Egypt from the position of isolation in the Pan-Arab arena. Second, and perhaps no less important, Israel's conduct may also have an influence in this direction. The annexation of the Golan Heights--an act contradicting the Egyptian view of peace--is an example of this. According to this scenario, the Pan-Arab arena will not be united after April, but split up between the radical bloc under the leadership of Syria and the pro-Western bloc. Israeli-Egyptian relations will mark time, but they will not, in any event, march toward a frontal confrontation, particularly not a military one.

In addition to what is written above, we should also not dismiss the possibility of surprises by President Mubarak, mainly in the more distant future. It is also clear that it will be a long time before we learn to know the new president's nature, and his intentions, well. It is a fact that even as far as President al-Sadat was concerned, and we watched him for many years. We failed more than once to understand his political moves and we were surprised by his military moves.

The root of the mistaken interpretation of President Mubarak's latest moves, as well as attributing too much importance to extremist statements by the Egyptian media, lies in my view in an incorrect interpretation of the scale of priorities in Egyptian national work at the present time. As I said, Mubarak is a new leader,

unknown to the nation. His moves toward opposition elements among the intellectuals and the left and his hints of a possible rapprochement with the Arab world--not at the expense of the peace process--should first of all be understood against the backdrop of his attempts to build for himself the image of a national leader, standing apart from the shadow of an al-Sadat. He is working hard to drive a wedge between the leftist opposition elements--with whom he is prepared to "open a dialogue"--and the fundamentalist Islamic underground, which he still sees as the greatest threat to the stability of the central rule.

His moves should, therefore, be understood in their internal, Egyptian context, just as Mubarak's need for recognition as an independent ruler in his own right should be understood; and there is no room for an interpretation of them as a trend away from the peace agreement.

The matter of Mubarak's leadership of Egypt requires further explanation, because the problem is a complicated one. Mubarak is the heir of two leaders who began their terms in power as anonymous men, but in the course of time were revealed to be men of great stature. As will be recalled, when al-Sadat came to power he was not considered to be a great luminary, but in the course of time it turned out that he was a person with a historical and political sense, a person who knew how to define his goals and put them into operation. Mubarak does not, for the moment, appear to be a person of this sort. For the moment he appears to be a normal military man, a good bureaucrat and an efficient man in work and coordination. In the course of time, if he feels that turning his back on Israel and moving strongly toward the Pan-Arab arena might consolidate his position in the leadership, this line may be of prime importance to him. In any event, because the process of consolidating power is a prolonged matter, perhaps he will have to take steps in domestic and foreign policy that a ruler accepted by the public as a national leader of Egypt no longer needs.

Against this background, in the more distant future there may be a negative development from Israel's viewpoint. This is because if Mubarak does not show himself to be a leader who consolidates his authority enough to silence the opposition on the right and the left, the fundamentalists may again become stronger and the left will also accumulate power. Such an opposition could, in the long run, jeopardize his rule. In such a case he might even face the danger of a military coup by the focuses of power in the army.

Such a situation, if it develops, could push Mubarak into following an extremist policy--something that is not now being predicted, but is possible. Every Arab leader who comes up against problems at home tries to strengthen his position by radical moves abroad, first and foremost against Israel. If its leadership is weak, Egypt might return to a coalition with the radical countries, but for the moment it is on relatively firm ground, because Mubarak's opposition is not by way of being a real threat to him.

CSO: 4423/73

BRIEFS

COMMITTEE ON UNIVERSITY CRISIS--A committee of public figures has been set up in Judeaea and Samaria to try and find a solution to the crisis in the al-Najah University. The members of the committee are: the Tulkarm mayor, the Qalqilyah mayor, the 'Anabta mayor, a Jerusalem cleric named Ikram Sabri, Hebron Municipal Council member (Zrayer), and 13 Nabulus notables. Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah and the head of the al-Najah university's board of trustees, Hikmat al-Masri, met yesterday in the framework of this committee's work. Hikmat al-Masri later left for Jordan. The university's board of directors is not functioning, but has been replaced by a 31-member council which represents the various university's sectors. [Text] [TA201656 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 20 Jan 82]

FOREIGN FUNDS FOR LAND PURCHASES--Hundreds of thousands of dollars are reaching Israel almost daily through the Jordan River bridges for Arab purchases of land in various locations inside the green line area and for the establishment of buildings near Jewish settlements in Judeaea and Samaria. The dollars are being brought openly by inhabitants of the territories returning from Jordan. According to sources in Judeaea and Samaria, the money originates from the terrorist organizations or organizations connected to them. The sources reported that in this way land and buildings have been purchased, mainly in towns with a mixed population, such as Ramla, Lod, Yafo and 'Akko. "This is methodical activity using funds arriving without any restrictions and practically nothing is being done to date to curb it," a source close to the subject said yesterday. It has also been reported that the phenomenon is causing security elements great concern. [Report by Arye Egozi] [Text] [TA201033 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 20 Jan 82 p 1]

OIL PROSPECTING PLANS FORMULATING--Scientists from the Geological Institute and the national fuel authority have drawn up a detailed plan for deep oil drilling near Rosh Ha'ayin. Our correspondent Gadi Sukenik reports that the drilling will go more than 6 km deep. The plan is to penetrate one of the two largest geological formations in the country. The formation, which is more than 40 square km in size, might possibly be a site where hundreds of millions of barrels of oil could be found. The plans for drilling east of Helez will also be completed in a month however, our correspondent says that there is little chance that the oil prospecting investment company [HANA] and the energy ministry will succeed in raising the necessary capital for it. Our correspondent emphasizes that so far attempts to raise funds for the Sedom-III site have also failed. A special oil-drill slated for operation at the Sedom site near the Dead Sea has been laid idle for more than 6 months, resulting in the loss of some \$250,000. The national fuel authority's board of directors will discuss ways to raise money for oil prospecting this morning. [Text] [TA200922 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 20 Jan 82]

CIVILIAN POWERS IN RAMALLAH--The military and civilian powers have been divided in the Ramallah District today, and the civilian administration has been entrusted to Pinhas Landau, who will be acting administrator. Earlier, these powers were divided in the Hebron District as well. [Text] [TA211717 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 21 Jan 82]

W. BANK LAND PURCHASES--The Israel land administration has reservations about the open market for the purchase of land in the territories and it claims that this market should be restricted to approved, professional agents. Sources from the Israel land administration told our correspondent, Yon Feder, that there is now a unbridled market for land in the territories and this is also leading to increased prices. [Text] [TA211232 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 21 Jan 82]

WORK HALTED ON NEGEV AIRFIELDS--Serious disruptions have been caused in the last few months in the construction work in the Nevatim (Tel Malhata) airfield between Beer-sheba, 'Arad and Dimona. Police units are summoned almost daily to defend the tractors on site against Bedouin still residing nearby. Most of the Bedouin families living on the airfield grounds have not yet left the area because no evacuation and compensation agreement has yet been signed with them. Recently, in view of the high compensation the Yamit District residents will receive for evacuating their homes, the Bedouin have also raised their financial demands and are no longer willing to accept the low compensation offered them, arguing that they cannot be discriminated against compared to the Yamit District inhabitants. "They flexed their muscles and got more money; we too will flex our muscles and get more money," the Tel Malhata Bedouin have been known to say. In the last 3 weeks the 'Arad police have registered numerous complaints of criminal offenses: stones were thrown at tractors breaking their windshields; in the night unidentified persons would damage the tractors and groups of Bedouin women and children would block the tractors' path. [Report by Buqi Na'e] [Excerpt] [TA191348 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 19 Jan 82 pp 1, 15]

OFIRA APARTMENTS TAKEN OVER--Members of the movement to stop the withdrawal from the Sinai today took over 11 empty apartments in Ofira. This has been learned by our correspondent in the south 'Ofer Taler. Another nucleus of Yeshiva students has settled in the town and the number of sympathizers with the movement currently on the site totals 100 people. Our correspondent notes that the Ofira citizen's committee had announced that it would object to the takeover but the police have not yet received any complaint. [Text] [TA192000 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 19 Jan 82]

VILLAGE DESCRIBED AS 'ARSENAL'--Inhabitants of al-Tayyiba in the triangle say that their village has become a large arsenal of weapons and ammunition over the past year and that the possibility cannot be dismissed that these arms will, when the time comes, be used against the country. "If the police do not act at once to remove the secretly held weapons, it will be impossible to do so in the future,"

residents of al-Tayyiba emphasized. The head of the local council, 'Abd al-Khatib Habib, whose house was shot at by unidentified assailants last week, says the situation in al-Tayyiba is deteriorating. Over the last 3 months there have been two cases of handgrenades being thrown and two cases of houses being fired upon. If we take into account that this matter involves a small place, these incidents should be regarded with great gravity," he said. Mr Habib called upon the minister of the interior to act to strengthen the local police station. "Ever since the station was established about 18 months ago, we have been promised that it will be manned by 30 policemen. Now the station is manned by less than 10 who deal not only with al-Tayyiba, but with several nearby villages," he said and confirmed: "The current large station has not succeeded in coping with the worsening crimewave and it cannot even cope with the crimes that are reported to it. The police station must work night and day, not only during the day." He added: "If criminals succeed in taking the law into their own hands in al-Tayyiba, they will do the same thing in the near future in other places throughout Israel, as well." [Text] [TA101016 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Jan 82 pp 1, 11]

CIVILIAN COORDINATOR ASSUMES POST--The new coordinator of activities in the territories, Mr Rehavya Vardi, will assume his post today. This is the first time that a civilian has been given this senior position. Mr Vardi, 55, has held various senior positions in the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff Headquarters. He was employed in various posts dealing with Arab affairs, he speaks Arabic and is acquainted with Arab culture. After resigning from the service, he acted for several years as the representative of the Jewish businessman from Iran, (Alqaniyan) (who was one of the leaders of the community, executed after the downfall of the shah). While in this post he dealt with, among other things, the establishment of the new diamond exchange in Ramat Gan. His appointment is considered to be one of the most acceptable in the defense establishment. Experts in Arab affairs hope that this will allow the minister of defense a more effective contact with the Arab population and the leaders in the territories. [Text] [TA100857 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Jan 82 p 2]

LAND OCCUPATION NEAR BAYT SURIK--Inhabitants of the Arab village of Bayt Surik in the Ramallah District (north of Qiryat 'Anavim) yesterday complained that Israeli settlers have begun cultivating 700 dunams of their land and prevented them from entering the area. The military government, with whom the complaint was filed, promised to examine their charges. It was reported from Bayt Sahur last night that in the last few days there have been some attempts to set cars on fire. There has been tension between the supporters of Bishara Qimsiyah and the area village league--supported by the Israeli administration--on the one hand and their opponents on the other. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's wife yesterday toured the church of nativity in Bethlehem and the shepherds church in Bayt Sahur. She was escorted by a local nun and was given a police security guard. It was reported from Nabulus yesterday that local residents were allowed to cross the border to Jordan following a ban on such visits that had been in effect for some time. At the same time, the ban continues to be in effect regarding inhabitants of the refugee camps and some Samaria villages. The Bethlehem soccer team did not depart for Amman yesterday and planned after the military government had informed four players that they were forbidden to travel. The team is from the (Silizana) school. [Text] [TA291037 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 29 Jan 82 p 1]

RECOGNIZE EACH OTHER'S RIGHTS--Journalist Raymonda al-Tawil from Ramallah has urged the Palestinians and the Israelis to recognize each other's national rights. She was speaking before the Jerusalem News Reporters Association on Wednesday. Among that association's members are radio and television editors from the "Palestinian office for news services" in East Jerusalem. Ms al-Tawil further called on Israeli journalists to pass a message of peace between the two nations, emphasizing that this was also the job of Arab reporters. In reply to questions, she noted the possibility of coexistence and of holding a dialogue and complained that her office, which deals with briefing and distributing information on the Palestinian issue, is not recognized. She said that unlike East Jerusalem reporters, her office staff members have not been issued journalist certificates. The chairman of the news editors association, Yitzhaq Gonen, reported that during the meeting, both Ms al-Tawil and her aid, Ibrahim (Qa'in), pointed out the similarity between the feeling of national affinity among Jews of various origins on the one hand and the Palestinians, who feel they are one people regardless of the country they live in, on the other hand. [Text] [TA290943 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Jan 82 p 3]

SHAMIR APPOINTS POLITICAL AIDE--Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has appointed a political aide to handle contacts between himself and his party. The aid, Gershon Avi'ad, 48, has for the last few years served as the director of the "blue-white" [Likud] faction's organization department. During the election campaign, Avi'ad served as a member of the Likud's election headquarters staff, managing Prime Minister Menahem Begin's appearances. He was born in Israel and graduated from the criminology and public administration departments of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Political circles believe that the appointment was made to strengthen Shamir's interpartisan standing in the struggles within the Herut movement. Since his appointment as minister more than 2 years ago, Shamir has not made any partisan appointment in his office or in the foreign ministry directorate. [Report by the political correspondent] [Text] [TA281318 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Jan 82 p 1]

SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL HEAD NAMED--Shaykh Sa'd ad-Din al-'Alami, who has so far served as the Mufti of Jerusalem, will be named the president of the Supreme Muslim Council to replace Shaykh Hilmi al-Muhtasib, who died and was buried in Hebron 2 days ago. Shaykh al-'Alami, about 75 years old, was born and raised in Jerusalem and obtained his knowledge of Islam in his home town and in the al-Azhar University in Egypt. In the last decade he was the Mufti of Jerusalem and was active in what became known among Muslim council circles as "maintaining East Jerusalem's Arab character." The power of the Muslim council lies in its being the most senior and most widely-respected Arab public institution in East Jerusalem and the territories and also because of the resources at its disposal. In the last 15 years, it has gained power because the Israeli Administration has been wary of harming it or undermining its status. The decision to elect Shaykh al-'Alami as the president of the council was made with the consent of its 12 members and received approval from Jordan. [Report by Yosef Tzuri'el] [Text] [TA281431 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Jan 82 p 2]

INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY URGED--Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon has asked the heads of the industrial sector to spread industrial plants throughout the area beyond the green line in Judaea and Samaria, in order to create employment for the local settlers. Yesterday the defense minister met in his office with the president of

Industrialists union, Eli Hurwitz, who was accompanied by the union's director general, Arnon Tibert and the director general of Ael [electronics company], Zalman Shalev. It has agreed during the meeting that the minister will attend the upcoming session of the industrial union's executive council. At the meeting, the minister expressed unqualified support for the local industry and pointed out that in his opinion the defense establishment should purchase locally all the products available on the market instead of importing them. [Report by the economic affairs correspondent] [Text] [TA261319 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Jan 82 p 6]

ANTIDRAFT LEAFLET IN DRUZE VILLAGES--This morning a leaflet was circulated in the Druze villages against the continuation of the IDF draft for members of the Druze sect. The leaflet, which is signed by the Druze initiative committee [va'adat hayozma hadruzit], says that more than two-thirds of those who are required to serve in the army from the village of Shefar'am have deserted from their units and some of them are in prison because of this. The authors of the leaflet reject IDF services; according to them, the Druze are Arabs according to their nationality, although their religion is different. [Text] [TA261505 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 26 Jan 82]

INTIMIDATING JEWS AGAINST EMIGRATION--Copenhagen, 25 Jan (exclusive)--Jewish circles in Leningrad have reported that the KGB is now employing a new method against emigration activists: intimidation. KGB men visit schools where Jewish children study and try to influence them to "work on" their parents to cancel their emigration requests. Similar action has been taken with regard to children whose parents take Hebrew classes. "Hooligans" meanwhile continue to harass emigration activists. [Report by correspondent in Scandinavia Eliyahu Zehavi] [Excerpt] [TA261315 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Jan 82 p 2]

YAMIT EVACUATION PLANS OUTLINED--Israel will remove most of the equipment from the Yamit District after the district is handed over to Egypt, but part of the agricultural equipment will begin to be removed before that date. Our political correspondent, Shim'on Schiffer, reports that a decision to this effect was made in Jerusalem in a ministerial consultation chaired by the prime minister. The defense minister explained to his colleagues that the Egyptians accepted Israel's request after he made clear to them what is liable to occur, should the equipment begin to be removed with the settlers still in their homes. The defense minister thinks in that case the evacuation could be properly effected only by the destruction of every vacated building. Government circles told our political correspondent that a decision on the exact date of the Yamit District evacuation should be adopted because 26 April falls 1 day before the remembrance day for IDF dead. These circles believe Israel will have to conclude the withdrawal several days before that date, or ask for a postponement of several days. [Text] [TA270544 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 27 Jan 82]

OFFICER TO HANDLE LAND PURCHASING--A staff officer for land affairs has been appointed in the Judea and Samaria military government. This is a new post, created in order to prevent fraud in land transactions in Judea and Samaria. The officer is Sammy Gabay, who has worked together with the staff officer for legal affairs, the spokesman for the civilian administration in Judea and Samaria has said that Mr Gabay is actually "the Israeli land registrar in Judea and Samaria." He confirmed

that Mr Gabay will closely examine all the Judaea and Samaria land transactions to prevent cases of fraud. So far such investigations have been carried out by Mr Yehuda Nahari, an Israel land administration man, who also served as custodian of absentee property in Judaea and Samaria. He will continue to investigate the Judaea and Samaria land deals, but Mr Gabay will carry out a parallel investigation. Thus, in effect, there will be double supervision. The need to appoint a staff officer for land affairs was raised in light of the buying spree of Judaea and Samaria land, which also entailed many cases of fraud, leaving many Jews with only a piece of paper in their hand. [Report by 'Amos Levav] [Text] [TA261225 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Jan 82 p 2]

ARSON IN GAZA--Unknown people yesterday set on fire the library of the Red Crescent Association. The head of the association, Dr Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, reported that several hundreds of books were damaged and the card catalog was burned. Religious books were also stolen from the library. The police have begun an investigation. Our correspondent Arye Gus reports it is believed that religious circles in Gaza are responsible for the arson. These circles believe that the Red Crescent organization serves as a center for communist activity. About 2 years ago Muslim fanatics set the association's Gaza offices on fire and in the course of a demonstration they also set fire to a moviehouse which, according to them, screened pornographic films. [Text] [TA261322 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 26 Jan 82]

SINAI AIRFIELD INSTALLATIONS DEMOLISHED--The IDF has already demolished most of the underground concrete installations that serve to shelter the aircraft at the Etam and 'Ezyon airfields, scheduled to be evacuated in April. These two airfields will be handed over to Egypt, and according to the military agreement the Egyptians will only be permitted to activate civilian flights from there. Fighter aircraft will not be allowed to land there or in any other Sinai airfields, and that is why the decision was made long ago for the IDF to demolish the underground concrete installation sheltering the aircraft as well as other defense facilities. In the earlier stages of the pullback the IDF also destroyed all the special concrete installations as well as bunker formations, like those in Umm Khushayb. The demolition work in the last two airfields began in Etam, and the work there is nearly finished. Now the experts expect to finish their work at the 'Ezyon airfield, too. [Report by the military correspondent] [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Jan 82 p 2]

EGYPT PRESSURED ON AUTONOMY--Saudi Arabia is putting heavy pressure on Egyptian President Husni Mubarak not to reach an agreement about a declaration of principles regarding autonomy before April 1982. This has been learned in Jerusalem from Western sources. The United States is concerned about this position being taken by Saudi Arabia and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig views this move by Riyadh with great gravity. There is an evaluation in Jerusalem that Egyptian President Husni Mubarak will try to avoid any decision in the autonomy negotiations until after the completion of the withdrawal from Sinai and that in his talks with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, he will oppose the U.S. initiative to achieve a rapid breakthrough in the negotiations. Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon has reported to the prime minister on his talks with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and with the Egyptian top ranks. [Report by Ilan Kfir] [Excerpt] [TA220950 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Jan 82 pp 1, 11]

IDF REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY REPORTED--The IDF has either already purchased or is in the process of purchasing some 200 apartments in Mizpe Ramon, Yeroham and Dimona. Over the next year the defense ministry will purchase some 335 additional apartments in those towns and in Elat. This transpires from Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon's reply to a query placed by Mr Jacques Amir on the IDF Negev redevelopment. In his query, submitted in November 1981, Amir contended that the Negev development towns have hardly felt the IDF redeployment in the region. According to the minister, upon the completion of the Nevatim airbase by the end of 1983, 300 more apartments will be purchased. All in all, the Negev will absorb thousands of regular servicemen, civilians employed in the IDF, and their families. Minister Sharon said that a plant for the supply of equipment to the IDF has been established in Mizpe Ramon and that negotiations are underway to expand the local military industries plant as well. Similarly, agreement has been reached to establish a large service station in Yeruham that will provide the regional IDF vehicles with the necessary services. [Report by the correspondent in the Negev] [Text] [TA250628 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Jan 82 p 4]

SCHIFFMAN TO RALLY KNESSET MEMBERS--Deputy Transport Minister David Schiffman has decided to try to rally Knesset members who sympathize with the Yamit District settlers wishing to remain there and not wanting the compensation money. Schiffman believes an attempt is called for to persuade Egypt and world public opinion that we have a humanitarian problem in the Rafah approaches and that the district should be left in Israel's possession. At the same time Schiffman opposes activities of the movement to stop the Sinai withdrawal because he is concerned about the future of the peace treaty, and seeks to maintain it. Mr Schiffman discussed this last night with our correspondent, Amnon Nadav, after a tour of the Yamit District with three other Knesset members. [Text] [TA250548 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 25 Jan 82]

TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY AIDED--It has been learned that recently the Sinai Bedouin have begun cooperating with terrorist organizations, smuggling landmines, handgrenades and explosives--something they have so far refused to do. Their readiness to assist the terrorists is related to the activities of the green patrol pursuing them. Reports on this have been received from military sources. [Report by the parliamentary correspondent] [Excerpt] [TA121059 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Jan 82 p 1]

LAND BUYING SPREE--The vast compensation money the Sinai evacuees are getting has led to a buying spree of Judaea and Samaria land. The buyers and middlemen do not even bother to conceal their evaluation that the purchasing of land in Judaea and Samaria is a good investment. If Israel remains in the area, prices will go up; if it is forced to withdraw or reach a territorial compromise, the Sinai compensation agreements will have constituted a precedent. Most of the purchasing activity today is done around Qarne Shomron, Bilqana and Ari'el, with potential buyers accompanied by real estate agents arriving there daily. [Report by Avraham Dishon, Arye Elor and Gid'on 'Eshet] [Excerpt] [TA251044 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 25 Jan 82 pp 1, 7]

AUTHORITIES SPLIT IN BETHLEHEM--The civilian and military authority have been split in the Bethlehem District. An officer holding the rank of lieutenant colonel, Albert Bahar, has been appointed in charge of the civilian administration. Thus

there are three officers in charge of the civilian administration in the various districts. Officers had been earlier appointed in charge of the Hebron and Ramallah Districts, all of them holding the rank of lieutenant colonel. Meanwhile, our correspondent reports that most mayors either boycott the civilian administration officers or address the military government by its old name. The civilian administration has initiated several meetings with mayors but they rejected the initiatives. [Text] [TA251828 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 25 Jan 82]

COORDINATOR OF ACTIVITIES TITLE CHANGED--The defense minister has changed the title of the coordinator of activities in the territories. From now on this official will be called the coordinator of activities in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, this is reported by our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari. A civilian, Rehavya Varid, has recently been appointed to this post in the framework of separating the military and civilian authorities in the territories. Yesterday, a civilian administration official, Pinhas Landau, was put in charge of the Ramallah District and earlier a civilian administration official had been appointed in the Hebron District. [Text] [TA221350 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 22 Jan 82]

UNLICENSED ARMS POSSESSION--Nine men and one woman were detained last night in the village of Jisr az-Zarqa, south of Ma'agan Mikha'el, in the framework of a large-scale campaign intended to stop the increasing use of unlicensed arms. Our correspondent Me'ir Einstein reports that early in the morning many policemen and border-policemen arrived on foot at the village and searched in eight houses. Within 2 hours various types of arms, IDF equipment, agricultural and other kinds of equipment that had been stolen, as well as apparently hard drugs, were seized. [Text] [TA231042 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 23 Jan 82]

COMMANDER SLATED FOR TOP POST--Commander of the air force, Maj Gen David 'Ivri, accepted, in principle, Minister Sharon's proposal to serve as director general of the defense ministry. Major General 'Ivri will most probably assume his office in June this year. [Report by the military correspondent] [Excerpt] [TA241011 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jan 82 p 2]

GOLAN HEIGHTS INCIDENT--For the first time since the application of Israeli law in the Golan, a Syrian flag was brandished yesterday in the Druze village of Majdal Shams in northern Golan. The flag had been hoisted atop the local school, and was taken down by a police patrol that passed through the village. Seven students from Druze villages received permits from Syrian authorities to study at the University of Damascus. In the past, some 50 students would go each year to study in Syria, but now the Syrians were much stricter in issuing transit permits from the Golan to Damascus. It was the International Red Cross representative who notified the seven last week that they were allowed to go to Syria. It has been learned the Red Cross representative informed the Druze that they would, most probably, have to take again all the matriculation exams that are held in Syria, as the Syrian authorities do not recognize Israeli matriculation certificates. Israel sympathizers in Golan Druze villages in the past levelled criticism at the option given to the Golan Druze to cross into Syria for studies. It was claimed those students are joining the Syrian Ba'th party and on their return to the Golan they sow subversion against the State of Israel. It has been learned that recently debates broke out among leaders of the Druze opposing Israel about the form of the struggle against

it. The dispute is between the religious and the secular Druze and focuses chiefly on whether or not the Druze should join the Rakah Camp. [Report by Menahem Horowitz] [Text] [TA241127 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jan 82 p 8]

GAZA TERRORISM--Last year terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip reached dimensions we have not witnessed for many years. As a result of this the local population in the Gaza Strip is not willing to cooperate with and play any role in the autonomy plan. This has been said by the head of the civilian administration in the Gaza Strip, Brig Gen Yosef Lunz, in a report on the 14th year of the administration. The report reached our correspondent 'Arad Nir and it includes a broad survey of the period between April 1980 and March 1981. In the report, Brigadier General Lunz also comments that, in connection with the trends toward normalization with Egypt, there was an appreciable increase in internal terrorism directed against moderate people and those who were considered to have collaborated with the Israeli authorities. The increasing terrorist activity, the report points out, increased in the second 6 months of 1981. The success in suppressing terrorist activity was not accompanied by the same success in finding partners for the peace process from among the local population. The call to the inhabitants of the area to join in the autonomy program remained a voice crying in the desert. That is the way it was phrased by the head of the civilian administration in the Gaza Strip, Brig Gen Yosef Lunz. [Text] [TA141620 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1420 GMT 14 Jan 82]

KNESSET DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE--The Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee appointed today a subcommittee to deal with the reorganization in the defense ministry. Members on the committee will be Moshe Arens, Hayim Herzog, Eliyahu Ben-Elisar, Yosef Rom, and Mordekhay Gur. The defense minister briefed the committee today on the changes he is planning to introduce in his ministry. The committee also discussed the creation of a logistic command for the IDF and the defense establishment. [Text] [TA121733 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 12 Jan 82]

MILITARY EXPENDITURES DISCUSSED--The chief of staff believes that the military industries should cut down their profit from sales to the IDF considerably and reduce the army's burden of expenses on equipment. Our military correspondent, Shmu'el Tal, has learned that Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan spoke in a meeting held in the defense ministry yesterday between senior IDF commanders and the defense minister on the one hand and the head of these industries, on the other. The air force commander said that expenditures on aircraft maintenance by the Israeli aircraft industries plants exceed the expenditures for the maintenance of these aircraft by army personnel at air force facilities. The director of the military industries has complained that despite the large-scale sales of the industries he does not receive government aid for production since the industries are part of the defense ministry. Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon told the leaders of the military industries that they should do their utmost to increase sales abroad. [Text] [TA120545 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 12 Jan 82]

SELLING AIRCRAFT TO COLOMBIA--London, 14 Jan--Israel and Colombia finalized a sale of 12 KFIR aircraft produced by the Israeli aviation industry. This is reported in the newest edition of the British Aviation Weekly FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL. The report says Israel will start delivering the aircraft in March this year. The aircraft in question is an improved version of the KFIR C-2 which possesses both fighter and bomber capacities. The report says this is the first time that Israel has succeeded in selling KFIR aircraft of foreign countries. This was facilitated by the U.S. consenting to lift the ban on exports of the KFIR, which is furnished with a General Electric J-79 turbo-jet engine. The report does not say what the value of the deal is, but earlier reports in "flight" and other foreign publications indicated the price of the KFIR to be in the vicinity of \$5 million. Hence the deal must amount to something between \$60 and \$70 million. [By London based correspondent Yosi Melman] [Text] [TA151000 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Jan 82 p 1]

GOLAN DRUZE DEVELOPMENTS--Heads of local councils in Golan Heights Druze villages who oppose pro-Syrian functionaries will not for the time being accept Israeli identity cards. One of them had asked to get back his Israeli identity card and the cards of three of his relatives, which he had returned several months ago. However, he later asked that the return be delayed following a resumption of the boycott against him and after his son was given an anonymous ultimatum to sever all relations with his father or else he would be boycotted by the entire Druze community in the Golan. The official in charge of the Northern District, Mr Yisra'el Koenig, met yesterday with the head of the Mas'adah local council, Munsin abu-Salah, and proposed that Israel appoint a "spiritual leader" from Israel's Druze community to conduct religious services in the Golan, but abu-Salah rejected the suggestion. He requested, on the other hand, the opening of an information center office on the Golan, and welcomed the grant of 1 million shekels to his local council for the erection of a cultural center. The Golan Druze are meeting with difficulties due to that region's changeover to a civilian administration. Having no identity cards, they are unable to renew drivers licences, permits to carry arms or register births. The IDF will also in the near future oversee the meetings between Druze from Israel and Syria that are held every few weeks at the Majdal Shams border crossing point, stated the Galilee District police commander, Assistant Commander Me'ir Sade. [By the "HA'ARETZ correspondent in the Galilee"] [Text] [TA141518 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jan 82 p 3]

TRANSFER OF PLO FUNDS--Jordan and the PLO have reached an agreement according to which aid would be funneled to East Jerusalem and the territories with the knowledge and approval of the PLO but without leaving any trace of its involvement. Outwardly the impression will be created that all the funds come only from the Jordanian authorities. Reliable Arab sources reported about this agreement last night noting that it was designed to bypass the ban imposed by the Israeli authorities on the transfer of funds originating with the PLO. According to Arab sources, the PLO "foreign minister" Faruq Qaddumi is involved in this arrangement and he was the one who convinced the Jordanian administration to act in coordination in order to null the Israeli decision. According to Arab personalities, Jordan stands to benefit from this arrangement in that the Israeli administration will continue to regard King Husayn as the sole Arab factor allowed to award financial aid to the inhabitants of East Jerusalem and the territories. The PLO stands to benefit from the fact that all those receiving aid will realize that, had it not been for

its intervention, they would not be receiving any assistance. Security elements said that they are aware of the PLO's efforts to bypass the order of the Israeli authorities and security elements are contemplating various proposals to reduce to the extent possible the influence the PLO exercises in the territories through the funds it has been directly and indirectly pumping into the region. [Report by Yosef Tzuri'el] [Text] [TA131458 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Jan 82 p 2]

ROMANIA DEBTS REPAYMENT--Minister of Industry Gid'on Pat has said that countries in East Europe have asked Israel to give them economic aid. He did not go into detail, but our correspondent Gid'on Rotem says that this apparently refers to a request by Romania to postpone the payment of debts to Israel. In a lecture in Tel Aviv, Pat said he would not close Israel to competing imports, but he would continue with his policy of selectively restricting the imports. [Text] [TA141734 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 14 Jan 82]

COMPLAINTS ON LAND EXPROPRIATION--The security forces have recently carried out a thorough investigation into the purchase of land in Judaea and Samaria. It has been learned that among the people that underwent interrogation were some senior officials of the Israel land administration. The police fraud investigation squad, headed by Deputy Commander Binyamin Zegal, maintains a thick file on "purchase of land in Judaea and Samaria." It has been learned that heavy pressure has been applied on the investigators by most senior elements arguing that any investigation of events in Judaea and Samaria insofar as land purchases by private businessmen is concerned only harms the national goal of liberating land. Dozens of complaints have been filed with the police by Arab landowners, protesting violent methods employed in attempting to persuade them to sell their land. However, it has been learned that many complaints were found to be groundless and it transpired that the motive prompting many landowners to submit false complaints was the attempt to convince extremist elements and PLO representatives that they were forced to sell the land. It has been learned that many Judaea and Samaria landowners are very much interested in selling their land, particularly barren, rocky plots of land of no agricultural value, but that they are afraid of doing so because Jordan issues capital punishment sentences to people who sell land to Jews. [Report by 'Amos Levav] [Text] [TA171222 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Jan 82 p 1]

BANK YISRA'EL GOVERNOR APPOINTED--The president of state officially appointed Dr Moshe Mandelbaum governor of Bank Yisra'el. At the ceremony this morning, Minister Aridor said he and the new governor must work together, and only in this way will they make the government economic policy succeed. Governor Mandelbaum elaborated on the importance of maintaining the independence of Bank Yisra'el. Our correspondent Shlomo Raz reports that former governor, Arnon Gafni, was absent from the ceremony. He is now overseas. [Text] [TA151041 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 15 Jan 82]

CSG: 1/15/74

GOVERNMENT FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT FIVE-YEAR PLAN CRITICIZED

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 1039, 16 Nov 81 pp 28-29

[Article: "Jordan's 1976-1980 Five-Year Development Plan Entrenches Aspects of Economic Defacement and Subservience"]

[Text] This study reviews the recently completed Jordanian 5-year plan according to the official figures and indicators announced by the authorities. In view of the importance of this review which was published in TARIQ AL-SHA'B [People's Path], the mouthpiece of one of the factions of the Jordanian National Movement, (namely the Democratic Front's organization in Jordan), we republish it here to enlighten our readers who are interested in the issues of Jordan and of the other subservient regimes in the area. The article is, naturally, addressed to the Jordanian public and, consequently, speaks from this angle.

The main figure indicators on the economic growth realized during the years of the latest 5-year development plan (1976-80 plan) were published recently. Even though these figures underline the miserable outcome and the abysmal failure of this plan in comparison to its declared general goals, the official Jordanian circles have not hesitated in creating a storm of praise for the alleged accomplishments realized by the plan.

What is more, these circles have declared that the results have exceeded the goals set for the plan! As usual, the official agencies have relied in their false praise of the accomplishments realized in the preceding years on some partial and one-sided indicators, disregarding the fact that no matter how brilliant these indicators seem to be, they cannot erase the essential facts apparent to all, namely that the past 5 years (the period of the latest plan) witnessed the entrenchment of the aspects of economic defacement and chaos and of the country's subservience to the international capitalist system instead of curbing and curtailing these aspects. This entrenchment has left deep negative imprints on the life of the country and of the citizens, the most significant being the intensifying inflationary pressures and the widening gap between the classes as a result of the further concentration of wealth and capital in fewer and fewer hands and of the constant impoverishment of the broadest classes, both in the countryside and in the cities.

Development Between Goals and Results of Plan

So that this review may not be mere generalizations floating in the air, let us compare, relying on the official figures and indicators themselves, the plan's general goals

with the actual accomplishments realized. It is well-known that the plan's official document sought to realize the following four main goals:

1. Realize an annual growth rate of 12 percent in the gross local product "by focusing on development of the commodity production sectors."
2. Distribute the development gains so that they may spread in all areas.
3. Raise the reliance of the general state budget on the local financial resources.
4. Reduce the deficit in the balance of trade from 153 million ... 1975 to 131 millions in 1980.

Have these general goals of the plan been realized or have they been approached at least?

The actual accomplishments, as declared by the official figures, stress clearly that they have not been realized. Regarding the first goal, the gross local production at the fixed prices [presumably of 1975] has grown at an annual rate of 8.5 percent, and not of 12 percent, under the impact of the rising inflation rate which has neared 12 percent annually. This growth rate (even if we accept that inflation has not exceeded this rate) is hardly enough to cover the costs resulting from the growth of the population at a rate of more than 3.5 percent annually. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the fundamental thing is that the plan's first goal was not only to realize a 12 percent growth in the gross local production but to do so by relying on the fundamental modification of the economic structure, i.e. by focusing on the production, not service, sectors in a manner that leads to raising the production sectors' contribution at tangible rates nearing 10 percent. But the official accomplishment figures show that the national economy's structure has not undergone this promised transformation by the end of the plan because the contribution of the production sectors to the gross local production has not exceeded 4.7 percent, rising from 34.1 percent to 38.8 percent between the years 1975 and 1980. It is needless to say that the targeted growth rates have been realized in the construction sector only. The contribution of the agricultural sector has risen by 5.7 percent, compared to the targeted 7 percent, that of industry by 13.6 percent, compared to the targeted 26.2 percent, and that of electricity by 8.1 percent, compared to the targeted 17.1 percent.

The fact is that the aforementioned accomplishment rates are based on the cash value of the production and not the material value of this production [as published]. We are afraid that the rise in prices, and not the rise in the material volume of the production, is what is responsible for the "growth" in the contribution of the aforementioned sectors.

The social effects of the actual development accomplishments during the years of the preceding plan become completely evident when we compare the plan's second goal with what has been actually accomplished. Instead of the gains spreading among the entire population and in all areas, as the plan document states, what has been realized is the further confinement and concentration of the fruits of the horizontal and vertical growth in the hands of a small segment of the population. There is no need to look for figure indicators to confirm that the rural areas and the southern and northern provinces have been denied the promised fruits of development. The severe

crises experienced by the agricultural sector in recent years, the flagrant lack of services in rural areas and the large-scale labor emigration from the countryside and from the various governorates to Amman are the best proof of the intensifying deprivation of the various provinces (especially the south) of the benefits and fruits of development. The ill-distribution of the development gains has not been confined to this aspect but has also assumed a vertical dimension in all parts of the country, including the Amman Governorate. The studies of a number of academicians and researchers whose loyalty to the regime is indubitable note that the real increase in worker wages has not exceeded 0.36 percent, i.e., less than one-half percent, [annually] in the past years because of the rapidly rising inflation rates. The same sources also point out that labor's share (i.e. the salaries and wages of workers and employees) of the national income declined in the years 1973-79 in favor of the investment share (i.e. the income of the various groups owning the means of production). The wages and salaries share the national income dropped from 49 percent in 1973 to 46 percent in 1974, 1975 and 1976 and to 43 percent in 1978 and 1979. If we take into consideration the increasing number of citizens entering the labor market and the hired labor during this period, it becomes evident that the workers' real average income is declining and not increasing. This, in its turn, explains the heavy emigration of labor to the outside world. In contrast to the declining income share of the workers (in addition to the declining incomes of small farmers and small producers in the cities), the incomes of big real estate owners, of parasitic capitalists and of the compradores have been increasing to the degree where this small segment of society enjoys more than one-half the entire national income. The passive figures prove indisputably the intensifying aspects of the "ill-distribution of the development gains" and prove that these gains have been taking the direction of sharply polarized wealth on the one side and poverty on the other side.

Another Unrealized Goal

The third goal of the plan has also not been realized. Despite the enormous rise in the budget's local revenues (from 80 million dinars in 1975 to 224.5 million dinars in 1980, i.e. with an increase of 30.5 percent over the plan's set target of [figure presumably dropped] million dinars in local revenues by the end of the plan)--a rise realized by squeezing more customs taxes and all kinds of fees and levies out of the citizens--this vast growth in the local revenues has not been able to cover the current expenditures which have been rising at a faster rate. In 1975, the local revenues covered 61.5 percent of the current spending (i.e. salaries and the state's consumption expenses). The plan assumed that by 1980, i.e. by its end, the local revenues would cover most of the current spending or 91.5 percent of this spending, to be specific. But these revenues have been able to cover only 68.9 percent of the current spending. Thus foreign revenues, comprised of foreign aid, grants and loans, have continued to be the main resource for the budget. Moreover, these revenues are relied upon completely to cover the capital and development spending, in addition to more than 30 percent of the current spending.

The plan also talked of its fourth goal of reducing the balance of trade deficit from 153 million dinars in 1975 to 130 million dinars in 1980. The plan noted at the time that this reduction will constitute "a change of direction for the first time," considering that the 3-year plan has sought to "reduce the rising deficit rate and not the value of the deficit." Has this been realized? Regrettably, the answer is no. The exact opposite has happened, considering that the balance of trade deficit has

risen at missile speed, compared with which the failure of the 3-year plan is negligible. This deficit has reached 543.3 million dinars in 1980, meaning that the actual deficit is fourfold the balance of trade deficit expected by the end of the 5-year plan. This rise is due to the growing import volume which has amounted to 715 million dinars (instead of the 300 million dinars expected by the plan).

The abovementioned facts completely refute the government's claims about the successes of the "plan" and prove, with official figures, the failure of this plan to realize the goals set for it. This reminds us that this failure is not a transient thing and that it has been the fate of all the successive development "plans" witnessed by the country in the past 2 decades. It is natural that this would compel one to wonder about the reasons for this failure and the reasons for our country's constant floundering in a vicious circle of backwardness, subservience and of chaotic capitalistic growth.

The answer to these questions requires no big effort. The reasons lie in this flagrant conflict between the development goals which the regime claims it tries to realize and the practical policies and measures which this regime adopts. The reasons lie in the lip service paid to the goals of curtailing the intensifying economic subservience, defacement and backwardness while working at the same time to deprive the country of the fundamental requirements for the realization of these goals. One of these requirements is the requirement of dependence on the obligatory and comprehensive planning of economic growth. It is needless to say that the so-called successive development "plans" witnessed by our country have not possessed the quality of abidance, meaning that they have not constituted the basic law directing the economic development as in the case of the countries which actually embrace planned development. Rather, these alleged "plans" in our country have been characterized by encouragement and recommendation that are not binding to the private sector. What is more, a balanced programmed development based on a binding plan requires the creation of a broad public sector that controls the main keys to the economy (major industries and production projects, banks, foreign trade and large-scale domestic trade). Such development also requires that the state intervene by controlling and guiding the private sector activity to insure its compatibility with the goals of the plan.

In our country, which lacks large and productive public sector that undertakes the prime responsibility of development, the regime refuses to use its tax, financial and legislative instruments to control and channel the private sector's activity to make sure that it is not in conflict with the development goals. Rather, this regime uses these instruments to give free rein to the compradorial and parasitic capitalism and to free its destructive activities of all shackles.

Regime Deprives Country of Fundamental Requirements of Development

Depriving the country of the fundamental economic conditions and requirements of programmed growth based on obligatory comprehensive planning leads us to remind that instead of supplying these requirements, the regime itself constitutes an insurmountable obstacle in the path of realizing the goals of real development. This is not surprising as long as the regime represents the alliance of the compradorial bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy and the big real estate owners, i.e. the classes most strongly tied to imperialism and most eager to maintain the conditions of backwardness with the aim of tightening their hateful grip on the country.

Exposure of the reality of the regime's alleged development policy strengthens the conviction that the only means to break the subservience and to realize economic and political independence and social progress lies in the establishment of a national democratic regime that responds to the people's interests and that provides the basic requirements of national economic, social and political development.

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CSO: 4404/133

RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR NOTED

JN312017 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 31 Jan 82

[Text] The allegiance to this nation does not require justification. To manifest this allegiance by sacrificing blood and people cannot be questioned or explained. To be impotent, silent or allied with the enemies against brothers is questionable and must draw the consternation and [word indistinct] of the masses. Those who side with the enemy attempt to search justifications and explanations for their behavior which they state openly and without hesitation. King Husayn's announcement about opening the door for volunteers to support Iraq and our people's honorable response to this declaration have been a manifestation of this nation's faith and an affirmation of sincere readiness to fight alongside Iraq in defense of its land, people, honor and dignity. Those who stood against Iraq during its justified and triumphant war are wittingly or unwittingly ignoring a clear fact, namely, that this war is not between Arab Iraq and Muslim Iran, because Iraq is also a Muslim country. It is not war between Arab Iraq and Iran which is said to have supported our nation following the Iranian revolution, because the Iranian-Israeli cooperation is well-known and is recognized even by the Iranian regime itself.

In order to know Iraq's enemy which is imposing war on it, we must point out a fact that is daily affirmed and revealed by events. This fact is that Iraq is facing a sectarian fanaticism which takes Islam as cover and umbrella so that it can hide its ambitions of political, economic and military hegemony in the Arab Gulf. Naturally, the Iranian regime cannot declare its extremist sectarianism against an Arab region professing Islam which calls for justice and equality and is based on respecting and sanctifying the rights of others. Nevertheless, what took place in Bahrain and Yemen and what is daily taking place in Lebanon, not to mention this Iranian-Iraqi war, clearly point toward the Iranian regime's sectarian fanaticism and is placing this fanaticism before all the ties of Islamic brotherhood and the ties of history and good neighborliness. This is very evident in all the regime's acts but is not directly stated in the regime's claims and statements. The Iranian regime which claims to support the Palestinian rights does not hesitate to cooperate and coordinate with Israel and does not hide its alleged rights in the Arab islands and its ambitions in many parts of the Arab Gulf region. The Iranian regime claims to uphold Islam and to protect the Muslims and at the same time continues its aggression against the Muslim

Iraqi Arab people and its crimes against the Muslim people of Iran and goes to the extent of encroaching on the holy places in the Arabian peninsula. What is more painful is that the regime continues to reject Iraqi calls for peace and love and its proposals of negotiations and understanding. Does Islam mean the recruitment of ill-trained children and sending them into minefields and arenas of death? Does Islam mean the killing of thousands by beheading and by fire squads and the perpetration of daily massacres? Islam as known to Muslims and humanity is the religion of mercy, love, forgiveness and brotherhood. Fanaticism means rancor and when fanaticism dons the garb of sectarianism the dangers of this fanaticism and its short-term and long-term results will be more than anyone can imagine. Those who fight against the Iranian regime are fighting to defend Islam so that it may not be used by the rancorous as an umbrella for their crimes and a cover for their fanaticism. They defend their land and people so that sectarian fanaticism might not infiltrate their nation and completely play havoc with them the way the Iranian regime is playing havoc with Iran and its peoples.

As for those Arabs who are still with Iran against Iraq, with sectarian fanaticism against Islam and Arabism and with those who reject peace and understanding against those who extend a hand of love and brotherhood, we do not find anything to say to them except to ask: How can you ask your brothers in the Arab Gulf and the Arabian peninsula to stand by you whether in matters of oil or in matters of support when you stand alongside their enemies who have ambitions against their land and dignity? How can you accept such a capitulatory stand for yourselves when Iran is threatening the people of their Gulf, their land and wealth which is an asset to the Arab nation in its fight against its enemies.

CSO: 4404/234

GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE ROLE HINTED IN WEST BEIRUT BOMBINGS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13-19 Dec 81 pp 13, 14

[Interview with Dr Samir Sabbagh, chairman of the National Security Committee by Fadiyah al-Sharqawi: "Sabbagh: Would That the Government Did Come Back"; date and place not specified]

Text What change has there been in the security context in the western section, now that the National Security Council as of 1 November 1981 has taken charge of restoring security, stability and tranquility to it, eliminating armed displays and devoting attention to such vital daily matters as solving the traffic crisis, watching vigilantly over sanitation and providing the citizens with water and electricity?

The fact is that if we review some figures in this regard, based on domestic security force reports, we will find a noticeable improvement in the framework of security between October and December. This has prompted citizens to foresee a good future for these measures, whereas security conditions had totally deteriorated.

In the month of October, for instance, the number of persons killed came to 119 and persons injured to 437, of whom 72 deaths and 259 wounded were victims of the Arab University explosion. There were also 62 incidents where shots were fired, 59 explosions and 123 skirmishes among local organizations.

Conversely, in the month of December, after the campaign had begun to take hold, the number of persons killed dropped to 68 and the number of explosions dropped to 44, although the incidents of burglary and robbery remained roughly as they had been -- 138 thefts and 11 robberies.

However, this chance to restore security, if only in a partial sense, to the western section, did not last long; some organizations in their internecine disputes soon disrupted the smooth surface of this security, especially after isolated political assassinations had increased along with the number of explosions set off here and there, everywhere, reaping fear, alarm, terror, death and destruction.

What is the National Security Committee's view concerning the resumption of explosions in the western section? What are the reasons for this wave? What measures will it take to cope with this new situation? Will it be able to continue at length with this security campaign?

These are questions we presented to the chairman of the National Security Committee, Dr Samir Sabbagh, vice president of the command council of the Movement of Independent Nasirists, the al-Murabitun. This conversation took place:

Question The Security Committee has up to today taken some measures to prevent violations. However, these measures have extended only to everyday public life, while the security situation remains as it has been.

Answer That is not true. The security situation has improved greatly since the measures began to be carried out. Naturally we cannot say "If we drop a pin we can hear it tingle," but we rarely see armed displays on the street or random gunshots. This is a big improvement and if we have not managed to impose total security that is due to a number of reasons.

Our Effect Is Limited

Question What about the al-Musaytibah skirmishes?

Answer This skirmish occurred as a result of a political dispute and old incidents from the past. Therefore we cannot classify it as one of the skirmishes or the overall violations that citizens have faced in the stage that has ended. If we go back a little we will find that every citizen ran the risk of being hit, having his dignity offended, or being threatened, whether by party personnel, vendors, jitney drivers or anyone carrying weapons, and for just a single skirmish to occur in the western district, over a dispute from the past in a period of 2 months is significant. The other areas, which are still in a state of sloppy security, we are not responsible for. I believe that people must not make us more responsible than we can be, since we cannot put an end to the final throes of a crisis that has lasted 7 years in a period of 1 month, especially since we are working in objective circumstances where our effect is not total.

Question What about the recent explosions, which were set off in an intensified form last week?

Answer The measures we took harmed a number of groups that had been living in a state of chaos and sloppiness, especially since some people in these groups had exploited them to advance their own political plans. Therefore we are not surprised that some suspicious, damaged groups have proceeded to sabotage security conditions. Therefore we have witnessed a kind of hysteria in the form of the detonation of explosions that if it indicates anything it indicates attempts to commit sabotage.

Every Citizen Is a Guard

Question What in your opinion is the solution for preventing the series of crimes from continuing?

Answer We intend to establish further specialized agencies and spread observers about on the streets and in the sections by getting the broadest segment of the masses to take part, so that every citizen will become a guard and an official. In addition, experience has taught us that such short-range waves quickly come to an end, especially when we continue to take measures to control the security situation. To the extent that we succeed in closing the gaps in our ranks, we will prevent this wave and the people behind it from acting consistently through these gaps.

Question What bodies are standing behind the sabotage? Why don't you put a limit to it?

Answer There is a group of unorganized forces that are living in the midst of chaos in the nationalist sections. These forces begin with people who have platforms and go from them, by means of some of the young people in the sections who have imposed a type of fear, to certain undisciplined party elements who impose a certain type of coercive presence in the section, to the "outbreak of military conditions" (where every section or district turns into a center of influence headed by an official or ruler who gives commands or interdictions), and to affluent groups which are adding to their profits and property by benefiting from the absence of any sort of oversight, encouraging a number of elements to commit violations and acts of trespass. These forces have been harmed by the security campaign, and this has made them feel that their interests have been threatened. It is natural that they should be the first to benefit from the sabotage, even if they are not the perpetrators of it.

Question Does that mean that the politicians do not have political interests?

Answer No, there are political groups that have been harmed, such as the Lebanese Second Branch and the Lebanese Front. However, these groups' plans cannot succeed in the nationalist section unless the citizens are in a state of extreme despair and disgust. Therefore, implanting and restoring stability will obstruct the consummation of their plans and liberate citizens from the nightmare of anxiety which the violations and trespasses are causing them, reviving their perseverance against all suspicious plans. Proof of that is that when we carried out our campaign on Piyad al-Bulh Street, we demanded, through the Arab deterrent forces, that there be a cease fire along the contact lines. However, the Lebanese Front's response was "We cannot guarantee that, because we have undisciplined elements." This means that purging this section of all its serious crimes and dope smokers is something that disturbs them. On that subject, we came upon a Phalangist who was spying or enjoying himself and had buried his party card under the dirt in the barracks. For this reason I say that it is natural that these groups that have been harmed should resort to sabotage against the security campaign.

No Proof

Question Is there tangible proof of the Second Branch's role in the sabotage operation?

Answer There is no tangible proof yet, but the conclusion which we have reached leads us to look to see who is benefiting from sabotaging the security campaign.

Question Don't you believe that there are people benefiting from that in the western section?

Answer The interests of the beneficiaries coincide. Therefore we can say that the Lebanese Front, the Second Branch and the group of forces we have named sometimes find themselves following a single line, guaranteeing their common interests.

Question What obstacles are there to thwart these forces in order to implant the security plan?

Answer There are three obstacles:

1. The difficulty of operating and the complexities of the area. It is difficult for a working group to find a rapid solution to a crisis that is not just 7 years old but

decades old, especially since we are operating within the context of objective conditions that we cannot ignore. For example, we must find a solution to the problem of traffic while we do not have places for cars to park, traffic lights or a law restricting the imports of automobiles. In addition, we cannot stipulate that warehouses must be built for weapons and ammunition outside residential areas, leading to the possibility of overseeing non-Lebanese who have entered the country secretly.

2. The absence of government. The solution to a large number of measures included in the security campaign lies in the hands of the government, whether in the context of the municipality, the domestic security forces or civil defense or regarding traffic, electricity or telephones. These government agencies are feeble -- in fact they are almost nonexistent. The reason why they are absent may be ascribed either to a decision not to work and a need to be negligent or to laziness. As examples, when we requested the domestic security forces to help us they did not agree to do so, since they did not want to work with unofficial forces and restricted their activity to the Arab deterrent forces. This made our security plan lose its momentum. One should bear in mind that we offered every guarantee to keep party people from obstructing its activity.

3. Material resources; these obstruct our plans and impede us from totally controlling the security situation. If we are not able to organize the citizens' daily life, that is, deal with the crisis in traffic, the mail and the electricity, we will not be able to oversee the section, people who have problems and suspicious people. Therefore we find ourselves compelled to advance slowly along the road in executing these projects.

Security or Morality?

Question Citizens are raising a question on whether the measures taken on Riyad al-Sulh Street are security or moral ones.

Answer Both at the same time. Through moral issues we can get at security issues. A dope smoker who cannot find enough money to procure daily requirements commits illegal acts to get it, such as murder, committing acts of aggression or spying, and the same goes for gamblers. It is enough to view the sights in a movie house that we broke into, which was a miasma of all kinds of social corruption, in order to realize what easy prey the people who go there can be for intelligence and other agencies.

Disputes

Question However, is it possible to continue with this plan, especially since there are ongoing disputes among parties and organizations in the western section?

Answer The parties and organizations in the western section have reached agreement on numerous things, most conspicuously a feeling of danger and the feeling that the security issue has become the only gap that inimical plans can be advanced through. In addition, popular vindictiveness has become aggravated to a point where it is almost causing a major breakdown among these parties and the masses. Political agreement exists on this point and on the need to find solutions to them so that citizens may regain their confidence. On the other hand, the inflamed struggle has turned the parties' view of the development of matters into a single, united one. This is our only guarantee to unify everyday activities on the ground. While there still are

some signs of conflict among parties, one must not forget that pursuit of a general reconciliation among all conflicting parties which will furnish these measures with a guarantee that they will succeed on the ground is one of the complex of measures that we are intending to carry out.

Question Why don't the parties in the western district dissolve most of their organizations and seek to create a unified military organization under a unified command?

Answer We will in the next stage. The first measure along this road will be to collect party weapons and put them back in storage in the parties' main warehouses so that they can be used only on orders from the party leaders, who alone will be responsible for them. I believe that if this happens, the leaders will act in a conscious, thoughtful way and the weapons will be used only if absolutely needed.

Question There has been much gossip recently about the possibility that a military blowup might occur in the western district.

Answer There is nothing to indicate that. If the analyses of the evolution of the struggle in Lebanon and the region are pessimistic, we must prevent a blowup in the situation in the military sense. However, if, God forbid, there is to be a blowup, it is in the western district's power to preserve the citizen's social security and protect him from the actions of the powers surrounding him. I believe that it is in our ability to continue with our security program up to the very last moment that we realize we are unable to continue. At that point we will declare that we have failed and in accordance with that we will abandon our positions to leaders who can succeed where we have failed.

Question Are you in favor of getting the government to resume carrying out this mission?

Answer Are we standing in the government's way? Let it come back. Would that it did come back and took over all the reins of affairs, recouping its respect and control from the people who have usurped it, that is, restoring unity and Arabhood to Lebanon and standing up to attempts at secession and dominance. At that point, there will be absolutely no reason at all for us to exist.

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CSO: 4404/210

GROWING REGIONAL INFLUENCE OF KINGDOM DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 83, 12-18 Sep 81 pp 12-19

[Article by Muhammad Ma'ruf al-Shaibani: "The Saudi Role: Prince Fahd's Plan to Enable International Parties to Move to Impose Peace Upon Israel; Secret Disclosed for First Time About Israeli Raid on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor; What Did Reagan Promise the Saudis Before his Election, and What is the Kingdom Asking of him Now? Saudi Arabia Studied All Options to Counter Possible Pressure from Sadat after Camp David."]

[Text] The proposals that Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz announced to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute shed a new and powerful light on the Saudi role.

When one deals with the history of the Arab region, or more precisely the Arab-Israeli conflict, one must stop at the role that the Saudi Arabian Kingdom has played and is playing in the region. Three matters highlight the Saudi role:

1. Its being that embraces the Kaaba and the mosque of the Prophet gives it standing among the Islamic states, and a standing on the world level, in which Islam is one of the most widespread and influential religions.
2. The enormous oil wealth, since it sits on the largest petroleum reserves in the world and is considered the biggest oil exporter. Accordingly, this makes its financial and monetary position influential in the world's economy.
3. The leadership that, with intelligence and skill, was able to employ the preceding two points in the service of Arab and Muslim issues, despite the intervening crises, confrontations and wars. In following the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, one must note three turning points in this struggle:
 1. The war of 1948, and the establishment of the Zionist entity on Palestinian soil.
 2. The 1967 war.
 3. The 1973 war.

The Saudi position during these three stages was one that did not change. In the first, it was the famous stand of King 'Abd al-'Aziz (unifier and founder of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom) when he demanded that some of the Arab states not tire themselves out giving advice to the Palestinians, but rather, that they must support them with money and equipment and all their requirements, so that they could remain on their land and liberate what had been usurped from them.

In the second (the Six-Day War) when Israeli occupied the territory of three Arab countries, and at the climax of the 1967 defeat, King Faisal hastened to case aside bilateral disputes and compelled the Khartoum summit conference to adopt clear and supportive positions for President Jamal 'Abd al-Nassir's stance against Zionist aggression. On that day the Saudi policy of financial and economic support to the confrontation states began and still continues. It has not been forgotten also that King Faysal cut off oil in 1967 as a means of putting pressure on America and its allies. There was no pumping from that day until President 'Abd al-Nassir urged. that the embargo be lifted.

As for the third (the 1973 war), it was the only war in which the Arabs were able to achieve a significant military and political victory against Israel. It is no longer a secret now that preparation for it began a long time before, and in complete secrecy, between President al-Sadat, President al-Asad and King Faysal. As soon as the war was launched on 6 October, the two presidents were preoccupied with its military management, while the King devoted himself to its political and economic management. The strongest means of pressure that could be imposed at once was the oil embargo against the United States and Holland, and the threat of applying it to any country that gave support to Israel. That war was the first time in which Israel perceived that the noose was beginning to tighten around her. Golda Meier asked America for help, and using extreme secrecy, declared a state of nuclear readiness. Its atomic missiles were prepared for launching, aimed at one of the Arab capitals, if the battle was turned into a crushing defeat. The only thing that saved Israel was the airlift of arms and equipment which America sent to it and which enabled Israel to save off defeat.

A few weeks later, after the belligerents had gathered up their cards, and the United States and the Western nations had breathed a sigh of relief at the end of the war and began to evaluate its dimensions, Golda Meier said that the real danger to Israel was from Saudi Arabia and that King Faysal's policies were a threat to Israel's security and integrity. Dr Henry Kissinger, then the American secretary of state, agreed with her.

The English press, at that time, analyzed Meier's description of Saudi Arabia as the true danger to Israel, by saying: "Israel's war with its Arab neighbors is a war of confrontation, that is, at the front door. As for the Saudi war against Israel, it is from the back door, i.e., America. Israel can be compensated for the airplane that Syria shoots down, or the tank that Egypt destroys, through the American arms factories, which never cease producing and supplying Israel. However, the real danger is that which threatens the factories--fuel--or more correctly, the oil which Saudi Arabia exports to America. That is precisely the war that Saudi Arabia launched against Israel, but through the back door."

There is an Arab proverb that says, "The truth is what the enemies saw." However, friends have their position. During King Faysal's visit to Egypt in 1974, and his crossing of the Suez Canal from West to East, accompanied by President Anwar al-Sadat, the Egyptian president said to the Saudi king: "Your Majesty, in the name of the Egyptian people and myself, I thank you. Were it not for you, we could not cross this canal."

After the 1973, Saudi Arabia devoted itself to political and economic support for the Arab position, and explained its dimensions in an attempt to gain the support of international public opinion, while efforts were being made to hold the Geneva conference to bring peace to the Middle East, as the result of the joint American-Soviet communique in October 1977.

At that time, President Carter formulated his thinking and principles about human rights, and began to refer to "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." Saudi Arabia found that the climate was suitable to make efforts to push the American government toward recognition of the PLO and to negotiate with it, a matter which, if it were accomplished, would mean changing the political balance and pulling the rug out from under Israel. However, why was there no recognition? Here is the story. In 1977, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz visited Washington for the purpose of convincing President Carter to recognize the PLO. Prince Fahd explained to the American president the background of the dispute in the area, and the PLO's principal role, which cannot be delegated to anyone else. He gave him to understand that America's interests would prosper and grow if he were to take this step.

President Carter made it clear to the Saudi crown prince that his government could not recognize the PLO, so long as the latter did not recognize UN Resolution 242.

The important thing in this matter is that, after long deliberations and Saudi pressures, President Carter and Prince Fahd reached an agreement that the PLO would announce its recognition of Resolution 242, and at the same time, declare that it had reservations about the resolution, in that it deals with the Palestinian question on the basis that it is a refugee issue and not a question of a people, and the PLO demands the return of this people to their homeland. In exchange, the U.S. government would declare its recognition of the PLO as the sole legal representative of the Palestinians.

Therefore, Prince Fahd returned with this secret agreement and submitted it to Yassir 'Arafat, chairman of the executive committee of the PLO, when he visited Saudi Arabia. The latter approved it in principle and requested time to study it with some of the PLO's leaders.

A few days later, Yassir 'Arafat went to Saudi Arabia and conveyed the PLO's approval of this proposal to Prince Fahd. Prince Fahd asked the Palestinian side to write down its reservations to Resolution 242, so that that could be conveyed to the American side, and then the draft of the statement of American recognition of the PLO and the PLO's recognition of the resolution, with reservations, could be written.

One of the senior members of the Palestinian delegation, accompanying Arafat, wrote down the reservations and delivered them to the Saudi side. It sent that to the American government, which told Saudi Arabia later that it agreed in principle to include those reservations with the PLO's recognition of the resolution, in exchange for American recognition of the PLO.

However, two surprises occurred that aborted that process. The first was 'Arafat telling the Saudi government that he did not want to take this step and to temporarily stop it. The second was President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, which shocked the area and the world.

The Jerusalem Visit

Contrary to some news reports of that day, Saudi Arabia had no prior knowledge of President al-Sadat's determination to visit Jerusalem. On the contrary, it continued

up to the last minute to believe that the whole thing was no more than a political maneuver on the part of the Egyptian president. Up until the time al-Sadat actually began his visit, Saudi Arabia preferred to wait and hesitate, because it did not think it possible that the president of a major Arab nation could visit Israel unless he had assurances of fundamental concessions for the Arabs' benefit, as a price for peace that he would grant to the enemy. In this regard, he must have either received a guarantee from America or Israel or both.

The Egyptian president returned from Jerusalem empty-handed, except for Israeli promises which were quickly frustrated. The talk and preparation for the Camp David meeting began.

It is worth noting here that even America itself was not fully aware that President al-Sadat was actually determined to visit Jerusalem when he announced that before the Egyptian People's Assembly in November 1977.

AL-MAJALLAH has learned that when President Carter visited Riyadh in 1979, King Khalid Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz questioned him about the truth of the American role in convincing President al-Sadat to visit Jerusalem. President Carter swore to him that he had no prior knowledge of President Sadat's determination to visit Jerusalem, but had only heard about it through his speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly, and then he thought at first that it was nothing more than a political maneuver. On the contrary, the American president told King Khalid, had President al-Sadat told him of this determination sufficiently in advance, he could have exploited his visit to Jerusalem in the Congress and with American public opinion, in order to counter the Jewish pressure forces, in order to emphasize his concept of the need for establishing a "national homeland" for the Palestinians. However, the Egyptian president preferred to do it in a theatrical fashion which startled Israel, America and the entire world.

Camp David

In August 1979, Mr Cyrus Vance, the American secretary of state at that time, visited Riyadh. He told Saudi officials of President Carter's decision to invite both President al-Sadat and Menachem Begin to hold a meeting with him at Camp David, in order to discuss bringing peace to the Middle East. Vance asked Saudi Arabia to declare its support for President Carter's step. Saudi officials told Vance that their country did not believe that the Egyptian president's step in visiting Jerusalem could lead to peace. However, Saudi Arabia was prepared to announce its support for the meeting, on condition that President Carter endorse practical steps to bring peace to the Middle East, such as Israel's withdrawal from territory occupied in 1967, restore Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty, and restore the Palestinian people to their homeland, in order to establish their independent state under the leadership of the PLO.

For his part, al-Sadat sent a letter to King Khalid, in which he told him of his decision to accept President Carter's invitation to meet with him and Menachem Begin at Camp David. In his letter, he said that, despite his conviction that the meeting would not result in anything, due to Begin's hardline, nevertheless, he was acceding to it in order to prove to the world that Israel was the one obstructing peace and not the Arabs, "who must endorse an invitation to peace, not reject it." He concluded his letter by requesting the Saudi monarch to declare his country's support for his participation in Camp David.

The king's response was in a message, carried by a special envoy to President al-Sadat. It contained the same substance that Riyadh had told the American government, that Saudi Arabia had no objection to supporting the Egyptian president's step, provided that he take into account the abovementioned peace steps, and that no concessions be inadvertently granted, no matter what the cost.

Meanwhile, the media campaigns of some Arab nations were at their height against the Egyptian president and Saudi Arabia which, at that time, was described as being "behind Sadat's treachery." On the other hand, Riyadh preferred to remain silent, because the situation had two possibilities. Either al-Sadat was right, and had guarantees to restore the Arab rights and confiscated territory, which made him take such a step as this, in which case, it would be better to support an Arab position, making it stronger vis-a-vis the enemy and the United States in forthcoming negotiations, or al-Sadat was stupid and could possibly surrender Arab rights. In this case, Saudi Arabia must exert pressure in an attempt to prevent him from making further concessions.

On this premise, contact between Cairo and Riyadh remained open, especially after the latter received an assurance from al-Sadat he would be fully committed to the peace conditions that Saudi Arabia had conveyed to him and to the United States, and that President Carter would help with that by putting pressure on Israel.

The Camp David meetings began. The Egyptian president, during the first few days, remained committed to what he had promised. On the other hand, Begin was intransigent in his position, and it quickly became apparent that the meeting would fail, and that President Carter would be subject to a crushing political defeat after having put all his political future at stake on the success of Camp David. At that point, the American president intervened to put pressure on President Sadat to accept the wording of a peace agreement that talked about Israel withdrawing from the Sinai and undertaking so-called "self-rule" negotiations. In exchange, President Carter assured him that the U.S. would put pressure on Saudi Arabia and the "other moderate countries" to approve the agreement and not to boycott the Egyptian president or cut off their economic and financial commitments to his country.

Perhaps the mistake was President al-Sadat's in believing that. Or perhaps the mistake was President Carter's in being too confident in himself.

In this matter the important thing is that the three conferees shocked the world by signing the peace agreement in Washington, and by Begin's announcement that he had decided to visit Cairo within a few days, in response to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

At this point the situation became impossible to explain. The Egyptian president had gone all the way, and attempts to make him turn back had failed. Saudi Arabia began at once to move. It recalled its ambassador to Cairo, and undertook intensive consultations with the rest of the Arab states to hold an emergency summit conference to discuss the situation and what steps must be taken.

The Baghdad summit conference was accompanied by interpretations and accusations to the effect that Saudi Arabia refused to break relations with Egypt.

The truth of the situation was completely the reverse of that. Riyadh was the first to withdraw its ambassador from Cairo, since Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal cabled his recall a few hours after the peace accord was signed in Washington, i.e., even before the date and place of the Baghdad summit had been set.

Reaction to the Possibility of Egyptian Pressure

However, the fact is that the Saudi point of view was emphatically to reject the views calling for boycotting the Egyptian people, and ousting the Egyptians working in the Arab countries. That was called for on the pretext of putting President al-Sadat into an economic squeeze. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia stipulated that it was the Egyptian regime that must be boycotted and not the Egyptian people, who had done no wrong.

At that time, some accused Saudi Arabia of succumbing to "Sadatist pressures, against which it could not act independently." That is not the truth of the matter. The Riyadh government studied all the possibilities, and formulated the solutions and options. It conducted a study aimed at responding to the following question: How can Sadat put pressure on Saudi Arabia? What are the ways and options to confront that pressure?

The result was that the Egyptian president might try to apply pressure through one of the following measures:

1. Order the withdrawal of Egyptians working in Saudi Arabia, for the purpose of creating a sort of chaos in the Saudi labor market.

In this event, the construction of a project or factory could be extended for some months until the Egyptian labor force could be replaced by others from their countries. However, there were two sectors that would be very affected by this action, education and nursing, since Egyptians make up a considerable share of foreigners working in them. Naturally, it would not be logical for the state to delay the education of an entire generation for months or a year because of a shortfall in teachers, nor is it also possible to leave a sick person on his bed because of a shortfall in nurses.

What is the solution?

The answer was contained in a plan that recommended that the solution to the first problem (withdrawal of Egyptian teachers) was to reduce the class hours in the schools, so that the students received three or four classes a day instead of six. To compensate, the Ministry of Education would operate an educational television channel during different study periods, so that a student could receive his education at home in addition to the school. This would be until the Egyptian teacher gaps could be filled by others from other Arab countries.

As for the other problem (nurses), its solution was to implement an emergency plan to replace Egyptians, who might be withdrawn, with others from East Asian countries that are famous for their services in the field of nursing and health care.

2. He could prohibit ships heading for Saudi ports from passing through the Suez Canal (despite the fact that that would mean a reduction in the Canal's financial income, which represents a strong economic support for Egypt). That would result in a large increase in the prices of commodities and goods in Saudi markets, due to the long transit imposed on those ships around the Cape of Good Hope. The solution in this event was for the state to bear the price differentials, in order to

maintain price stability in the local markets, similar to the action taken each month in terms of financial subsidies to prevent the market from being affected by the rise of world commodity prices.

Therefore, it is clear that Saudi Arabia had taken every possibility and solution into account, so that it could not be affected by any kind or form of pressure.

The Baghdad summit ended with the adoption of a boycott of the Egyptian regime and its ouster from the Arab League, as well as ending any responsibility from any decisions obligating Saudi Arabia or any other Arab state to Egypt.

Carter and Saudi Arabia

The Saudi government reached the conclusion that President Carter was weak in the face of Israeli intransigence, and that in fact, he was not sincere in seeking a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. On the contrary, what he really craved was a political victory in foreign policy that would provide him with some credit for his election campaign to regain the presidency. He was unable to find anything better than to sign a unilateral peace pact between Egypt and Israel. Therefore, a silent crisis was generated in relations between Washington and Riyadh, when the American president tried to induce Saudi Arabia not only to remain silent but not to declare its opposition to the unilateral peace agreement. However, that was met with a decisive reply, rejecting that and pointing out that America's interests might be subject to danger if he were to attempt to put pressure on Saudi Arabia in this regard. Moreover, this reply conveyed the bitterness that the Saudi government felt because of his non-positive position which resulted in the signing of the peace agreement that increased tension in the area and damaged the interests of the Arab Nation. The silent crisis of relations between the two countries continued. President Carter tried to alleviate this later by plunging into the battle of the sale of advanced arms and equipment to Saudi Arabia, by selling it F-15 aircraft. He succeeded in overcoming the Jewish lobby in Congress and the Senate, and the deal was concluded. However, Riyadh had arrived at the conviction that Carter was not a strong man who would be able to impose peace upon Israel.

Reagan Comes to Power

When the American election campaign began, it became clearly apparent that the two principal candidates were Carter and Reagan. Saudi Arabia was very careful to have a sort of contact with the Republican leader. In fact, Reagan met with Saudi officials in America, who were tasked with explaining the Arab-Israeli dispute to him, as well as the other area issues, their country's position regarding them, and the principal role that the PLO was playing with the blessing of the Arab and Islamic states. Reagan promised that, in the event he came to power, he would do everything possible to bring peace to the Middle East.

Reagan was elected the new president of the United States by an overwhelming majority, and Saudi Arabia designated its minister of industry, Dr Gazi al-Quasaybi, to travel to Washington on an unannounced trip, where he held a series of meetings with the president-elect's senior advisors before Reagan officially took over the White House.

During his mission, the Saudi minister called attention to the extent of the perils to which the region would be exposed, if President Reagan were to carry out his campaign promises to endorse the Israeli point of view, and to totally ignore--deliberately--the essence of the issue, which was the Palestinian question and the occupied Arab territories.

The Saudi official made it clear that his country wanted the president-elect's statements kept in the context of promises that any candidate for the American presidency has to make in order to win Jewish votes, and that those promises should not get out of hand, which might be damaging to American interests in the region.

The Saudi minister, in explaining the background and development of the dispute in the region, went on to assure Reagan's senior advisors that Saudi Arabia believed that the Camp David decisions could not form a basis for peace in the Middle East, and that the United States, if it was sincere in wanting to achieve a lasting peace, must compel Israel to comply with the rules of the international community and its resolutions to withdraw from Arab territory and to restore the Palestinian people to their homeland, so that they can establish their state.

President Reagan took over the reins of power in the White House. He began to say that the United States was carrying out a complete and comprehensive evaluation of the course of events in the Middle East. He also began to talk about awaiting the results of the Israeli elections, which would determine the nature of what might be done in the next stage.

The Missile Crisis

Then the Syrian SAM-6 missile crisis occurred. Israel objected to their presence in the Biqa' valley, where they were placed to protect the skies from Israeli raids. That crisis quickly developed and became complicated, until the possibility of its spreading into a full-blown war became apparent. America then tried to mediate in the issue, and sent Philip Habib to the area to attempt to induce the Syrians to withdraw the missiles from Lebanon. The American official began to shuttle around the area, including Riyadh. Habib, on behalf of his government, asked Saudi Arabia to intervene with Syria in order to get the missiles removed. Saudi Arabia diplomatically rejected this request, making it clear to the American official that those missiles were for defensive purposes in order to protect Arab skies. "It is unreasonable for you to demand that we not protect our Arab skies and leave them a fertile field for repeated Israeli raids. If you ask this of us, it is also unreasonable for us to accept this request."

Mr Habib made repeated attempts throughout his trip among the nations of the region without result. The missiles which Syria introduced remained, and Saudi Arabia refused to pressure Syria to withdraw them, because they were protecting Arab skies in need of protection.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was making outstanding efforts, in cooperation with Kuwait, within the Arab follow-up committee, to break the blockade around the Lebanese city of Zahlah. In fact, the exhaustive diplomatic efforts were successful and the blockade was broken.

The Bombing of the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor

Meanwhile, Israel carried out its lightninglike raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor (Tammuz) near Baghdad.

Some of the media began to ask how was Israel able to bomb the nuclear reactor, or how could its aircraft slip through the skies of any Arab country to carry out

the mission? The Western media that had connections with Zionism volunteered the reply to that propagandistic question, to the effect that Saudi Arabia was the country and that the AWACS aircraft located there were unable to spot them.

Moreover, skepticism reached a point that Israel itself said that, and showed an alleged map of its aircrafts' course "through Saudi airspace."

The fact of the matter is other than that. Israel leaked those reports, for the purpose of damaging Saudi relations with the Arab countries, especially Iraq, and to create a kind of uproar and battle of words that would increase the divisions and deepen the differences. The Israeli mentality cannot speak openly about the true secrets of its military operations when that might represent a danger to its security.

However, the question remains in peoples' minds: How did the Israeli aircraft get through without being discovered? Did they slip through the airspace of any Arab country?

We shall answer this question through a secret with AL-MAJALLAH is revealing for the first time.

The bombers took off from Israel and followed an air corridor that is disputed with Jordan. However, the disputed corridor had no air defenses or surveillance in it, which made it easy for the Israeli bombers to slip through quietly, at low altitude, free of the surveillance and air defenses of the neighboring countries.

After carrying out their mission, they flew at very high altitude and at speeds that broke the sound barrier on their return to their Israeli bases.

Therefore, the Israeli aircraft did not in fact slip through Saudi airspace. Moreover, the matter of their being detected by the AWACS was impossible, because the AWACS were on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia. Their range is limited and does not extend to the corridor, through which the Israeli aircraft flew, and which is more than 800 km from where the AWACS are stationed.

On the contrary, had the AWACS been able to detect the raiding aircraft, Saudi Arabia would not have hesitated to warn Iraq immediately, so that it could have prepared itself to defend the nuclear installations.

After the Israeli operation, Saudi Arabia made a demarche, in joint coordination with Iraq, to France, after the latter had expressed its lack of enthusiasm for Iraq's idea of rebuilding its destroyed nuclear reactor. The Iraqi government submitted the matter to King Khalid Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. The Saudi king changed the itinerary of his two official visits to Britain and Spain, so as to include a visit to France. He met with the new French president, Francois Mitterrand, and told him he was not convinced by the justifications of France's refusal to rebuild the nuclear reactor, which existed for peaceful purposes and which was continually subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the French Agency for Nuclear Energy, in order to assure that it was not being used for purposes other than what it was established for. He emphasized to him that (the question of) the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has become commonplace by most of the nations of the world, and that Saudi Arabia could not accept the fact that France, which had begun this cooperation with Iraq, was now standing against it. The Saudi monarch made it

clear that his country wanted the new government of President Mitterrand not to adopt this position, so that Saudi Arabia could be able to expand and cement cooperation in the economic, oil and military areas.

The meeting between the Saudi and French leaders resulted in President Mitterrand agreeing in principle to rebuild the Iraqi reactor and in Saudi Arabia's decision to pay all the costs of rebuilding the reactor.

Moreover, this meeting was a good opportunity for King Khalid to review with President Mitterrand all the phases of the struggle in the region. He made clear to him his country's position regarding peace efforts, which must endorse the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands occupied in 1967, of restoring the Palestinian people to their homeland, on which the Palestinian state must be established under the leadership of the PLO, and to return Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty.

Prince Fahd's Plan

Last month, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz announced an eight-point peace plan, around which interpretations and comments have multiplied, to the extent that the Israeli leaders have had differences in evaluating it, creating a disparity of views among them. Whereas Foreign Minister Shamir has said that it represents "a danger to the security and existence of Israel," Abba Eban, the former foreign minister, said "it deserves time be taken to study its meaning."

The plan as such could be considered a course of action to which Saudi Arabia has committed its policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, since a peaceful solution is wanted to it. This plan is in fact considered moderate and neither hardline nor impossible, if the other side (Israel's) intentions for peace are sincere. How?

To answer that, we shall look at the eight points of the plan:

1. "Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territory that it occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem." This point is what UN Resolution 242 stipulates. Israel must implement it, at which time, it would only be carrying out a resolution agreed to by the entire international community.
2. "Elimination of the settlements that Israel has established since 1967." This point is another about which UN and Security Council resolutions have been issued, since those settlements were considered "illegal and they must be eliminated." It is therefore an international consensus.
3. "Guarantee freedom of worship and practise of religious ceremonies for all religions in the holy places." This point naturally includes allowing Jews and Christians to practise their religious rites, as the Muslims have always done.
4. "Ensure the right of the Palestinian people, and compensate those who do not wish to return." This is an incontestable principle, which would restore the right of the Palestinian people living in the occupied territory to what is theirs, but would not compel those living abroad to return, if they wanted to be compensated.
5. "Put the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into a transitional stage, under UN supervision, for a period not to exceed several months." This is a procedural matter

which is not assumed to present a difficulty if both the Arab and Israeli sides agree to implement the first and second points.

6. "Establish the independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital." Perhaps this is the most difficult of the conditions. Israel has unceasingly and strongly opposed it, claiming that the establishment of a Palestinian state would result in a base for Soviet expansion in the area. This justification is refutable. The Palestinians who have lived for more than 30 years at war and as refugees, will take that opportunity, when their state is established, to build their nation and live in peace. There is no doubt of that. When they need economic and financial support, the wealthy Arab states will be able to provide it to them.

7. "Ensure the right of the nations of the region to live in peace." If it pleased Israel to interpret this point as Saudi recognition of it, then we say: "If all parties to the dispute have sincere intentions for peace, and the previous six points are implemented, what would be the motive for war?"

In addition, this point is not a Saudi invention. On the contrary, it is one of the articles that is repeated in any of the UN resolutions pertaining to the conflict in the Middle East. If we as Arabs demand that Israel implement the UN resolutions that the international community has approved (regarding Israel's withdrawal from all territory occupied in 1967, and to restore the Palestinian people to their homeland and establish an independent state) then we must be obligated to carry out those parts of the resolutions pertaining to us, if the other side implements that which pertains to them.

8. "The United Nations, or some of its member states, shall guarantee implementation of these principles." This is a procedural condition to ensure both the Arab and Israeli sides of an international cover to guarantee implementation of the seven preceding principles. It would also not exclude other parties from the settlement process, such as the Soviet and European sides.

Therefore, it is clear that the eight-point plan is moderate and reasonable. The international parties that are searching for steps to peace in the area could operate within its framework if they could impose the idea of peace on Israel.

President Reagan who, in the past few weeks, has made decisions characterized by force and confrontation (such as the decision to manufacture the neutron bomb, disregarding the SALT II agreement which his predecessor signed, and other decisions) has been asked now by Saudi Arabia to make a bold and strong decision to impose peace on Israel, who will not accept it without being forced to.

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CSO: 4404/31

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY REVIEWED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 29, Aug 81 pp 16-17

[Article: "Winds of Change Sweep Through the Saudi Chamber of Commerce; Forty Candidates Compete for 12 Seats; Fully Integrated Commercial-Industrial Slate Won; Six Appointed Members Added to Those Elected; Chairman Appointed from Outside the Winners and Candidates"]

[Text] The recent elections for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riyadh saw fierce competition which could be considered the first of its kind since the chamber's establishment. This competition was reflected in the results which brought about the victory of a fully integrated slate of 12 members, half of old members and the other half new. The number of candidates was 40, competing for 12 seats.

This competition was not the only characteristic marking the Riyadh chamber elections this year. There was another distinguishing feature, no less important. That was the representation of industrialists on the board of directors for the first time. They have six seats, compared to the six seats held by the merchants, who used to monopolize all the board's membership. This reflects a development in the economic structure, not in the city of Riyadh alone, but also in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a whole, with respect to the prominence of the industrial sector in recent years and its occupation of a significant place along side the bustling commercial sector.

Also among the highlights of the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce elections was a new chairman of the board, who is considered one of the leading economic figures in the kingdom and who is well known in foreign circles. He is Shaykh Sulayman Salih al-'Alyan. It is clear that the official authorities who selected the chairman through appointment, i.e., from outside the sphere of elections, know that al-'Alyan is seldom in the kingdom and spends most of his time abroad, pursuing his varied activities in other countries. Perhaps this was the only point of weakness in the selection process, bearing in mind that there is a strong and effective secretary general of the chamber (Shaykh Salih al-Tu'aymi) who is to a large extent relieved of the pressure of this situation, or to put it more exactly, from the thrust of the change occurring on the leadership level.

In addition to the 12 new members who were elected from out of 40 candidates, the minister of commerce selected six other members, four of them from among those who were not allied with those who won the election, and who were also-rans in terms of voters. Two came from outside the election process, one of them being the new

chairman, Shaykh al-'Alyan.

After the elections, the new board of directors was formed as follows:

Sulayman Salih al-'Alyan, chairman

Ibrahi m'Abd al-'Aziz al-Tuq, first vice president

Mutlaq al-'Abdullah al-Mutlaq, second vice president

Members:

Ibrahim 'Ali al-Khadr

Sulayman al-'Abdullah al-Qadhi

Sulayman 'Abd al-Rahman al-Salih

Salih al-'Abdullah al-Hamidan

'Amir Hamad al-Hushan

'Abd al-Rahman al-'Abdullah al-Kharif

'Abd al-Rahman Ibn 'Ali al-Juraysi

'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abdullah al-'Uhli

'Abdullah al-Rashid Abu Niyan

'Abdullah al-Zamil al-Salim

'Abdullah Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Nimr

'Ali al-'Abdullah al-Manjam

'Ali Sulayman al-Shahri

'Amir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-'Amir

Fahd al-'Abdullah al-'Uwaudhi

The six members who have left the board of directors after having served on it for 4 years are: Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Farih (former chairman), Ibrahim 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Tuq, 'Abdullah Ibrahim al-Habib, 'Abd al-Muhsen al-'Abd al-Muhsen al-Suwaylam, Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Humaydi and Yusuf Salih al-Tuwayjri.

The New Board's Program

The new board set its course of action and goals in the election statement, stating that "based on the principal goals of the current 5-year plan and concentrating on the growth of the private sector, our group will strive to support those goals by adopting the following program:

1. Development of the chamber's capabilities to push the private sector toward a more positive role.
2. Support for the practical aspects of local industrial regulations.
3. Endorsement of the agricultural sector's participation in the chamber's activities.
4. Mobilize the efforts of the private sector, especially in the contracting field, so as to form organizations capable of implementing the huge projects which are presently being done by foreign firms.
5. The possibility of formulating principles to direct foreign firms operating in the kingdom to buy their basic needs from the local market.

6. Educate businessmen about the opportunity for investment in new fields.

With regard to developing chamber services, the new board set its program of action with several important points, including support for the information center, expansion in the field of research, concentration on training, establishing forums and a permanent exhibition of domestic products in the chamber's new building.

Presidency of the Saudi Federation of Chambers of Commerce

One final question remains, in light of the results of the Riyadh chamber of commerce elections: Will these results lead to a change in the leadership of the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the kingdom, and specifically, on the level of the federation's presidency?

It is well known that the chairman of the Jiddah chamber, Shaykh Isma'il Abu Da'ud, is presently serving as president of the federation. Could it be that the "contagiousness" of the competition will shift to the federation's presidency, or will it be confined to the Riyadh chamber? In any event, the presence of the secretary general of the Riyadh chamber, Shaykh Salih al-Tu'aymi, in the center of the secretariat general of the federation might prevent the shifting of such a "contagion," but the nature of the developments forces the observer to raise the question.

In any event, the change that has swept through the leadership of the Riyadh chamber, and the developments which will ensue, will most of the time constitute a healthy phenomenon with regard to any economic body, since it avoids the evils of repetition and stagnation in both faces and ideas.

Who is Al-'Alyan?

The new chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riyadh, Shaykh Sulayman al-'Alyan, is one of the leading Arab and international economic figures. He heads the al-'Alyan Saudi Holding Company group, considered to be one of the largest groups, since its gross income in 1979 for example was \$260 million. It is assumed that that figure has increased since then, and probably has doubled. This holding company has about 20 firms.

Al-'Alyan occupies a significant place in the United States, where his group's investments are estimated at \$400 million. He is the second largest stockholder in Chase Manhattan Bank, after David Rockefeller. He has close relations with two of the senior economic policy-makers in President Reagan's administration.

George Shultz, president of Bechtel, who turned down the post of treasury secretary in the Regan government, is al-'Alyan's partner. Moreover, William Simon, Regan's advisor and a former treasury secretary, is his financial advisor.

When the American University in Beirut went toward Arabization in an attempt to improve its financial situation, some prominent Arab elements went on the board of trustees. Al-'Alyan was one of the first.

Al-'Alyan is noted for his strong desire to keep out of the spotlight.

TOUCHINESS OVER LATEST SAUDI INITIATIVES DESCRIBED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13-19 Dec 81 pp 24, 25

[Article by W.H.: "After Fez: A Fragile Hair Still Connects Damascus to Riyadh"]

[Text] A prominent Syrian official, talking about the current Arab situation, says, "The situation we are experiencing to a large extent resembles a group of people inside a heavily sealed room whose walls are of solid rock. What has happened to this group is that it is arguing among itself and some people are looking for a cause for a fight."

The official added, "We are seeking now, as we did in the past, to cover the hard walls with enough sponge so that if anyone tries to bang his head against the wall that will not cause him to fracture his skull. Ultimately what must happen is that we will all smash our own skulls either against one another or against the wall."

This foreword by the prominent Syrian official was a comment on the results produced by the Arab summit meeting at Fez. This foreword portrays the real state of inter-Arab relations, which are said to be much worse than the real state of the Arab-Israeli struggle. If the Arabs had been fated to spend less time settling their disputes, or, more accurately, if they had been fated to become more deeply engrossed in confronting Israel, they would have made fundamental strides in the area of a strategic balance with Israel. As more than one Syrian official says, as long as such a balance is lacking, the roads toward a political settlement of the Middle East crisis seem to be closed.

In this field, the American emissary's task seems very delicate, especially in Damascus, since he is trying to buy American diplomacy enough time to keep war from breaking out in the Middle East while the United States is busily engaged in arranging the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

However, it appears hard for Syrian leaders to respond to the American emissary's task while Damascus is accusing the American administration of comprehensively allying itself with Israel on the one hand and of provoking the Moslem Brothers group. It is also accusing it of exerting different types of pressure on Syria to please Israel. During Habib's visit to Damascus, the headlines in Syrian papers conveyed the details of these accusations.

Syrian officials presented the emissary, Phillip Habib, with a clear message, whose gist was that the American role was contingent on the independence of American

decisionmaking and that the continuation of the mission of Habib himself was contingent on new recommendations, not on repetitions of previous statements whose answer Phillip Habib knows in advance. This means that the "self-control" that Habib is urging in Damascus is being requested of Israel, not of Syria, because the Syrian capital, as an official said, has suffered, and is suffering, from the curse of explosions, both the ones that occurred in the al-Izbikiyah section of Damascus and the ones seen on the Lebanese stage, where the Arab deterrent forces are. The papers, the radio and the television in Damascus have been eagerly showing pictures of the terrible tragedy that occurred as a result of the al-Izbikiyah explosion. The Syrian media have also been eagerly portraying the broad support the authorities met with in Damascus, while everyone has condemned the crime and the people who committed it.

The question is whether all that took place because President al-Asad did not attend the Fez summit.

The conviction is growing among informed sources in Damascus that what happened in the al-Izbikiyah section of Damascus, and what is going on now in Lebanon, are the beginning of a complicated process whose dynamic is to punish Syria for the position it took prior to and during the Fez summit.

These circles add that the people who have been harmed by the Syrian position are the ones who have acted and worked to have Syria pay the price. Officials in Damascus do not deny that they are determined to reply in various directions, that is, where the leaders responsible for the acts of explosion and assassination dwell. President al-Asad himself has stated Syria's determination to prosecute whoever is proved to have a connection with the explosions. The size of the catastrophe, as a Syrian official says, is so great that a response by various means, is necessary.

But why didn't President al-Asad go to the Fez conference?

Official sources in Damascus say that Arab contacts in general and Saudi-Syrian ones in general prior to the convening of the summit focused on two basic notions:

1. Saudi Arabia is not tenaciously adhering to its plan; it is just presenting it for discussion.
2. The declaration Prince Fahd made is just "ideas," not a plan in every sense of the word.

The sources add that the Syrian leaders proceeded from these two considerations in deciding to attend the Fez summit, and that basis that the media delegation moved on to Morocco along with the president's special guard, prior to President al-Asad's appearance early in the morning of the date set for inaugurating the conference.

However, after a number of Arab heads, foremost among them Damascus' allies, had absented themselves, and after some countries had endorsed the Saudi plan as a plan, while more than one Arab country developed reservations about it and others objected to it, President al-Asad considered it proper not to go to the conference, and sent Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam.

Lost Power

Syria opposed the framework of the Saudi "plan," or Saudi "ideas," proceeding from the point that Arab relations were deteriorating and that as a result it was not

permissible or reasonable that the Arabs should present a plan for peace with Israel unless this plan was supported by Arab power.

The essence of the Arab situation is fragmentation, internecine squabbling and hostilities, in the words of the Syrian official. Then the Arabs have not responded to the basic Syrian question, which is, what is the alternative, in the event the Israeli-American rejection of the plan continues? In other words, will Israel give the Arabs, in the depths of their weakness, what it had previously refused to give them when they were in a position of strength?

The Syrian official says that if Syria had agreed to the Saudi plan, that would not have changed anything in the current Arab situation; the Arab countries must arrange their affairs and their relations in a manner guaranteeing that they can assert their will in any negotiations on any of the plans set forth.

"To that," the Syrian official said, "add the fact that the Western world in general, headed by the United States and Western Europe, seems to be the prisoner of Israeli will, and is no longer taking the Arab role into consideration. The proof is that Europe has abandoned its reservations on the Camp David agreements, disregarding all Arab rejections of the two agreements.

"Therefore," added the official, "the problem does not lie in the Saudi plan or the 'ideas' that Prince Fahd expressed. The problem goes beyond all that and has become a matter of the Arab countries' responsibility with respect to the issue of the struggle with Israel - a subject the Fez summit would not have discussed."

The question is, will the Syrian stand of opposition to Prince Fahd's plan result in tensions in Syrian-Saudi relations?

In Damascus it is plain that the Syrian-Saudi dispute will not lead to a rupture between the two countries. During the marches that were launched to condemn the explosion in the al-Izbikiyah section it was observed that some demonstrators raised anti-Saudi posters, holding Saudi Arabia responsible for what had happened. However, people carrying bullhorns distanced themselves from the posters that dealt with Saudi Arabia. Some people read in that a Syrian initiative to keep the crack in the dispute between the two countries from widening, in spite of the tension that has gripped Saudi-Syrian relations. A Syrian official says that the Syrian-Saudi dispute would stay within a specific perspective and would in no case depart from that.

That means that the fine line of relations between Damascus and Riyadh has not been severed. There are people who say in Damascus that it never will be. One must bear in mind that it is difficult to predict the future of Arab relationships, especially since the recent past has brought surprises that had not been taken into account.

11987
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ACHIEVEMENTS OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES DISCUSSED

Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 30 Dec 81 p 3

[Text]

The Military Construction Establishment (MCE) will have completed 350 projects totalling LS 1,500 m (\$380 m) by the end of 1981. A sister company, the Military Housing Establishment (MHE), reported recently that it was working on projects totalling LS 1,100 m (\$278 m).

Together with the Syrian Arab Construction Company, the two recently won a LS 500 m (\$127 m) contract to build 8,000 flats in Aleppo.

Syria is not unusual in creating public sector companies to carry out government development schemes. The involvement of the military is rarer but by no means unknown elsewhere — China's People's Liberation Army has long been proud of its contributions to development. But Syria is possibly unique in establishing military-run companies with most of the characteristics of civilian — albeit state-owned-firms.

Established in 1972, MCE was one of the first public sector construction companies to be set up in the face of serious delays in carrying out

government projects. Until then small government projects were built by local private companies, while larger schemes were awarded to specialized foreign firms.

In both cases, many schemes suffered from chronic delays and bad implementation, with many projects abandoned in mid-stream. Syrians blame this on the "dishonesty" of both local and foreign capitalists. In particular, they say that a number of European companies abandoned contracts after collecting millions of pounds in advance payments.

The newly-formed public sector companies at first worked on completing projects abandoned by private contractors. MCE, for example, has almost finished a textile plant in Idlib started by an Italian company. Since then, however, they have increasingly become prime contractors.

The decree establishing MCE granted it corporate identity and financial and administrative independence, though it is under the ultimate authority of the Defence Ministry. It was given the task

of studying and implementing projects and engineering works for the Defence Ministry and, more significantly, any other branch of the public sector. Its managing director is General Mahmoud al-Kurdi, who has a doctorate in engineering.

In less than 10 years, MCE has carried out some of Syria's most important development schemes. The largest is the Tartous cement plant, the biggest in the Middle East. It

was built by MCE jointly with the General Establishment for Major Projects, with technical help from German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Other major schemes carried out by the company include a modern flour mill at Der'a, a medical institute and courts building in Aleppo, a government office complex in Hama and a pharmaceuticals factory at Dimas, near Damascus.

Public sector construction companies should become more specialized, both in the kind of work they do and its geographical distribution, Al-Kurdi says. He proposes that companies should be restricted to work within a 100-kilometre radius of their bases. This would improve administration of projects and make better use of equipment and labour.

The labour problem has been Al-Kurdi's biggest headache. In its nine years, the company has lost some 12,000 skilled

workers to private sector or foreign rivals — equal to its total present employment. This happened despite laws which attempt to prevent workers from leaving public sector jobs without permission. Al-Kurdi blames high salary differentials between public sector employers with strict financial controls and private employers with no such restraints.

Another problem has been inadequate capitalization, as the work of the company has grown. Profits have been ploughed back into fixed assets, creating a shortage of working capital. Al-Kurdi suggests that the government form a specialized bank to finance the working capital needs of all public sector construction companies.

An achievement that Al-Kurdi is particularly proud of is MCE's virtual self-sufficiency in building materials for its projects. With the exception of steel and cement, the company produces all its materials — including furniture for the homes it builds. In addition, MCE's workshops have sold surplus production amounting to LS 52 m (\$13 m).

Like many developing countries, Syria has found that her military provides an island of relative efficiency in a sea of bureaucratic red tape. But in creating her military-run companies, Syria has gone further than most in exploiting this asset.

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS NOTED

Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 6 Jan 82 p 5

[Text]

The growth of industry in recent years is perhaps the most striking facet of Syria's transformation from an essentially agricultural country to one with an economy finely balanced between agriculture, heavy industry and light industry. The transformation has been accomplished within an avowedly socialist frame-work, although anyone who has seen the metalworkers of Aleppo hammering out spare parts for cars and tractors from almost anything they can lay their hands on can see that the spirit of private enterprise is far from dead. The result has been a proliferation of state-run projects, ranging from steel mills, cement works, fertilizer plants and power stations to sugar refineries, textile factories and a tractor assembly plant.

The foreign involvement in these projects has been considerable. In the end, they are designed to be run by Syrians and maintained by them, but a succession of problems, concerning lack of manpower and technical skill, have in the short term intensified foreign involvement. In general, it remains true to say that while Syria's industries offer hope, inefficiency over their

establishment has all too often turned them in to a drain on immediate resources. Indeed it was largely because this problem required rectification that President Assad swore in a largely technocratic government in January 1980.

July saw a happier event for Syrian industry: the start of test runs at the £ Syr1,000 m (\$ 255 m) ammonia urea factory in Homs. The factory will use naptha from the Homs refinery to produce 1,000 tonnes of ammonia a day. Of this, 400 tonnes will be exported, while the remaining 600 tonnes will be used to help produce 1,050 tonnes of urea, for use as fertilizer.

Up to 80 per cent of this urea is earmarked for export. Test runs were completed in October after 30,000 tonnes of urea had been produced successfully and it was hoped that fertilizer exports would begin shortly afterwards. The factory, built by France's Creusot Loire in association with the American Pullman Kellogg company, was completed in late 1979, but lack of Syrian specialists delayed operations at the plant. The plant is capable of conversion to natural gas, and will eventually be fed from the gas pipeline network to be built

in northeast Syria.

Syria's other major fertilizer project, the triple super-phosphate (tsp) factory in Homs, was also subject to delays between completion of building work and commencement of actual production. However, trials began in March and full production was scheduled to begin in the last week of October. The \$180m factory was built by Romania's Industrialexport and is able to process 800,000 tonnes of phosphate a year, 450,000 tonnes of tsp. Production from the two Homs fertilizer plants will turn Syria into a significant fertilizer exporter. In addition, Syria's own phosphate mines, at Khneifis and As Sharkiya, should produce between them some three million tonnes of unprocessed phosphate, most of which will be sold abroad. Eventually, phosphate and fertilizer exports look set to replace oil as Syria's major source of foreign exchange.

Syria's need to expand its industrial base has led to a series of studies on the country's domestic steel industry. Consumption of reinforced steel profiles is estimated at 700,000 tonnes per year over the next five years, while domestic production from the country's only steel mill is just 120,000 tonnes of steel bars. An Indian company Mecon Industries, earlier this year submitted a report recommending construction of a one million

tonne a year integrated steel plant which would use domestic ores. Syria's proved deposits include 500 million tonnes of low-grade ore and exploration for high grades is continuing. At the same time, plans to double the capacity of the Hama plant have not been dropped.

In one important sector, cement production, Syria finally looks likely to achieve its ambition to become a net exporter. In 1980, Syria's consumption of cement totalled about three million tonnes, but, despite the start up of new plants at Aleppo, Muslimiya and Adra between 1977 and 1979, production only totalled 2,350,000 tonnes. None the less, after a year of delays, the new one million-tonne-a year cement works at Tartous look set to start production in the near future. In addition, the new Shaikh Said cement works at Aleppo should be producing at the 500,000 tonne-a year level by the end of 1981, while eventually it will be capable of producing one million tonnes a year.

In light industry a number of projects came to fruition in the late 1970s. These were mainly to provide substitutes for imports, and consisted of local assembly of models designed elsewhere. Thus Syria joined with the Spanish company, Motor Iberica, to produce medium-sized tractors in Aleppo. But problems arose in the spring of 1981, when the

Syrians, who provide three quarters of the Al-Furat joint company's capital, sought to increase the amount of Syrian manufactured parts in the product.

In one sector, however, plans for expansion seem likely to be carried through. Syria has long had a reputation as a textile producer, ever since the days when the nation's gave its name to the silk brocade known as damask. The Syrian-Libyan company for Industrial and Agricultural Investments has commissioned a feasibility study for a textile factory near Homs to produce 14 million meters of pure Syrian cotton fabrics, together with cotton-polyester products.

In addition, the General Organization of Textile Industries has just bought 239 new weaving looms from the Swiss company Sulzer for factories in Damascus. Ironically, while the country's wealth is likely, with Libyan finance, to give a boost to the country's clothing industry, the fate of its more traditional handicrafts is in doubt. In 1969, a factory producing hand-loomed pure silk in the old quarter of Damascus still employed 375 people. Today it employs just 53. It is the last such factory in Syria and according to its proprietors, the Naasan family, it may close down in two years because they can no longer find enough young men to take up an arduous, albeit rewarding, profession.

FOOD CONSERVATION EFFORT SUCCESSFUL

Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 11 Jan 82 p 3

[Article by Abdullah Shehadeh]

[Text]

The food industry is considered one of the most important branches of industry not only in Syria but anywhere in the world. For in addition to ensuring the availability of foodstuffs for consumers, the food industry helps peasants in marketing their crops. A few months ago, peasants in some Syrian governorates, particularly in Dara'a, had trouble in marketing some crops, particularly tomatoes and grapes. This crisis stemming from the lack of a sufficient number of food factories, led to the damage and loss of a big quantity of agricultural crops.

Syria today has three factories for the conservation of agricultural crops located in the governorates of Damascus, Dara'a and in the Jebleh district in Lattakia.

The Jebleh factory, also called "al-Sahel Company for the Conservation of Foodstuffs", was established in 1973 and started operation in the same year. The aim of the factory is to industrialize the surplus crops produced in the governorate of Lattakia and to organize their marketing, both locally and for purposes. The factory has also helped in

combating unemployment by means of offering jobs for over 200 persons.

Tomatoes, apricots and peas are the three main crops the factory processes. In 1980, the factory's production of these foodstuffs was 1000 tonnes of tomatoes, 400 tonnes of apricots and 350 tonnes of peas. Other foodstuffs such as broad beans and okra are also processed in the factory. The actual annual production of the factory ranges from 2500 to 2700 tonnes of all kinds of foodstuffs.

In 1980, the Jebleh factory for foodstuffs conservation processed surplus crops of apricots and tomatoes of the Lattakia governorate. The governorate's production for that year was estimated at 2500 tonnes of tomatoes and 200 tonnes of apricots.

In some cases, the factory buys the crops it needs such as peas from other governorates like Homs and Damascus.

In spite of the large quantities of surplus crops, they were all saved from damage through the efforts exerted by the staff of the factory. Within seventeen days over 2000 tonnes of the various crops were processed.

The factory ensures the availability of the main crops such as tomatoes and apricots with the help of the General Company of Vegetables and Fruits as well as some peasants associations. It receives these crops regularly and processes them on the same day they are received lest they are spoiled. The factory pays higher prices to peasants than the merchants of the private sector pay them.

The major part of the factory's production is marketed by the General Consumer Establishment. The factory arranges for the marketing of the other part.

In 1980, cold storage was arranged for the factories production. In the same year, profits of the factory totalled over L.S one million. About L.S

two million have also been allocated to develop the factory and to improve its technical standard. It is expected that over 95 per cent of the factory's production plan will be achieved.

Jebbeh's factory for foodstuffs conservation is considered an outstanding achievement in the field of the food industry. Through this factory, peasants in the coastal area will no longer have trouble in marketing their crops. Consumers, on the other hand, will not suffer from the shortage of conserved foodstuffs. The factory will also help the government save a lot of the hard currency which formerly used to be paid to import foodstuffs from foreign countries.

CSO: 4400/117

BRIEFS

ALEPPO BUDGET APPROVED--Aleppo (SANA)--The Council of Aleppo governorate approved Tuesday its 1982 budget which amounted to LS 128 million. Around LS 42 million were earmarked for the municipality projects and LS 53 million were allocated for road projects in the villages of the governorate. [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 30 Dec 81 p 2]

ALEPPO INVESTMENTS REVIEWED--Aleppo. (SANA)--The volume of investment projects in the fifth five-year plan of the governorate of Aleppo amounts to LS 2.293 billion, the governor of Aleppo, Mr. Nihad al-qadi, said in a statement given to SANA. Around LS 580 million have been allotted for carrying out the construction of 5,000 classrooms for elementary schools, 1024 classrooms for preparatory and secondary schools, a teachers training Institutes and five technical schools. Another LS 128.6 million have been allotted for the completion of health projects at different hospitals of the governorate, the construction of ten clinics in different parts of the governorate, and the establishment of a male nursing school. As for water projects, the governor said that an amount of LS 243 million has been earmarked for supplying sufficient irrigation and potable water. Concerning road construction, over LS 243 million have been allotted for the construction of 350 kms. In the field of social affairs and labour, more than LS 41 million will be spent on completing the construction of the institutes for social care, on building a school for disabled children, seven workshops and a marketing exhibition for carpets. As for as culture is concerned, LS 17 million were allocated for building an art exhibition, a center for applied arts, and three cultural centers. An amount of LS 6.6 million was allotted for public works and water resources. The governor concluded that not less than LS 1.166 billion will be spent by the municipality of Aleppo on road construction, building of parks and squares, and health care. [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 6 Jan 82 p 2]

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